作者：刘少波
出版社：暨南大学出版社
格式: AZW3, DOCX, EPUB, MOBI, PDF, TXT
改革、转型与增长国际论坛=InternationalEconomicForumonReform，TransitionandGrowth试读：
前言
2014年，经暨南大学经济学院与俄罗斯莫斯科国立罗蒙诺索夫大学，匈牙利布达佩斯考文纽斯大学，塞尔维亚贝尔格莱德亚洲研究中心、贝尔格莱德政治研究所进行协商，为建立长期的交流与合作，决定共同打造一个高端的学术交流平台，定期举办学术会议，一年一届，轮流由各单位承办，通过这种方式来加深彼此间的了解，在教学、科研等方面开展合作，促进共同发展。
2015年11月7日，由暨南大学，俄罗斯莱蒙诺索夫莫斯科国立大学，匈牙利布达佩斯考文纽斯大学，塞尔维亚贝尔格莱德亚洲研究中心、贝尔格莱德政治研究所共同主办，暨南大学经济学院承办的“第一届改革、转型与增长国际论坛”在中国广州召开。来自7个国家和地区的经济学者、暨南大学经济学院师生150多人参加了论坛。论坛得到成功举办，受到各参与单位的一致肯定。会后，经主办单位之间的商议，决定将本次论坛会议论文结集出版，作为一项重要的会议成果。
本次会议举办得到了中国暨南大学，俄罗斯莱蒙诺索夫莫斯科国立大学，匈牙利布达佩斯考文纽斯大学，塞尔维亚贝尔格莱德亚洲研究中心、贝尔格莱德政治研究所等四国五校（所）领导的大力支持，暨南大学经济学院师生也付出了辛勤劳动，在此一并致以谢意。
本论文集的出版也得到了暨南大学经济学院蒲华林、罗勇辉、翁雍容三位老师以及李祯钰、彭姗姗两位硕士研究生的大力支持，他们为该论文集的出版承担了许多工作，感谢他们的付出。最后还要感谢暨南大学出版社为本书所提供的高水平的出版服务。论坛组委会2016年5月
Preface
Based on the consensus of long-term communication and cooperation, a high-end academic platform was established in 2014 under the joint effort of the Economic College of Jinan University, Moscow State University, Corvinus University of Budapest, Center for Asian Studies and Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade. In pursuit of common development, annual conferences will be organized by these universities and institutes each year in turn to further mutual understanding and cooperation in teaching and research.
Hosted by Jinan University, Moscow State University, Corvinus University of Budapest, and Center for Asian Studies and Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade, organized by the Economic College of Jinan University, the first International Economic Forum on Reform, Transition and Growth was held in Guangzhou, China on November 7th, 2015. Economists from seven countries and areas, along with over 150 teachers and students of the Economic College of Jinan University, attended the forum. The forum turned out to be a success, and it was decided that all the papers on the forum should be collected and published as an important achievement.
Our sincere gratefulness goes to the support on the forum from leaders of Jinan University in China, Moscow State University in Russia, Corvinus University of Budapest in Hungary, Center for Asian Studies and Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade, Serbia, etc., as well as teachers and students in the Economic College of Jinan University.
The publication of the essays benefitted from the help of Professor Pu Hualin, Doctor Luo Yonghui, Weng Yongrong, and Li Zhenyu (graduate student), Peng Shanshan (graduate student) in the Economic College of Jinan University. Lastly, we would like to thank Jinan University Press for their excellent service.Organizing Committee of the ForumMay, 2016
The Barriers to Innovation and Technological Progress in a Renascent Market Economy
Balázs Hámori(Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary)1. Introduction
At the beginning of the transition period-like in other Eastern-European countries-great expectation took place in Hungary concerning the evolving market economy.Hungarians gained very positive experiences on the experimentations with some elements of market economy in the early 1980s, many years before the change of regime.As a consequence of property rights reforms, people could launch new private entrepreneurships and small collective (1)entrepreneurships (GMK) in the SME-sector. Inside the state-owned companies also some opportunities were opened for the partly (2)independent entrepreneur-type VGMKs. The expanding private ownership, evolving the free entrepreneurship in the SMEs and autonomous working groups inside the state-owned companies, to some extend served as a salve for the genetic ills of command economy (the shortage, the weak motivation for work, the inefficiency of all types of economic processes). Many innovative ideas have surfaced, and the strong financial motivation enabled overcoming the shortage-related problems by innovation in this restricted area of the (3)SMEs.After the changes one would logically expect that switching to a real market economy would lead to the appreciation of R&D activity and innovations in general.
