中国士绅：城乡关系论集(博雅双语名家名作)(txt+pdf+epub+mobi电子书下载)

作者：费孝通

出版社：外语教学与研究出版社

格式: AZW3, DOCX, EPUB, MOBI, PDF, TXT

中国士绅：城乡关系论集(博雅双语名家名作)试读：

“博雅双语名家名作”出版说明

1840年鸦片战争以降，在深重的民族危机面前，中华民族精英“放眼看世界”，向世界寻求古老中国走向现代、走向世界的灵丹妙药，涌现出一大批中国主题的经典著述。我们今天阅读这些中文著述的时候，仍然深为字里行间所蕴藏的缜密的考据、深刻的学理、世界的视野和济世的情怀所感动，但往往会忽略：这些著述最初是用英文写就，我们耳熟能详的中文文本是原初英文文本的译本，这些英文作品在海外学术界和文化界同样享有崇高的声誉。

比如，林语堂的My Country and My People(《吾国与吾民》)以幽默风趣的笔调和睿智流畅的语言，将中国人的道德精神、生活情趣和中国社会文化的方方面面娓娓道来，在美国引起巨大反响——林语堂也以其中国主题系列作品赢得世界文坛的尊重，并获得诺贝尔文学奖的提名。再比如，梁思成在抗战的烽火中写就的英文版《图像中国建筑史》文稿(A Pictorial History of Chinese Architecture)，经其挚友费慰梅女士(Wilma C. Fairbank)等人多年的奔走和努力，于1984年由麻省理工学院出版社(MIT Press)出版，并获得美国出版联合会颁发的“专业暨学术书籍金奖”。又比如，1939年，费孝通在伦敦政治经济学院的博士论文以Peasant Life in China—A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley为名在英国劳特利奇书局(Routledge)出版，后以《江村经济》作为中译本书名——《江村经济》使得靠桑蚕为生的“开弦弓村”获得了世界性的声誉，成为国际社会学界研究中国农村的首选之地。

此外，

一

有鉴于此，外研社人文社科出版分社推出“博雅双语名家名作”系列。

博雅，乃是该系列的出版立意。博雅教育(Liberal Education)早在古希腊时代就得以提倡，旨在培养具有广博知识和优雅气质的人，提高人文素质，培养健康人格，中国儒家六艺“礼、乐、射、御、书、数”亦有此功用。

双语，乃是该系列的出版形式。英汉双语对照的形式，既同时满足了英语学习者和汉语学习者通过阅读中国主题博雅读物提高英语和汉语能力的需求，又以中英双语思维、构架和写作的形式予后世学人以启迪——维特根斯坦有云：“语言的边界，乃是世界的边界”，诚哉斯言。

名家，乃是该系列的作者群体。涵盖文学、史学、哲学、政治学、经济学、考古学、人类学、建筑学等领域，皆海内外名家一时之选。

名作，乃是该系列的入选标准。系列中的各部作品都是经过时间的积淀、市场的检验和读者的鉴别而呈现的经典，正如卡尔维诺对“经典”的定义：经典并非你正在读的书，而是你正在重读的书。

胡适在《新思潮的意义》(1919年12月1日，《新青年》第7卷第1号)一文中提出了“研究问题、输入学理、整理国故、再造文明”的范式。秉着“记载人类文明、沟通世界文化”的出版理念，我们推出“博雅双语名家名作”系列，既希望能够在中国人创作的和以中国为主题的博雅英文文献领域“整理国故”，亦希望在和平发展、改革开放的新时代为“再造文明”、为“向世界说明中国”略尽绵薄之力。外语教学与研究出版社人文社科出版分社

编者说明

费孝通的英文著作China’s Gentry 1953年由美国芝加哥大学出版社出版。该书由芝加哥大学教授罗伯特·雷德菲尔德(Robert Redfield)撰写

导论

费孝通以中国士绅为主题，恢宏广阔地勾画了农民、士绅、国家之间的结构型态，深入浅出地展现了中国传统乡村社会的权力结构和秩序维持的实践图景，现在看来仍具有重要的借鉴意义。更重要的是，费先生是希望通过这些英文文章，向西方读者表达一个中国人对中国的看法。这也是英汉对照双语版首次在国内推出的重要价值所在。

