作者：胡适
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胡适英文论著：中国外交试读：
Is There a Substitute for Force in International Relations?
International Conciliation: Special Bulletin
New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1916. 15 pages.Ⅰ
The question "Is there a substitute for force in international relations" implies a serious ambiguity which, if not clearly understood at the outset, will greatly hamper our understanding of the real issue involved. Those who raise this question really mean by "force," not force qua force, but only the frequent and unrestrained resort to armed force for settlement of international disputes. But the way in which the question is put not only begs the question from a logical standpoint, but also seriously obscures the real meaning intended by the questioner. For the wording"a substitute for force" seems to suggest that the substitute to be sought is to be antithetically opposed to force—is to be devoid of force. Such a substitute there is none. For, in the words of Mr. John A. Hobson, "there is no display of moral force in any act of human conduct which does not make some use of physical force as its instrument."
This point will become clear if we consider a doctrine which is commonly supposed to be diametrically opposed to force, namely, the doctrine of non-resistance. When this doctrine is advocated, it is very often confronted by two sets of questions. Its advocate is asked either, "What would you do if you saw your wife or your sister attacked by a criminal?" or, "Did not Christ himself use force when he drove the venders and moneychangers out of the temple of God?"It is regrettable that the zeal of the non-resister often makes him blind to the truth underlying these questions. The first question implies that the problem of force cannot be solved by any sweeping condemnation of its use, but must be considered in relation to the specific and concrete circumstances which demand the application or the non-application of force. The second question points clearly to the fact that the Christian command "Resist not evil" does not necessarily mean a condemnation of force as such. It seems that the doctrine of non-resistance may be interpreted as another way of saying "Vengeance belongs to God." The question is not, whether force is condemnable or justifiable, but, whether the administering of justice should be done by the interested parties themselves or by some higher and impartial power.
In recent discussions on this doctrine, it has been often pointed out that this principle implies no total denial of force, but only a firm belief that the attitude of passivity is capable of leading the offender or the criminal into repentance and goodness. It is this belief which has led some writers to call this doctrine that of "super-resistance" or "effective resistance." "The non-resistance doctrine,"says Professor John Dewey, "can only mean that given certain conditions, passive resistance is a more effective means of resistance than overt resistance would be."
I have indulged at some length in discussing the doctrine of non-resistance, because I believe that much of the vagueness and confusion in current discussion of international problems has been due to a misunderstanding of the real nature and place of force in human society. The point I wish to make clear by the foregoing discussion is that it is futile to look for an international policy which shall not involve a use of force; that even the so-called doctrine of non-resistance is not really a condemnation of force as such; and that the search for a "substitute for force" can only mean seeking a substitute for the most crude form and most wasteful use of force.Ⅱ
What is wrong with the international situation is not that force prevails, but that force does not prevail. In the present war, we are witnessing the most stupendous manifestation of force that has ever happened in human history. And yet what has this tremendous display of force so far accomplished? Has the twenty-one months' world war resulted in more than a deadlock on all battle-fronts? Will all the unprecedentedly great sacrifices of lives and property, all defeat and victory, be able to settle any of the questions which somehow drove the nations into this war two years ago? The truth is that the nations have not yet learned how to make force really count for something in international relations. They have only been lavishing their available forces in a most wasteful manner with the least returns.
Why has force of such an unprecedented magnitude yet been unable to secure peace and order, to achieve the ends for which such force was manifestly intended? Because force has not been efficiently used, because it has been wastefully applied. Force cannot prevail, if it is unorganized, unregulated and undirected. Under existing conditions, force is employed to resist force, or, more correctly speaking, force is so employed as to create for itself hosts of rival forces. The result has been a mutual cancelment of force: both the acting force and that acted upon are wasted in this process of mutual resistance and annulment.
Our problem, therefore, is not to condemn force in toto , nor yet to seek for any substitute-policy which will involve no use of force, but to find a way to make force actually prevail, that is, to avoid the wasteful use of it which leads nowhere but to self-exhaustion and annihilation. The solution of our problem lies in the organizing of the existing forces of the nations in such a manner as to minimize resistance or friction and to insure maximum economy and efficiency in their expenditure.
The experience of mankind in gradually passing from the lawless state of the savages into the civilized state of government by law, is the best illustration of the way in which isolated and conflicting forces or energies are gradually organized for the economical and efficient direction of human activities. "Law,"says Professor Dewey, "is a statement of the conditions of the organization of energies which, when unorganized, would conflict and result in violence—that is, destruction or waste." The reign of law simply means a state of conditions where our conduct is governed by, to use a recent expression of President Wilson,"a prescribed course of duty and respect for the rights of others which will check any selfish passion of our own, as it will check any aggressive impulse of theirs." It is this "statement" or "prescription" of the rules of conduct that enables men to avoid the wasteful expenditure of force which would necessarily result if the activities and energies of men were allowed to run wild and clash with one another.
