作者：潘忠岐
出版社：复旦大学出版社
格式: AZW3, DOCX, EPUB, MOBI, PDF, TXT
从“随势”到“谋势”：中国的国际取向与战略选择试读：
Introduction
The relationship between China and world order had been a hot topic of debate among Chinese and Western scholars long before China coined the term of“peaceful rise”.The key to this question, for the rest of the world, is about how to integrate China into the international system, while for China itself, it is about how China should embrace the world.There is no fundamental difference between these two perspectives.But it has quickly changed into more specific and controversial questions since China has kept a continuous high-speed economic growth and articulated a peaceful rise strategy. From a foreign perspective, the questions now have become those as follows. Whether could China be accommodated by the current international system? Whether would China' s integration pose a challenge to existent world order? What role will China play in the process of building, maintaining and reforming world order？Will China become a revisionist state or a status quo power? From the Chinese perspective, however, the questions are that how China could achieve its national revival in its engagement with the international system, that how China could defuse international misgivings and pioneer a new path of peaceful rise, that how China could convince the international community to accept and adapt to China' s peaceful rise, and that how the world should embrace China.The divergence between those two perspectives has become increasingly prominent since the“China threat theory”was faked and renewed.
China' s original intention by initiating the notion of peaceful rise is to roll back the“China threat theory”rather than to propose a grand strategy for its national development. Nonetheless, out of China' s expectation, many foreign scholars cast doubt on the possibility of China' s peaceful rise and even argue that this term signifies that China is a revisionist state and a challenger to current world order.Interpretations of the term“peaceful rise”have shown a big contrast between the Chinese and foreigners.While the Chinese emphasize the first word —“peaceful”, many foreigners focus more on the second word —“rise”.Although China quickly changed the term“peaceful rise”to“peaceful development”, international observers did not follow suit.They continue to talk about“peaceful rise”, which has almost become their exclusive term because most Chinese scholars have already made a shift according to Chinese government' s official rhetoric.Since replacing the term of“peaceful rise”by“peaceful development”has simply little effect on converting many western scholars' deep-rooted bias towards China, here I would rather continue to use the concept of“peaceful rise”and try to find alternative ways to defuse their misgivings.
This book cannot answer all above-mentioned questions on the relationship between China and world order.Instead, it is designed to focus on only two questions with new perspectives. They are closely related.First, why will China not become a revisionist state or a challenger in existent world order? Second，how could China further its peaceful rise in the process of proactively engaging with the international system? The first question concerns China' s international orientation.China has always advocated to“establish a just and rational international political and economic order.”But, it is unfair and doubtful if somebody would define China as a revisionist state or a challenger in the international system just according to China' s such kind of policy announcements.Whether there exists a necessary causal relation between China' s rising power, as well as its ensued power shift, and China' s orientation of international engagement — taking either a revisionist course or a status quo one? And what is the mechanism of their interactions if yes? These questions deserve more serious and in-depth research from theoretical perspectives. The second question concerns China' s international strategy. China has arguably achieved its alleged peaceful rise, at least provisionally.The 2008 global financial crisis, as both a great challenge and a great opportunity, showed that China' s peaceful rise had embarked on a new historical stage.The question to be answered now is no longer whether China could make its peaceful rise, but why China could do this and whether, and how if yes，China would continue its great process of peaceful rise.A visionary and comprehensive theoretical thinking is in great need to look at what strategy China should have in order to further its peaceful rise.China' s international orientation and strategy are complementary. China' s international orientation is mainly determined by the fact that China cannot achieve its peaceful rise by challenging current world order.And, likewise, China' s international strategy should be made according to the fundamental guideline that China must further its peaceful rise by proactively integrating into and engaging with the international system.China' s international orientation and strategy must be in consistent.They thus could be regarded as two aspects of one question.
Relevant analyses have been done by many scholars elsewhere.What I want to do in this book is to introduce a few new concepts, by which I will try to search for China' s path of peaceful rise in its international engagement and answer the questions about China' s international orientation and strategy. Three concepts are involved: the“image gap”, the“geo-theory”, and the“S hi”.