本版以英文原本与三联译本为基础——原英文版附录的六篇生活史(LifeHistories)并非费先生所作，为初版编者所加，故本书未收录；文中附图系郭光远(James K. Y. Kuo)为英文初版绘制；经译者惠允，本版对译文作了进一步修订，以期在呈现作品英文原貌的同时，便于读者对照阅读，更好地理解这一经典著作个中要义。外语教学与研究出版社人文社科出版分社2011年2月导论

I

To Western readers Hsiao-tung Fei is known as the author of a [1]short,illuminating book on life in a Chinese village, of another and [2]more mature work on agriculture and industry in southwestern China, [3]and of a stimulating article on one of the principal themes of the present book:the gentry in Chinese society. In China he is known also as a brilliant teacher, a leader and pioneer in sociological field research, and a man who has written widely, talked much, and acted fearlessly toward the solution of the immense social problems of China. After his return from London, where he took his doctorate under Bronislaw Malinowski, and during the war with Japan he joined those Chinese students and scholars who assembled to continue Chinese scientific and intellectual life in Yunnan Province. It was there that he carried on the studies that resulted in his second book. After the defeat of Japan he went back to teach in his old university, Tsinghua, in Peiping; and there (where I had come in the autumn of 1948 as a visiting professor to the same university) my wife and I resumed an old association with him.

This book is made from articles contributed by Fei to Chinese newspapers in 1947 and 1948. During that autumn of 1948 he dictated to my wife a rough translation of these articles, stopping as he did so to talk over with her the substance of the dictation and in part rewriting and enlarging the text in the course of these discussions. The work was done hastily, with enthusiasm, and in the tense anticipations of the coming of Communist control. For, while the dictation and the rewriting went on, Peiping was ringed by Communist forces, and the fall of the universities and of the city itself was expected within a very short time.In December, 1948, most of the students and many of the faculty of the university looked forward to the coming of the Communists as a relief from hardship and oppression and as new opportunity to apply intelligence to the improvement of social and political conditions in China. There was apprehension too; but, with the abundant knowledge of corruption and tyranny under the Nationalist government, the hope outweighed the apprehension. Fei, always sanguine and courageous, was then of the opinion that he could work effectively with the Communists, even though he would continue to criticize when he thought criticism was due. Like others in his university, he did not conceive the incoming government of Chinese Communists in the image of Stalinist Russia; he thought of them as Chinese like himself, as his old friends and students, whose voices he heard over the Communist radio promising all good things to the people of Peiping. So Fei spoke to us of his hope of becoming, for the Communist government, a part of “the loyal opposition.” He had already fallen into the disfavor of both parties. While in Yunnan he had been threatened with arrest by the Nationalist government and was fired upon in a public meeting where he had spoken unfavorably of Chiang’s regime; on the other hand, Communist voices in the North had attacked him bitterly for certain articles he had published. On the whole, however, Fei felt that his views as to developing Chinese industry and agriculture would be congenial to the interests of the new regime and that after the transition he would be able to continue to work and to speak for China. In this hope, almost a confidence,the articles here assembled were dictated.

My wife and I left Peiping in December, 1948, and for more than three years now we have had no word from Fei. From others we have learned of some bare events. At about the time when Peiping fell to the Communists, Mao Tse-tung asked Fei to take charge of a research program with regard to problems of urban reconstruction, and he accepted and began the work. Fei published articles praising the “New Democracy” of China. He accepted membership on governmental boards or committees. Later he went on an expedition to study some of the remote communities of southwestern China—where he had worked during the Japanese war. Later word tells us that he has returned to Tsinghua University.