Unfortunately, what mankind has at last learned to practice within the nations themselves, has not yet to any considerable extent found its way into the realm of international dealings. What is termed international law to-day is only a little way in advance of what may be called the stage of regulated dueling. The few provisions for pacific settlement of international disputes have not been extensively applied by the nations, and fourteen years' reign of international law under the Hague Conventions has not only failed to avert the present world calamity, but also failed to effectively regulate the conduct of war in the relations both between the belligerents themselves and between belligerents and neutrals.
Since the outbreak of the present war, however, there has developed, especially in the English-speaking world, a fairly wide recognition of the fact that the only way to safeguard civilization from repeating any such calamity lies in some international arrangement or organization for pacific and judicial settlement of disputes. Such opinion has found exponents not only in many of the publicists who have given thought to the international situation, but also in such official representatives of powerful states as Premier Asquith and President Wilson. The latter, in his speech before the League to Enforce Peace, declared his desire for "a universal association of nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent war, begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world."In short, many there are who have come to realize that the failure to organize the conflicting forces of the nations for some definite common purposes has been the fundamental cause of international strife, insecurity and war; and they have also realized that such stupendous waste of energy, vitality and resources as we witness to-day, cannot be prevented until there is found some method of direction and organization for a less wasteful and therefore more efficient expenditure of the force of the nations.Ⅲ
We have so far arrived at the conclusion that in order to make force work effectively in achieving the contemplated ends of peace and security, we must seek to convert the now isolated and conflicting energies of the nations into some organized form—into some form of international association under a prescribed course of reciprocal duties and rights. We may now consider the directions in which the future task of organizing the forces of nations may possibly and profitably proceed. Such a discussion can best be undertaken by reference to the present status and defects of the law of nations.
First, it seems that in the coming international arrangement, the scope of the category of justiciable disputes should be greatly enlarged. At present, only"disputes of an international nature involving neither honor nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of fact," are justiciable or arbitrable. This naturally excludes from the process of juridical settlement many of the disputes which are most likely to lead the nations into war. Furthermore, each nation is at liberty to declare "that in its opinion the dispute does not belong to the category of disputes which can be submitted to compulsory arbitration." Thus an insult to a flag may be a question of honor, and a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela may be a matter of vital interest to the United States.
It seems therefore necessary to the permanent interest of the world to gradually enlarge the category of justiciable disputes so that many of the cases now beyond the reach of international law may be made either arbitrable or at least subject to inquiry and conciliation by an international commission. In this connection, it is encouraging to note that the treaties negotiated by ex-Secretary of State Bryan with the several powers on the subject of an international commission of inquiry, provide that "all disputes between the contracting parties, of every nature whatever, which diplomacy shall fail to adjust, shall be submitted for investigation and report to an International Commission." It is to be hoped that this principle will find wider application in international law than it has hithertofore received. Without some such extension of jurisdiction, the law of nations can only "strain at a gnat and swallow a camel."
In the second place, the charge has often been made that international law is itself imperfect and uncertain, and does not cover the needs of the times. One illustration is the fact that international law has not been able to keep pace with the rapid increase of new weapons of warfare such as are being used in the present war. It is also silent on such important subjects as the definition of"spheres of influence" by certain powers in the "backward" states, or the definition of the so-called "war zones" in neutral territory by belligerents, neither of whom the suffering neutral is in a position to resist. It seems therefore evident that, in order that international law may guard itself against archaism and against evasion through its own loopholes, there must be frequent periodical revision and codification of the law, or, better still, some form of international legislature which shall periodically meet and progressively extend the law over fields which it does not now cover.
In the third place, the most serious weakness of international law is that it has no effective means of enforcement. Without enforcement, which Professor Roscoe Pound calls "the life of law," international law is not much more than a mere scrap of paper. Under existing conditions, a nation might refuse to submit a justiciable case to arbitration, or it might decline to accept or carry out an arbitral award which went against its interests. In case of unarbitrable disputes, a nation might refuse to submit to inquiry; it might actively prepare for eventual resort to arms during the prescribed period; or it might refuse a pacific settlement after the Commission has made its report. Any one of these recalcitrant acts will suffice to render a reign of law impossible.