2. Literature review
The above expectations concerning the market economy seemed to be well-based by the theory too, since the market economy by (4)definition is innovative economy, it differs from all other economic systems in this regard (Baumol, 2002; Kornai, 2010;North, Wallis & Weingast, 2006; Steedman & Metcalfe, 2013). Paradoxically, the innovation activities in the CEE countries did not increase, rather decreased after the changes.
It is a common-place, that innovation plays a key role in diving GDP growth, and the general development of societies, and its determining role is strengthening permanently.(Aghion & Howitt, 1992;Huw & Roberts, 2002;Li & Florida, 2008;OECD, 2012a;Romer, 1994;Ulku, 2004)Therefore, the fall of the R&D expenditures and the weakening innovation activities of national firms of the CEE countries in the 1990s (Varga, 2007), as a result of switching to the new economic system, can be considered as an anomaly in every way.
According to OECD data, all transitional economies have experienced cuts in R&D expenditures since the beginning of reforms, in absolute terms and in relation to GDP (Radosevic & Auriol, 1999; European Commission, 1994). The European economies in transition were, indeed, the only part of the world that experienced a substantial decline in R&D activity in the first half of 1990s. The OECD data shows 173that the largest fall was recorded for industrial R&D. (Urem, 1999)
The dramatic cut of the R&D did not eliminate only the unproductive “quasior pseudo-researches” of planned economy, but also a considerable part of hopeful and fruitful scientific and technological sources, including the very valuable human capital and its accumulated knowledge.This was a late version of “enclosure”, that resulted a great loss of human resources.
Drastic transformations of national R&D systems in this geographic area have been accompanied by inevitable losses, not just of their obsolete components, as widely described in the international 153literature…(Gokhberg, 1999)
During the two and a half decades that has passed since 1990, private property has become dominant, multitudes of global firms have settled in the Hungary like in all other CEE-countries. As a result of EU membership achieved in 2004, essentially the same economic regulations work in Hungary than in the old EU member states. Yet, we are still unable to cope with the well-known ills of the command economy: the lack of motivation for initiatives of economic actors, relatively low competitiveness and lowering Total Factor Productivity (Kátay & Wolf, 2008), and weak innovativeness. The international organizations in their various documents judge the sluggishness of technological development and innovation as quite serious. This statement is supported by evaluations of the latest comprehensive OECD Country Report of Hungarian Innovation Policy that is valid even today:
The overall level of innovation activity as measured by most standard indicators of innovation input, output and even technology diffusion (such as ICT-related indicators) has remained comparatively low in the economy at large. The weakness in recorded innovation activity seems to be at least partly due to the fact that much of the observed innovation activity and research and development (R&D) in particular are concentrated in some large, export-oriented, often foreign-owned enterprises, operating in a limited number of manufacturing industries, and-to a lesser extent-in some parts of the services sector. In contrast, a vast number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) record no or only feeble innovation activity. What seems to be lacking is a strong segment of the medium-sized innovation-oriented firms which play an important role in many of the 61more innovative OECD-countries. (OECD, 2008)
Though the foreign owned firm do considerable researches in the CEE countries, and especially in Hungary, the gap between the developed countries and the CEE-region in terms of innovation continues to increase.
MNC innovation brings few benefits to domestic enterprises. Despite massive foreign direct investment into the region, and the introduction of modern production and management methods, there have not been sufficient “spillovers” of technology and “know-how” into the domestic economy…The CEE region has underperformed and will continue to do so…Improving innovation performance requires an increase in direct inputs-such as R&D spending, better science [2]education and IT infrastructure. (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2008)
In the next sections we try to analyze the innovation related issues, focusing on Hungary.
3. Weakness of Hungarian innovation potential in the light of the latest data
As a method for analysis we use the statistical data offered by international organization and theoretical generalization of the facts can be founded in the literature.