This book is published without any participation from him in its production since the days when he dictated its substance to my wife. It is evident that he prefers it so. Communication with Westerners would embarrass or endanger him; he does not write to us, and we have ceased to write to him. My wife edited the text she had transcribed, assuming considerable responsibility in changing the order of the parts, in adding references, and even in inserting phrases or whole sentences when she was sure that Fei’s meaning would be served by such additions. It is to be emphasized that the book therefore is an expression of Fei’s views and judgments as he was about to step over the threshold between revolutionary China and Communist China. It was written when his students (many of whom I knew) moved in an excitement of fresh opportunity to remake their country—and moved without dogma.Few of them had read a line of Marx. Most of them saw the Nationalist government as their oppressor, the Communists as their liberaters.一

许多西方读者都知道，费孝通写过一本关于一个中国乡村生活的[4]书，这本书篇幅虽短，但具有启蒙意义；还有一本有关中国西南部[5]工农业方面的更为成熟的著作；再有就是涉及本书主题——中国士[6]绅的那篇引人注目的文章。在中国人看来，费先生还是一位睿智的师者、社会学实地研究领域的先驱和带头人，是著述广泛、善于言辞并为解决中国诸多社会问题而勇敢行动的人。他在伦敦获得博士学位，师从马林诺夫斯基。在抗日战争期间，一些中国学生和学者聚集云南，继续从事科学和学术活动，费先生回国后也加入了他们的队伍，他的第二部著作就完成于此地。日本战败后，他回到母校(即位于北平的清华大学)执教，我曾于1948年秋做过清华大学的访问学者，在那里我和夫人与他恢复了旧日的联系。

本书取材于费先生1947年至1948年间发表在中国报纸上的文章。1948年秋，费先生向我夫人翻译并口述了这些文章的大致内容，他不时停下来与我的夫人讨论口述内容的要点，并在讨论中作了某些修改和扩展。在他口述和修改这些文章的时候，共产党军队已经包围了北平。费先生怀着对共产党即将当政的强烈憧憬和满腔热情，仓促完成了这项工作。人们料想共产党将很快占领各所大学和整座城市。1948年12月，清华大学的大部分学生和许多老师都期待着共产党的到来，以求从压抑和痛苦中解脱出来，并认为这是运用聪明才智去改善中国社会和政治条件的新的机会。虽然他们也怀有恐惧，但由于已充分了解国民党政府的腐败和暴虐统治，希望还是战胜了恐惧。一向乐观而勇敢的费先生当时所持的观点是：他可以和共产党人一起有效地工作，不过，当他认为需要进行批评的时候，他会继续批评。但是，像清华大学的其他人一样，他并没有把即将到来的中国共产党的政府想象成斯大林主义俄国式的统治。在他心里，共产党人和自己一样是中国人，是他的老朋友或学生那样的人。他在收音机里听到了共产党向北平市民所作的美好承诺。所以，他告诉我们，他希望成为与共产党政府“忠诚对立”的一部分。他早已不被两党中的任一方所宠爱。在云南的时候，他曾被国民党政府以逮捕相威胁，并在一次公众集会上，因斥责蒋介石的统治而受到攻击。另一方面，北方的共产党也因他出版的某些文章而对他进行猛烈抨击。然而，总的来说，费先生认为他关于发展中国工农业的观点是符合新政权的利益的，在政权更替后，他仍能继续为中国而工作、为中国说话。这里汇集的几篇文章就是他满怀着这一近乎信心的希望口述的。

我和夫人1948年12月离开北平，至今三年多来我们一直没有费先生的音信。从其他人那里我们仅得到了很有限的消息。听说共产党占领北平后，毛泽东请费先生负责一个有关城市重建问题的研究项目，费先生应允并开始了工作。他发表文章赞扬中国的“新民主”，还加入了政府性质的委员会，成为其中的一员。后来，他奔赴中国西南部——那是他曾在抗日战争期间工作过的地方，在那里从事对某些偏远社区的研究。后来又有消息说，他已重返清华大学了。