To remedy this defect of the existing law of nations, it has been proposed that some kind of sanction should be provided in the form of a concerted use of the economic and military forces of the signatory powers against any transgressor of the law. There are certain obvious advantages in such an international organization of force. In the first place, it will avoid unnecessary duplication and waste. It is the indispensable condition of a general reduction of armaments: it will free the nations from the alleged necessity of each so arming itself as to be stronger than every other. Secondly, it will minimize the use of force. Where the object of employing force is clearly defined and understood, where, as some writer has put it, "all the cards are on the table," where a breach of public law carries with it a possibility of public punishment, there we have the beginning of a reliable structure to safeguard civilization from sudden and periodic breakdown. Thirdly, the combining of the forces of the nations for the enforcement of public law and maintenance of peace will perhaps have an educative value in inculcating the sentiments of international solidarity and good-will. At least it will tend to liberate the nations from those artificial barriers and prejudices which now prevail.Ⅳ
But, while readily admitting the advantages of an effective sanction of international law, we must not ignore the indispensable preliminary conditions without which no international organization can ever hope to succeed. One of these conditions is that there must be a sufficiently strong body of interests which demand the enforcement of the law. At present, there are a number of practical interests of an international nature. Of these we may mention commerce, finance, investment, communication, transportation, the freedom of the high seas, immigration and the exchange of labor. All these interests have long transcended national lines and have become what has been termed "trans-national" in character. National defence, too, has become a "trans-national" problem. No nation can now rely on its own isolated force for safety and for satisfaction of injured interests, violated honor and outraged justice. Interests of such an international or trans-national nature need only to be made articulate and conscious of their own needs in order to become a firm foundation on which to build an effective international structure.
But such interests alone are not sufficient. Government by law has not been created by private interests alone, but has come about as a result of many centuries of conscious thought and deliberation, of the development of political and legal philosophy. Likewise, international government by law and combined force cannot arise from practical interests and inarticulate needs alone. There must be a radical change of the attitude of nations towards one another: there must be a new political philosophy and a new jurisprudence. First, we must have a new theory of the sovereignty of the state. Instead of the old theory that sovereignty consists in freedom from external juridical responsibility, we shall teach that the sovereignty of a state is a right the existence and validity of which entirely depend upon a tacit or explicit recognition and respect on the part of the other nations. As a right valid only by reciprocal understanding and recognition, the sovereignty of the state is not impaired but strengthened by becoming a member of a society of sovereignties.
We must also, in this revolution in international thinking, gradually modify our nationalism. Instead of "Right or wrong, my country," we must regard the state as merely one of the many groups to which the individual belongs and which, to use the words of Professor Harold Laski, must "compete for his allegiance just like his church or race or trade union, and when conflict arises the choice of the individual must be made on moral grounds." Instead of exalting the nation-state "über Alles ," we must realize that the state is only a means to the well-being and free development of the individuals that compose it; and that whatever improvement of world-organization tends to enhance the safety of the state from external threats of aggression and destruction, is entitled to the devotion and support of every patriotic citizen.
Furthermore, there is needed a new conception of the nature, place and function of force in human society. While admitting the necessity and value of force as a means to a desired and desirable end—thus avoiding the one-sided condemnation of force in toto —we must realize that, if the forces of the world are not co-ordinated to a definite common purpose but are allowed to rival one another for superiority in magnitude and deadliness, then force cannot be used for productive ends and is of necessity squandered in the endless process of outpowering the rival forces. In order to avoid this resultant waste and sterility and in order to insure a maximum economy and efficiency, it is necessary to organize and direct the rival forces, not towards mutual resistance and therefore mutual cancelment, but towards the co-operative achievement of some positive ends of common interest. Force cannot be rationalized until its use is socialized or internationalized. Not until such a conception of force shall be widely popularized and intelligently applied to international as well as to national life, can there be a really reliable substitute for the present wasteful and destructive employment of force in international relations.
And, lastly, those who desire and work for a better international order will have constantly to fight against that inveterate habit of thinking which may be termed "historical fatalism." They are frequently reminded that deliberate planning and conscious effort have little or no place in determining the course and destiny of mankind. "The march of events rules and overrules human action,"—these memorable words of McKinley are frequently quoted in justification of groping and muddling in international affairs. Such determinism in political thinking practical idealism must repudiate and seek to replace. That the march of events rules and overrules human action is a frank declaration of the bankruptcy of statesmanship and human intelligence. It might find some justification in those olden times when one part of the world lived in complete isolation and ignorance of the other parts. But in these days when rapid transportation and almost instantaneous diffusion of intelligence have actually placed the entire earth "under our immediate notice, acquaintance and influence," in these days when we actually have at our command the equipment for the effective diagnosis and control of the international situation, it is only intellectual laziness and senility that still seeks to explain away political blunders by the fatalistic deus ex machina . Never before has traditional statesmanship—the statesmanship of drifting along with the tide of time and events—wrought so much devastation and suffering to the world. Never before has the possibility of conscious planning and control of international relations appeared so well within the power of human intelligence and resourcefulness. Shall we, then, again permit our statesmen to muddle through and be hurled along by "the march of events"—ever comforting ourselves with the thought: "After us, the millennium?"
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