The concept of“image gap”is what I coined.It signifies the tension of a state' s ideas on world order.A state' s image —its perceptions, evaluations, ideas, and visions of world order —usually consists of two parts: the realistic image that is reality-based, reflecting the actual situations of world order, and the ideational image that is vision-based, reflecting what ideational world order should be. More often than not, there are discrepancies between a state' s realistic image and ideational image.An“image gap”therefore exists in a state' s views on world order.And this“image gap”is continuously changing in the long run, though relatively stable in the short run.We cannot have a better understanding of a state' s relationship with world order solely relying on its basic image of world order in some specific historical period, no matter how comprehensive that the image might be.Comparatively, the dynamic changes of a state' s“image gap”towards world order could tell us more about a state' s relationship with, and attitude towards, world order in a longer historical period.I thus will retrospect China' s engagement with, benefits from and impacts on world order since PRC' s foundation in 1949 so as to assess the changing nature, extent, and tendency of China' s“image gap”.This analysis more convincingly explains why China will not take a role of a revisionist state or a challenger in current world order and why China' s positive interaction with the international system will be sustainable and lasting.This constitutes the first chapter of this book.
The concept of“geo-theory”is not totally brand new, deriving from geo-politics that has a long history.Geo-politics has not come to an end along with the end of the Cold War and the accelerating process of globalization as some people had predicted.On the contrary, it has further developed in terms of both connotation and extension.The emergence of geo-economics and geoculture has made the concept of geo-politics too narrow. Consequently, I would rather use a broader category, i.e.“geo-theory”, to denote new developments in the area of research related to geography.Geo-politics, geo-economics, and geo-culture could be defined as three branches of geotheory. Meanwhile, I would like to further differentiate the geo-theory into three levels according to the changing geographical space. They are peripheral geo-theory, regional geo-theory, and global geo-theory.
Since every sovereign state is firstly a“spatial entity”, a territorial country, and a geographical existence, it is necessary for a state to think about its survival and development strategy from a geographical perspective.China, as a big developing country, is located in a very tricky neighborhood in East Asia, with complicated geo-political and security environment.Without any doubt, China must base its geo-strategy on its geographical situation.China' s geo-strategy should be made according to its geographical space, should focus on geo-political, geo-economic, and geo-cultural aspects, and should include peripheral, regional, and global levels.To have an appropriate and effective geo-strategy, China has to clearly define its geo-strategic objectives that are to be achieved in China' s engagement with the international system, identify its geo-strategic threats and challenges that may endanger those objectives, and design its geo-strategic means according to available political, economic, and military resources to best manage those threats and achieve intended goals.
For that reason, chapter 2 will review the new developments of geo-theory and propose an analytical framework about China' s geo-strategy. The foundation and structure, as well as characteristics and orientation, of China' s geostrategy are discussed.Consequently, I will argue that China' s geostrategy should be a strategy of cooperative engagement for peaceful rise. Then, chapters 3,4, and 5 will respectively explore China' s geo-political strategy, geo-economic strategy, and geo-cultural strategy.
The concept of“Shi”can be traced back to a very ancient time in China' s history.Sun Tzu, the Chinese grand master of military strategy, used the Shi as the title of a chapter in his Art of W ar and provided a very classical analysis about the Shi.The Chinese are very familiar with an old saying that a good Go player focuses on developing and shaping the Shi（intangible layout on the board）while a bad one cares about gaining the Stones（tangible territory on the board）.Here in this book, I will introduce the concept of“Shi”into international politics, coin the term of“following the Shi”, and redefine the categories of“winning the Shi”and“shaping the Shi”according to the game theory.I define the Shi with two dimensions.On the one hand，the Shi means a static overall situation and structure, on the other it is about a dynamic mainstream tendency and momentum. The dynamic Shi is implied in the static Shi.The Shi shows not only the objective law of development, but also the subjective initiative of actors that control or exert influence on it.
In international politics, following the Shi is, for a state, to go with the tide of historical development, adapt to the realities of international structure and the trend by which it evolves, and make full use of every favorable historical opportunities to defend and expand its core national interests.Winning the Shi means a state being in a favorable position comparative to its peers，holding the vantage point in the international system, and following a development path consonant with the historical trend.It implies more opportunities of a country to overcome challenges and to dissolve difficulties, so as to protect and expand its core national interests.Developing and shaping the Shi is to intentionally and farsightedly shape a favorable international structure, master and even steer the historical trend of development.In doing so, a country could safeguard and expand its fundamental national interests as much as it could and create itself opportunities and embrace an even more prosperous future.