自从他向我夫人口述这些文章的主旨后，这本书的形成和出版再也未经他的任何介入。很明显，他是乐于保持这样的状况的。由于与西方人接触会给他带来尴尬和危险，因而我们不再通信。我的夫人对她自己的记录进行了编辑，并且还怀着强烈的责任感对某些部分作了顺序调整，添加了注释，甚至添加了一些短语和句子——因为她相信，这样会使费先生所要表达的意思更明确。需要强调的是，本书表达了费先生将要从革命中国跨进共产主义中国时所持有的观点和看法。当他写这些文章时，他的许多学生(其中很多我都认识)已开始激动不已地并且毫无束缚地投入到重建自己国家的新契机中去了。他们中很少人读过马克思的著作，大多数人把国民党政府看作是压迫者，而把共产党人看作是解放者。

II

At the time he dictated a translation, Fei wanted the essays to be read by English-speaking people. Like other intelligent people of good will,he wanted China to be understood by Westerners, and he believed that he had something to say about China that was not said in other books.But, when Fei wrote the articles in the first place, he was talking to the Chinese; the present English version does not change that fact. Fei had developed a large audience for his newspaper articles; all sorts of people,mostly people neither peasants nor intellectuals, read and admired what he had to say about the problems of China. These essays, as newspaper articles, had contributed to the extension of a sense of responsibility in the Chinese people themselves to take charge of their own affairs,and to deal with them, for their own good. Thus the book provides for Westerners an unusual and valuable light on China: a Western-educated Chinese, devoted to working to solve problems of China, analyzes some aspects of these problems so as to make them clearer to his countrymen.The essays give a Chinese point of view on China. They are not written to put a good face on things, or a dark face. They are written to help the Chinese to reach understanding of their troubles. Fei is saying to his countrymen: “Look, this is what has happened to us in recent years.This is the real revolution. This is the place where our shoe pinches.Understand; then act.” To Americans, accustomed to thinking of China simply as an object of our foreign policy under the assumption that what will happen in China depends on what we do rather than on what the Chinese do, this book gives fresh insight. Problems of China are here looked at by a Chinese as problems for Chinese to solve, and to solve not by taking political sides, not by joining Russia or joining America, but by reform, by Chinese, of Chinese institutions.

Of course only some of the problems of China are considered in this book. Fei examines certain aspects of the traditional social structure and certain changes that have occurred in that structure that make difficulties for China. The changes have taken place chiefly as a result of the influence of the West. The book therefore bears on that social revolution in China which underlies the overthrow of the empire, the revolutionary republican movement led by Sun Yat-sen, and the winning of political control of China by Chinese Communists. The book does help us to understand how Chinese communism won China.

二

当费先生口述这些文章的英文译文时，他是希望英语读者去阅读它。像其他具有良好愿望的知识分子一样，他希望中国能被西方读者所理解，并且相信他要讲的是一些其他书中不曾讲到的关于中国的问题。但是，当费先生最初写这些文章时，他是在与中国人对话。这一事实在此英文版本中并没有改变。费先生在报纸上发表的文章有很大的读者群，包括各种各样的人，大多数既非农民也非知识分子。他们都读过费先生讲到的中国社会问题，而且都很欣赏。这些发表在报纸上的文章唤起了中国人的责任感，使他们意识到自己的事情要由自己来解决，从而维护自己的利益。因此，对于西方读者来讲，本书包含有一种关乎中国问题的不同寻常而又价值无比的见解，这是一位受过西方教育的中国人献身于解决中国问题的事业当中，对这些问题的某些方面进行分析，以使他的同胞能够得到更清楚的认识。这些文章表达了一个中国人对中国的看法。这样做并非是在给事物贴上好坏的标签，而是帮助中国人理解他们当下所面临的困境。费先生是在对他的同胞讲：“看，这是近几年来发生在我们身上的事。这是真正的革命。这就是令我们裹足不前的所在，认识它，了解它，然后就可以有所作为。”长期以来，美国人一直认为中国只不过是美国外交政策的一个对象，中国的发展取决于美国人而非中国人怎么做。对于他们来说，这本书无疑体现了一种全新的观点。在本书中，中国人把中国的问题看作是他们自己要解决的问题，而解决这些问题并不能依靠政治上的一边倒——倒向俄罗斯或倒向美国，而要靠改革，要由中国人来改革自己的制度。