Hungary's innovation potential in regards to its spending on R&D is problematic not only in comparison to the developed countries, but also to most of the CEE countries, as it is seen in Fig.1. In 2012, only one EU member country, Romania, spent less of its GDP on innovation than Hungary. In addition, the R&D spending and the higher education expenditures by the state compared to the GDP had decreased for 2012 in comparison to 2007, which had only occurred in a handful of OECD countries. A larger decline in the above index has only occurred in one country, in Israel. However, in this Middle East country, state R&D spending is much higher in proportion to the total R&D spending than in Hungary. The suppression of state R&D spending in proportion of the GDP is still hardly justifiable, even if as a (5)result of this the ratio of the BERD and the GERD indexes have improved, and the weight of the business sector's spending within the total R&D spending have increased, which previously was quite low in Hungary. The decline in the state support of innovation is especially critical in an era, in which the transformation of the technological basis of the economy is moved by innovations, and all other phenomena originate from innovations. Today, in a normally functioning modern economy, especially in the developed countries, 60-80 percentage of the growth in the gross domestic product GDP is provided by innovation.Fig. 1 HERD and GOVERD, as a percEntage of GDP, 2012, and toal HERD and GOVERD in 2007Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators Database.June 2014.www.oecd.org/sti/msti;Eurostat and UNESCO Institute of Statistics.June 2014.
The low contribution of the total factor productivity to the economic growth, which is still quite low even compared to other Central and Eastern European countries, indicates the weaknesses of technological development and in connection with it the weaknesses of innovation (see Fig.2). Furthermore, this ratio also shows a declining trend, and during the global crisis it slipped straight into the negative territory. As it is well known, technological growth and efficiency are regarded as two of the biggest sub-sections of total factor productivity, and the weaknesses of these apparent in Fig.2 can be considered critical from the perspective of the Hungarian economy's competitiveness.**Fig. 2 The contribution of various factors of production to the economic growth in Hungary and in the Central and Eastern European countriesNotes: *Unweighted average of other Central and Easten European countries(Czech Republic, Poland and Slovak Republic).**Contributions to growth are calculated using a weight of 0.67 for potential employment and 0.33 for productive capital;total factor productivity is calculated as a residual.Productive capital excludes investment in housing.while potential employment abstracts from cyclical variations in the labour force and unemploymnet.Source: OECD.OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections(database), December 2013.
In regards to competitiveness, during the past one and a half decades the situation has not improved, on the contrary it has become (6)worse: in 2001 we still ranked 32nd place, in 2006 only the 41st in (7)the global competitiveness rankings, and since then we have slid down a lot. Currently, we are ranked at the 63rd position in the (8)rankings of the World Economic Forum. Behind the decline in competitiveness we can again suspect the weakness of innovation, since competitiveness is strongly related to innovation. So even, if our dramatic sliding down in the competitiveness rankings is not only caused by the lack of innovation, it is still one of the determining factors of the deterioration we experience in this area.
Based on the above facts and data we should state, that the political-economic transformation in Hungary just partially was accompanied by a“technological transformation”: a rapid and unambiguous switch from a sterile, peculiar industrial society (9)to“information capitalism” (commonly known as information society (10)or knowledge based society).
The share of innovative enterprises in Hungary is among the lowest in the EU, 32%, which is about half of the leading EU countries' similar indicator (see Fig.3). In addition, the vast majority of innovative companies are foreign owned firms, and the innovation activities of the SMEs are also sporadic, if we exclude the barefoot or jugaad (11)innovations that are not included in the EU and OECD and national surveys either.Fig. 3 Share of innovative enterprises in the EU, 2010-2012Source: ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6483064/9-21012015-BP-EN.pdf/ad7e4bf6-fc8f-459b-a47e-da1c9043bf2e.
In the case of almost all indicators related to innovation we remain significantly below the EU average according to the IUS report of 2015 (see Fig.4). Although the new Central and Eastern European member countries are considerably dragging down the EU average, compared to the average of the old EU members our lag is even more significant.
As it is seen in Fig.4 in regards to the in-house innovations of SMEs we only reach 38% of the EU average. Out of the 33 indicators and indicator groups, that are also present in the European Innovation Scoreboard, we only surpass the EU average by a meaningful margin in three cases, not to mention that one of our above average indicators is somewhat misleading. In regards to the export of knowledge intensive sectors we are exceeding the EU average by 25%.Fig. 4 The development of the sub-indexes determining the innovation performance compared to the EU average(EU-average=100)Source: Innovation Union Scoreboard, 2015: 61.