In the session of conclusions of this book, I present an overall picture about China' s international orientation and strategy with the concept of“S hi”.Rising by following the S hi，rather than against it, is China' s most important historic experience.Thanks to its periodic achievement of peaceful rise，China was winning the S hi when the 2008 global financial crisis broke up.And the crisis in turn further pushed China into a comparatively more favorable position.China acquired a fresh important historic opportunity to open a new chapter for its peaceful rise story due to its relative advantage in economic growth, accelerated process of multi-polarization in the international system, increasing expansion of China' s international influence, and positive change of international views towards China.Notwithstanding winning the S hi, however，China should also be good at employing the S hi, developing the S hi, and shaping the S hi.To further its peaceful rise, to make itself a world class power, and to promote the international communities' acceptance and accommodation of China' s peaceful rise, China should shift its strategy from following the S hi to developing and shaping the S hi.It is time for China to proactively develop and shape the S hi on its economic growth，strategic position, international influence, and national image. Developing and shaping the S hi for further peaceful rise requires China to make more efforts in“getting something accomplished”while continuously“keeping a low profile, ”with its strategic focus gradually moving from seeking short-term gains to wining long-term advantages, i.e.mastering the S hi.The process from against the S hi to following the S hi, and further to shaping the S hi, signifies not only the path of China' s peaceful rise, but also that of China' s engagement with the international system. Generally speaking, China' s international orientation and strategy are mutually dependent.Corresponding to its national development, China' s role in the international system has transform ed from a challenger that is against the S hi to a quasi status quo power that follows the Shi and even wins the Shi.In the foreseeable future, China' s role should further shift to a shaper of the international system, along with China' s new strategy of shaping the S hi to further its peaceful rise.导言探寻中国在国际参与中实现和平崛起的路径