当然，本书只涉及了中国的某些问题。费先生研究了传统社会结构的某些方面以及发生在这一结构中的给中国造成困难的某些变化。这些变化的发生主要是西方影响的结果。因此，本书与中国的社会革命有关，它是以君主专制的灭亡、孙中山所领导的民主共和革命运动以及中国共产党夺取政权等历史事件为基础。本书确实可以帮助我们理解中国共产主义运动是如何赢得中国的。

III

As the essays were written as separate articles, the threads of common idea which hold them together are not so apparent as they might be. There are two interrelated themes: the functions of the scholar and the gentry in the traditional Chinese society and the relations of the country and the city. The first theme is uppermost in the first four essays. The gentry and the scholars must be discussed together, for the scholars were chiefly (but not entirely) derived from the gentry, and the gentry carried on their functions and enjoyed their social position by virtue of the fact that some of them were scholars. The scholars were an elite; the gentry, a social and economic class. The first essay shows how the scholars, by becoming administrative servants of the imperial power,obtained security for themselves and kinsmen. In the second essay we find an account of the history of the development of this adjustment and of how the scholars reflected upon the relationship they had come to have with the centralized authority and how they explained and justified it in their philosophies. The third essay turns on the question why China experienced no important technical development. The scholars, or intellectuals, are now examined from the point of view of the exclusive concern they had with ethical knowledge: the intellectuals had no technical knowledge; they were supported by the labor of others and were unconcerned with productive work. So the governing class lacked the kind of knowledge which would have improved the material condition of the people. In the fourth essay, as in the first two, the point of attention is the function of the scholar-official in mediating the imperial power. But now the attention is directed to that educated member of the gentry who,remaining in the local community, negotiated, in a personal and extralegal way, with the formally recognized functionary who occupied the lowest position in the official bureaucracy. This critical function, exercised by the scholar-gentry, made the imperial power workable, while yet maintaining the traditional social organization of the village. This essay develops into a discussion of the pao-chia system (at that time recently reintroduced by the Kuomintang and later abolished by the Communists) by which it was sought to make the central authority directly influential upon the local community and shows why it was doomed to failure.

In the fifth essay there is apparently a new beginning; Fei here takes up not the administrative relations but the economic relations between country and city. The scholar-gentry are not so apparent; but they are here just the same. For, while Fei is telling us that the economic relationship between city and country works to the disadvantage of the country, because the city lives off the country by taking rent and interest from the countryman without sending to the country the products it needs and could consume, we must remember that it is these same gentry who are pocketing the rent and interest and increasingly using the money to buy Western-made products instead of Chinese-made goods. Fei distinguishes several types of towns and cities and shows how each type served the interests of the gentry (and also those of the imperial power)and did not bring advantage to the peasants. Garrison town, market town, and treaty port—all provided opportunities for the economic exploitation of the country. Thus the peasant came to pay a large part of the products of this labor to maintain the gentry class, while the gentry,coming to prefer Western goods, no longer bought the products of rural handicraft and so ruined the small manufacturing which provided the peasant with a little margin over the barest subsistence.

The sixth essay develops this theme of the unsatisfactory character of the exchange between city and country and the worsening of the situation since the introduction of products manufactured in the West.And the seventh essay continues the consideration of the dislocations of the old social and economic system brought about by the influence of the West, while it returns to the theme of the scholar and his functions in Chinese society. In these last pages we see that the modern intellectual,the man educated in Western learning, does not take the place of the old intelligentsia. He does not go back to the country where he has no social position and no career. He stays in the city; so from the country is eroded away some of its best human resources. And some of the rural people,becoming poorer than ever, are also detached from the rural community and become predatory rovers or—as ever in China—rebels against the government. So only a few years before the Communists began to purge by shooting, and before the fighting in Korea, this series of essays ends, a diagnosis of immense problems, a declaration of hope that the Communists would provide leadership toward solving them.