In reality however, we can only classify this type of export into the knowledge intensive sector statistically, since in the high-tech industries we actually carry out assembly tasks which mostly do not (12)require any particular skills, while generating little added value. The only truly outstanding indicator is the license and patent revenues from abroad. However, it is less pleasing that since 2010 this indicator has declined significantly, but it is still outstanding.
All above facts and data bring up there search questions inevitably: How efficient system alternative the “existing” market economy is, if Hungary has been unable to strengthen considerably the innovativeness of its economy and to overcome, or at least considerably moderate its technological backwardness in comparison to developed countries or even to the EU-average during the last 25 years? What reasons are behind the shortcomings of innovation activities, that are reflected in the above presented data and facts?
4. The institutional determinants of innovations
Without the complex analysis of the institutional arrangement in the case of Hungary we cannot provide an answer to the above questions, and we would be unable to explain why technological progress and innovation had not really accelerated, why economic development-as a consequence of the above shortcomings-came to a halt from time and time again (see Fig.5).Fig. 5 Change in real GDP, HungarySource: https: //www.quandl.com/.../hungary/hungary-gdp-growt.
Certainly, in this short paper we cannot attempt to provide a thorough analysis of the working institutional system, and we are formulating only two fundamental statements:
Thesis 1: The formal implementation of market economic institutions-from competition regulations through progressive income tax to strict consumer protection rules-does not mean the efficient workings of those. Naturally, only the efficient and working market institutions enable and foster the innovation activities.
Thesis 2: In terms of complex institutional system, Hungary has not yet departed from that institutional arrangement, which is characterized by the lack of (or strongly limited) real competition for resources, and which is called by North and his co-authors (North et (13)al., 2006) as “limited access society”.
New technologies and innovations-as several institutional (14)economists and economy historians convincingly proved it - do not appear and spread in a society accidentally, rather they are the consequences of the complexity of social relations. It is important to emphasize that innovation is socially constructed, there is innovation only, where the social climate allows it. János Kornai(2010) in his book considers five preconditions necessary for inventions and scientific achievements to become innovation: ① decentralized initiative, individual autonomy and freedom; ②enormous reward for the innovators including fame and moral recognition; ③competition; ④free experimentation, and the acceptance of failures that come with that; ⑤free unengaged money waiting to be invested (40-41). All such social arrangements that lack these interlinked elements are not suitable for further development.
Numerous foreign and domestic researchers have sought (and found) connection between innovation and the social environment (Hollanders & Arundel, 2007: Havas, 2009;Bartha, 2007) and we could continue listing them. Our approach is perhaps somewhat special in that regard that-following Kornai and North-we do not emphasize one or another, or perhaps several accentuated factors, rather we highlight the interrelation between them.
Economists have thoroughly documented that no one factor explains economic development-not capital accumulation, human capital, resource endowments, international trade, or geographical location to name a few prominent examples. Instead, the complex ways that societies structure human relationships-the institutions that shape economic, political, religious, and other interactions-appear to be the key to understanding why some societies are capable of sustained economic and political development.(North, Wallis & [3]Weingast, 2006)
The extent of capital accumulation or the human resources of the country by themselves do not explain neither the fast, nor the dragging, crisis burdened development in any county.In case of Hungary, behind the almost complete set of the formal market economic institutions are standing the vestigial real market economic institutions, numerous institutions are only existing as hollow frames, which are by far only partially filled with real content.(Sajó, 2008;Fleck, 2008;Krekó-P Kiss; 2007;Szántó-Tóth, 2008;Tátrai, 2006;Belyó, 2008) Under the term institution we do not mean the operational rules declared or formally legislated, rather we use this term in the sense of (15)Schotter's classical definition, according to which, we qualify the institutional system emphatically based on real, observable regularities, and not on declared rules that are rarely upheld by many. Numerous elements of the “streamlined” market economic institutions introduced after the change of regimes and the EU accession in Hungary, do not work efficiently: Quite a significant part of these real interactions are taking place through crossing these frames or partially or completely circumventing them. The formal and the real institutional systems throughout the years and decades have not got closer, indeed in a certain sense they have got further apart from each other.
And the dog is buried exactly there! Behind the formal behavioral rules similar to those in developed market economies stand radically different behavioral patterns and regularities. If we examine more closely what reasons are behind the failure to assimilate to the developed innovative economies, we find the following real objective and behavioral factors, which are evidently not independent of each other. (Tab.1)Tab.1 The explanatory factors of the Hungarian economy's weak innovativeness
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