早在中国明确提出和平崛起概念之前，中国与世界秩序的关系问题便一直为中外学者所关注。问题的核心就外界而言是如何让中国融入国际体系，就中国自身而言则是如何拥抱世界，两种视角之间并无根本性差异。但是，随着中国实现国民经济持续高速增长，综合国力显著提高，并明确提出和平崛起的战略构想，中国与世界秩序的关系这个虽然笼统和宽泛但中外不乏共识的问题便迅速演化为更具体、更富争议性的问题。从国外的视角来看，问题变成了：中国能否被现行国际体系所容纳？中国的融入是否会对现有世界秩序构成威胁？中国在世界秩序的创建、维护与变革中究竟扮演何种角色？是现状国还是修正国？从中国的视角来看，问题则变成了：中国如何才能在参与国际体系的过程中实现民族复兴和国家崛起？如何才能消除国际疑虑，走一条和平崛起的新路？如何才能让国际社会接受和适应中国的和平崛起？如何让世界拥抱中国？两种视角之间的差异随着西方抛出并不断翻新“中国威胁论”而显露无遗。
中国明确提出和平崛起概念的初衷在一定程度上便是要消解国际上的“中国威胁论”。然而，结果并不完全如中国所愿，国外不少学者对中国实现和平崛起的可能性提出质疑，甚至以此为由宣称中国是现行世界秩序中的挑战者和修正国。中外对“和平崛起”四个字的解读几乎南辕北辙，中国想要强调的是前两个字——“和平”，但国外很多人看到的却是后两个字——“崛起”。尽管中国随后不久将“和平崛起”改为“和平发展”，但国外并没有跟进，而是继续沿用“和平崛起”，以至于“和平崛起”几乎成了国外学者的专属名词，国内学者只能将其改为“和平发展”。鉴于将“和平崛起”改为“和平发展”并不能改变国外学者在观察中国时所固有的偏见，笔者这里试图继续沿用这一概念，并探寻消除国外疑虑和偏见的其他路径。
本书不可能全面回答在中国与世界秩序关系方面提到的诸多问题，而是将探讨的具体问题严格限定在两个方面——一是中国为什么不会成为现有世界秩序中的挑战者或修正国？二是中国如何才能在积极参与国际体系的过程中实现进一步的和平崛起？并尝试提出思考这些问题的全新视角。
第一个问题涉及中国的发展取向问题。尽管中国一向倡导要“建立公正、合理的国际政治经济新秩序”，但单凭诸如此类的政策宣示就把中国界定为国际体系的挑战者或修正国，显然过于牵强，也不公允。中国实力上升或由此产生的权力转移与中国在国际参与中究竟遵循修正路线还是现状路线之间是否存在着必然的因果联系，其互动机理是什么，需要更加严肃和深入的理论探讨。第二个问题涉及中国的发展战略问题。在一定意义上，中国实现和平崛起已是不争的事实。但这只是阶段性的和平崛起，2008年金融危机作为大挑战和大机遇，预示着中国和平崛起将步入新的历史阶段。现在需要回答的问题已不再是中国能否实现和平崛起，而是为什么能够实现和平崛起，以及能否和如何继续和平崛起的伟大进程。中国为在国际参与中实现进一步和平崛起应有什么样的战略选择，亟待更加前瞻和全面的理论思考。中国的发展取向和发展战略是相辅相成的两个问题，中国不能在挑战现有世界秩序的前提下实现和平崛起，这是发展取向使然，同时中国又必须在积极融入和参与国际体系的过程中进一步推进和平崛起大业，这是发展战略使然，二者必须保持一致，因此又可以看作一个问题的两个方面。
中国的发展取向和发展战略问题已经有很多学者从各种角度进行了分析和探讨。笔者这里试图使用一些新的概念，并以此为视角探寻中国在国际参与中实现和平崛起的路径，求解中国的发展取向和发展战略问题。这里需要提及的主要有三个概念，即“意象差距”、“地缘学”和“势”。“意象差距”概念为笔者所创，是指一国在看待世界秩序时所表现出来的理念张力。一国对世界秩序的认知、评判、理念和构想，往往包含两部分内容：一是反映世界秩序实然状态的现实意象，二是反映世界秩序应然状态的理想意象。由于现实意象和理想意象之间总是或多或少存在落差和不一致，因此各国的世界秩序观一定存在意象差距。这种意象差距并不是一以贯之、永恒不变的，而是在不同历史时期会有所变化，因此单纯凭借一国在某个历史时间点上有关世界秩序的基本意象，不论多么完整，都无助于我们更好地理解该国与世界秩序的关系。相比而言，有关世界秩序的意象差距的变动，即反映世界秩序实然状态的现实意象和反映应然状态的理想意象之间差距的变迁，能够更准确地反映一国在一个较长历史时期内与世界秩序的关系和对世界秩序的态度。因此，笔者将以此为视角通过考察新中国成立以来中国在世界秩序中的参与、受益和影响情况，来判断中国意象差距的性质、程度和变动趋势，从而更有力地说明中国为什么不会在现有世界秩序中充当挑战者或修正国的角色，而且中国与世界秩序的良性互动是可持续的。这部分内容将构成本书的第一章。“地缘学”并不是全新的概念，它在历史非常悠久的地缘政治学的基础上发展而来。地缘政治学并没有像有些人预期的那样随冷战结束和全球化进程而消亡，相反却在内涵和外延两个方面获得了新的发展。地缘经济学和地缘文化学的出现，使地缘政治学这个概念显得过于狭隘。于是笔者想用一个更宽泛的可以涵盖这些新发展的范畴来加以概括，姑且称之为“地缘学”（Geo-theory），把地缘政治学、地缘经济学和地缘文化学看作其三个分支。同时，笔者还根据地缘空间的变化，从外延上将地缘学区分为周边地缘学、地区地缘学和全球地缘学。