三

由于这些文章独立成篇，其共同主题并非显而易见。文中有两条相互交错的线索：其一是传统社会中文人和士绅的作用，其二是乡村和城市之间的关系。前四篇文章主要讲第一个主题。文人和士绅要相提并论，因为文人大部分(并非全部)来自士绅，而士绅也靠他们中的某些人是文人而发挥作用和享受社会地位。文人是精英，而士绅属于社会经济阶层。第一篇文章讲述文人如何通过做官来为他们自己以及亲属赢得安全。第二篇文章描述了从文人到官员的这种调整的发展历史和文人如何看待他们与集权统治的关系以及如何以他们自己的哲学来对此加以解释和论证。第三篇文章转向了为什么中国没有经历重要的技术发展这一问题。在这里是从他们对于规范知识的独特关注的视角上而对文人或者说是知识分子作了考察。知识分子毫无技术知识，他们依靠别人的劳动，对生产活动毫不关心。所以统治阶级缺乏那种能够增进人民的物质条件的知识。与第一、第二篇文章一样，第四篇文章的关注点是士大夫在帝国的权力中作为中介的功能。但是现在的注意力指向了士绅中受过教育的人，他们仍住在地方社区当中，以私人的以及法律以外的方式，同那些正式承认的、在官府中担任最低职位的官吏打交道。文人士绅发挥的这种关键作用，使得皇权统治得以施行，并且维护了村庄的传统社会组织。这篇文章继而进一步讨论了保甲制度(该制度当时刚被国民党重新提出，后来又被共产党所废除)，以此探求中央权威如何对地方社区施加直接影响，并要表明这样的做法为什么注定要失败。

第

五

第六篇文章进一步论述了城乡交换的不尽如人意以及引进洋货后这一情形的进一步恶化。第七篇文章继续论及西方影响给中国陈旧的社会经济制度造成的混乱，最后又回到文人及其在中国社会中的作用这一问题上来。在最后的这些篇幅里我们注意到，受过西方教育的现代知识分子并没有取代旧知识分子。他们没有回到既无社会地位又无事业可谈的乡村中去，而是留在城市里，因此乡村流失了一些最优秀的人力资源。一些乡民变得越来越贫困，他们脱离了乡村群体而成为流浪的强盗，或者是像中国过去一再出现过的那样，成为叛乱分子。这一系列文章收笔于共产党准备开始镇压反革命以及朝鲜战争爆发的前几年。这是一份对中国众多问题的诊断书，是希望共产党能带领人们解决这些问题的一份宣言书。

I

V

To the Westerner the book sheds light on the recent political behavior of China and suggests that the failure of the West to prevent the party and power of Mao Tse-tung from taking control arose out of a worsening situation among the Chinese people which the party of Chiang Kaishek did not remedy and which many Americans did not understand.Furthermore, it offers a different construction from that which is often put forward as to the benefit so far received by China from the importation of Western technology and capital.

First is borne in upon the reader the unwisdom, in the light of this analysis, of assuming that to the Chinese the central government has traditionally the meaning to Chinese which government has had to Americans and western Europeans. We have dealt with Chinese governments as though the Chinese thought they represented the Chinese people. It might have been nearer the truth if we had begun by assuming that centralized government is, traditionally, a potentially dangerous predator upon the people—“the tiger.” With the revolution of Sun Yat-sen appeared governments that promised to act on behalf of the people, limiting their own power constitutionally. However, the credit of this promise, to Chinese, passed in the last decade from the Kuomintang to the Communist party. And the “people’s assemblies,” the innumerable committees and discussions, stimulated and guided by the Communists, gave Chinese, when the Communists took over, a sense of direct participation in government which they never experienced, and rarely thought was theirs to claim, during the long imperial period.

Second, we understand from what is brought forth in these pages how little prepared have been the Chinese people to assume leadership and carry on constructive and efficient national government. When many of us joined General Marshall in bidding the educated liberals of China to take the lead in constituting a government neither Communist nor corrupt, we did not understand the tradition of which those liberals are the heir. Since the time of Confucius at least, the educated man in China has been concerned with ethical advice (or “normative knowledge,”as Fei calls it), not with political action. Indeed, as Fei makes quite plain,especially in the first and fourth essays, sound political policy in China has been to neutralize the political power of the emperor, not to control it. Do-nothingism, he says, has been the equivalent of a constitutional check on government. So the scholar, while being an administrator,had nothing to do with shaping national policy; and administrative effectiveness consisted not in technical efficiency, as in the West, but in skill in such personal negotiations as kept local affairs running not too much disturbed by demands of centralized power. An educated elite with this tradition, without any political power or experience in the formation of policy, separated from the peasantry by mode of life and class position,could hardly be expected to rescue China from the torments of civil war.For the Chinese who has a modern Western education is only the heir of the scholar-official of the long imperial period.

The ancient system was not based on economic justice, but it worked. It worked to the degree that, except for natural catastrophes and wars, it gave the peasant a certain amount of security. His village handicrafts provided an income supplementary to that provided by his agriculture and used the labor that was not needed in slack seasons of the farmer’s year. He had to support the gentry, but the scholar-official of the class he supported was useful to him in negotiating with the representatives of the imperial power to prevent the infliction of extreme hardship; and, if the peasant was both industrious and fortunate, he might live to see his son or grandson become a scholar and an official and so experience elevation in his own status. The teachings of the ancient sages reached the peasants through these scholars and redefined again and again the sense of moral purpose which peasant and gentry had in common. The Confucian non-acquisitive ideal both harmonized the peasant’s ethics with his lot in life and acted as a restraint upon an imperial power otherwise without check.

If we call this regime, from a view of its politics, democratic or authoritarian, we are likely in either case to misrepresent the facts. The participation of a good many villagers in decisions as to local matters was hardly an equal participation, and the influence of the gentry on the local life was, through their economic power alone, very great. The authoritarianism of the central government was in cases and at times truly autocratic, yet that regime was in theory based on moral authority rather than force; the teachings of the Confucians made the point again and again; the fact that an ideal other than absolutism existed influenced the facts, just as the ideal of social equality between all men influences the facts in the United States.

Thus the opposition between gentry and peasantry in traditional China was held within bounds by the real economic interdependence of the two classes, by the degree of mobility between them, by the co-operation between the two in dealing with the imperial power, and by common ethical principles. What happened to this system that made in China a genuine social revolution？ Fei’s book is no systematic study of this question—or of any other—but it does suggest some part of the answer. The changes that occurred in China through contact with the West disrupted this system, made it unworkable, and increased the real or apparent harshness of the inequality of life-changes between gentry and peasantry. Fei assumes but does not discuss the general effects in China of that great awakening of the ill-fed, overworked two-thirds of the human race, who live chiefly in Asia, which is such an immense event of our times: the new and growing discontent of the underdog everywhere.The special effects which he puts to the fore are the importation of goods(rather than of capital) and the new learning. Fei is plainly convinced that the benefits of Western capitalistic development in China did the common people harm rather than good. As the gentry developed tastes for Western goods, while some of them found new sources for wealth in trading with the West, they came to spend their profits realized in rent or interest on Western products. The peasant lost his market for his handicrafts and often found it difficult to move to market any agricultural produce that he might be lucky enough to have left over from his domestic wants. Whether Fei’s account can stand without some qualifications or not, the visitor to China in recent years cannot fail to catch some of the bitterness with which many Chinese look upon Shanghai and the other treaty ports, where live the privileged, Chinese or Western, “sucking out the wealth of the Chinese people for their own luxuries.” So the war between Nationalists and Communists is seen,against this background, not as a conquest of China by a foreign power or a foreign ideology but as a civil conflict between the traditionally privileged rentier class and the rural population.