由于任何主权国家都首先是“空间实体”、领土国家、地缘国家，因而都需要从地缘空间的角度思考自己的生存和发展战略。中国作为一个发展中大国，天生处于地缘政治与安全环境复杂的东亚地区，在参与国际体系的过程中无疑更需要根据自身的地缘状况，思考相应的、恰当的、有效的地缘战略。中国国际参与的地缘战略应以实际地缘空间及其特点为基础，以地缘政治、地缘经济和地缘文化为内容，以周边地缘、地区地缘和全球地缘为层次，确立中国国际参与的地缘战略目标，界定中国国际参与的地缘战略威胁，选择中国国际参与的地缘战略手段。
为此，本书第二章主要探讨的是地缘学的发展与中国地缘战略的分析框架，在分析中国地缘战略的基础与结构、特性与取向的基础上，笔者提出中国的地缘战略应该是一种崛起的战略，是一种能够结合中国地缘空间结构，反映中国地缘战略特性和取向的合作性参与战略。本书随后的第三、四、五章分别深入探讨的是中国的地缘政治与安全战略、地缘经济战略和地缘文化战略。“势”的概念在中国古已有之，《孙子兵法》有专门的“势篇”，对“势”有非常经典的分析；“善弈者谋势，不善弈者谋子”的古语更是中国人耳熟能详。笔者这里想把“势”的概念引入到国际政治的分析中，并仿照“随强”（bandwagoning）提出“随势”概念，同时还对“得势”、“谋势”等范畴从博弈的角度进行新的界定。笔者提出，所谓“势”，一是指静态的总体格局，即局势、形势、气势；二是指动态的主流趋向，即情势、态势、趋势；静态之势蕴含动态之势。在国际政治中，所谓“随势”，就是顺应国际格局的历史现实及其发展趋向，充分利用一切有利的历史机遇，维护和拓展国家核心利益。所谓“得势”，就是在国际格局中处于有利地位，发展道路与历史潮流一致，拥有更多的有利契机，便于化解各种挑战和难题，维护和拓展国家核心利益。所谓“谋势”，就是能够有意识地、前瞻性地塑造于己有利的国际格局，掌握和控制历史发展潮流，为维护和拓展国家核心利益不断创造有利契机、开辟更广阔的发展空间。
在本书的结语部分，笔者用“势”的概念进一步回答了中国的发展取向和发展战略问题。如果说中国60多年，特别是改革开放后的30多年，发展的成功经验在于“随势”，中国可以进一步延续和平崛起进程的保障在于“得势”，那么中国要在积极参与国际体系的过程中续写和平崛起的新篇章就必须主动“谋势”。中国国际参与战略的重点应适时从“随势”调整为“谋势”、从“务实”过渡到“务势”。从“逆势”到“顺势”、从“随势”到“谋势”既是中国实现和平崛起的过程，也是中国参与世界秩序的过程。中国的国家发展战略与国际参与取向是紧密相关、一脉相承的。与中国的国家发展历程相应，中国在国际体系中所演变的角色由逆势的挑战者转变为顺势的准现状国，并进而发展为得势的准现状国。在可预见的将来，中国的角色应随国家发展的谋势战略而演变为谋势的国际体系塑造者。
本书的构思、研究和成文得到了多方面的支持。笔者首先得益于自己主持的上海市哲学社会科学规划课题“马克思主义国际体系理论与中国”、教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“中国在世界秩序中的参与、受益和影响”和复旦大学倪世雄教授主持的教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“我国的地缘政治及其战略研究”。复旦大学倪世雄教授、上海社会科学院黄仁伟副院长、中国驻欧盟使团吕录华参赞（我被外交部借调在中国驻欧盟使团工作期间的同事）对我的帮助和影响最大、最直接。在此一并致以最诚挚的谢意！第一章意象差距的变动与中国在世界秩序中的参与、受益和影响自20世纪90年代中国经济发展和综合国力取得显著成绩以来，国际社会便开始关注中国的发展取向问题，诸如中国是否会对现有世界秩序构成威胁，中国是现状国还是修正国，中国能否被现行国际体系所容纳等，一直是国内外学者所热衷于研究的课题。其中涉及的问题并不仅仅在于中国实力上升或由此产生的权力转移可能带来的影响，还在于中国对世界秩序的意象。中国一向倡导要“建立公正、合理的国际政治经济新秩序”，很多外国学者据此把中国界定为旨在颠覆现有世界秩序的修正国。然而，对现有世界秩序的不满和批评与一国究竟遵循修正路线还是现状路线之间是否存在着必然的因果联系，却没有得到严肃的理论探讨，其中的互动机理也没有得到深入的发掘。本章试图从中国对世界秩序的意象这一视角，分析中国与世界秩序的关系和中国对世界秩序的态度。第一节根据对世界秩序的意象区分国家与世界秩序关系的基本类型，以及国家对变革或维护现有世界秩序的态度取向。第二节探讨意象差距的变动，并提出几个判断国家意象差距的性质、程度和变动趋势的基本指标。第三、四、五节，分别从中国在世界秩序中的参与、受益和影响情况，分析中国对世界秩序的意象、意象差距以及中国与世界秩序关系的发展历程。最后，在小结部分，概括中国对世界秩序的基本意象及其变动趋势，并展望中国与世界秩序关系的未来。第一节意象、意象差距和国家与世界秩序的关系
国家行为体与世界秩序之间的互动，是通过国家对世界秩序的意象这个中间环节进行的。这里的意象并不是指华尔兹提出的关于分析层次的意象，而是指一个国家对世界秩序的认知、评判、理念和构想。意象包含两种情况：一种是反映世界秩序实然状态的现实意象（这与世界秩序的客观现实可能未必一致而存在某种程度的“错位”），另一种是反映世界秩序应然状态的理想意象。两种意象之间或多或少总是存在落差和不一致，这里姑且称之为意象差距，因此，国家对世界秩序的意象常常是矛盾的统一体。国家对世界秩序的基本意象和意象差距，既反映国家与世界秩序的基本关系，又决定国家对世界秩序的满意程度和基本态度。
国家对世界秩序的意象和意象差距，虽然在短时间内具有相对的稳定性，但在长时间内却是不断发展变化的。因此，同一国家在不同历史时期，或者不同国家在同一历史时期，往往对世界秩序具有不同的意象和意象差距。正是意象差距的存在和变动，才为一国在不同历史时期以不同态度和方式参与世界秩序的创建、维护与变革提供了重要动力，并因此使“世界秩序才有了生命力，才有了新旧之分”。
很多学者倾向于从理论上根据国家对世界秩序的态度把国家区分为现状国（status quo state）和修正国（revisionist state）。如果说就个人和家庭而言，没有规矩不成方圆；那么就整个世界而言，没有共同遵守的规范和准则，就无以成秩序。世界秩序的维护与延续必须依靠国际社会普遍接受的原则、规范与机制。同理，要变革现有世界秩序，国际行为主体就不仅需要变革国际体系，而且需要变革原有的维持世界秩序的原则、规范与机制。要求变革现有国际体系以及当前世界秩序基本原则与规范的国家通常被称作“修正国”、“非现状国”或“挑战国”，而致力于维护现有体系和规范的国家则被称作“现状国”。现状国致力于制定、维护和推广于己有利的现有国际准则和规范，以捍卫已有世界秩序，约束其他国际行为主体；修正国或非现状国则致力于挑战、推翻并置换于己不利的现有国际准则与规范，以改变已有世界秩序，摆脱其他国际行为主体的约束。现状国与非现状国之间的互动构成了世界秩序发展的内在动力。
但是，实际上，国家对世界秩序的态度并不是单一和一贯的，世界上鲜有纯粹的修正国（认为世界秩序绝对不合理，现实意象与理想意象根本对立），也鲜有纯粹的现状国（认为世界秩序绝对合理，现实意象与理想意象完全符合）。恰如施韦勒所分析的，不同修正国对现状的不满程度是有区别的，改变现状的要求也是不同的。有些修正国具有真正革命性的目标，寻求推翻整个国际体系及其规则与制度；而另些国家可能只具有温和的目标，可能寻求对现状的有限调整而不是根本变革。因此，可以说，在现状国和修正国两个极端之间存在着一个变动的区间（见图1-1），所有国家都可以沿着这个图谱进行排列和定位。出于进一步区分的需要，我们可以将位于图谱中央的称之为中立国，位于图谱左侧的趋向现状国的可以称之为准现状国（或称有限的现状国），位于图谱右侧的趋向修正国的可以称之为准修正国（或称有限的修正国）。图1-1：国家对世界秩序的态度
根据对世界秩序的态度对国家作这样的区分，并不是要给具体的某个国家贴上或现状国、或中立国、或修正国、或准现状国、或准修正国的标签，而是要为我们思考国家与世界秩序的关系提供某种分析工具和解释手段。国家对世界秩序的态度是国家对世界秩序基本意象和意象差距的外化与体现，并直接折射出国家与世界秩序关系的具体类型，三者的相互关系可以通过表1-1得以把握。表1-1：国家与世界秩序
依据各国对世界秩序的意象和态度，我们可以把国家与世界秩序的关系区分为五种类型。主导型关系是指一国对世界秩序的创建、维护与变革具有不可替代的主导作用，与世界秩序存在主导型关系的典型国家是二战结束以来的美国。美国不仅是冷战期间世界秩序的主要缔造者和受益人，而且在冷战后时代更是如此。尽管冷战的结束是对两极秩序的否定，在某种程度上是一种对现状的修正，但这并不足以使美国成为修正国，因为冷战秩序的终结不仅没有违背美国的理想意象，反而使之变为了现实。美国，尤其是在冷战后，有足够的能力将其理想意象转变为现实意象，因此美国的意象差距小，对现行世界秩序的满意度高。
在图谱的另一个极端是与世界秩序处于受动型关系的国家，如朝鲜和两次世界大战间歇期的德国。这种类型的国家往往对世界秩序的创建、维护与变革不具有直接的影响力，只是世界秩序的被动接受者。由于它们既不是世界秩序的缔造者，甚至不是主要参与者，也无法从世界秩序中受益，甚至只能受制于世界秩序，因此与世界秩序存在受
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