And more and more did the sympathies of the Chinese with modern education turn to the rural population and against the rentier class.They came to take hope that the reforms promised by Mao Tse-tung would remove some of the worst of the economic injustices of China.They saw a chance that they could use the special scientific knowledge many of them had acquired in solving the problem of how the city and country might be made mutually beneficial. They attacked the question of how industrialization of China might be wisely carried on, so that the common people might benefit. They began to see how great was their own personal and professional problem: to learn to act politically, to help make public policy in rural communities, and to work with a peasant from whom tradition had separated them.

Hsiao-tung Fei, himself a member of the gentry class, at the time these essays were written was probably the leading voice among those striving to solve the problem of China with the aid of science and toward the common welfare. Through his studies and periods of residence in the West he had come to assume a position, unfamiliar to the traditional intellectual of China, that “something must be done to help.” For this he and some few others in China like him were criticized by other intellectuals. Interested in American democracy and in English socialism, convinced that the people of China must assume responsibility for economic and social reform, he turned to the writing of the papers that now appear in this book partly because the suspicious Nationalist Chinese government would not allow him to carry on field research. The essays are in part an indirect criticism of the failures of the Nationalist government. Whether today Fei has the freedom he needs to speak and act in accordance with his convictions is not known to the writer of these lines. But those who know him are sure that he will continue as long as he is able to devote his energies, and to risk his life, to help the Chinese people.

四

本书给西方读者阐明了中国近期的政治行为，并指出，西方企图阻止共产党和毛泽东政权上台的失败，是由于蒋介石的国民党没能挽救中国人民于每况愈下的处境，而对于许多美国人来说也未能理解这一危急形势。同时，对于通常认为中国受益于引进西方技术和资本的观点，本书也作出了相反的回答。

依照这一分析，读者首先认识到，如果假设对于中国人来说，传统上中央政府对中国人的意义与政府对美国人和西欧人的意义一样，这是很不智的。我们在与中国政府打交道时，总是假定中国人认为这些政府是代表中国人民的。如果我们一开始就假定，即从传统的意义上说，中央政府对人民而言，通常是潜在的危险的捕食者，是“老虎”，这也许会更接近于真实。随着孙中山的革命运动，出现了代表民众、用宪法限制自身权力的政府。不过，在中国人看来，代表民众的美名在过去的十年中由国民党转移到了共产党身上。由共产党所发动和领导的人民代表大会、不计其数的委员会和讨论，使中国人感受到，自己在共产党掌权后直接参与了政府，这是他们在漫长的帝国时代里从未经历也几乎没敢要求过的。

其次，从这些文章中我们了解到，中国人对于掌握政权、施行建设性和有效的国家统治是何等地准备不足!我们许多人加入马歇尔将军的队伍，呼吁中国受过教育的自由派领导中国，建立起一个既非共产主义的、也非腐化堕落的政府。但是我们并不了解，这些自由派实质是这些传统东西的继承人。至少是从孔子时代开始，中国受过教育的人已经和伦理教条(或者如费先生所称谓的“规范知识”)而非政治行为联系在一起。实际上，正如费先生特别在第一篇与第四篇文章中明确阐述的那样，在中国，良好的政治策略是使皇帝的政治权力自然化，而不是要去控制它。他说，“无为”成为政府体制约束的同义词。因此，作为官员的文人，在制定国家政策上无所事事；行政的效率并非像西方那样体现在技术的效率上，而是体现在为保持地方不过多地受到中央政权的干扰而进行的个人游说的技能上。一个具有这种传统的受过教育的精英，没有任何政治权力或制定政策的经验，从生活方式和阶级地位上脱离了农民身份，我们很难想象这样的人能把中国从内战的混乱中解救出来，因为受过现代西方教育的中国人也只不过是中国漫长的帝国时代的文官的传续。

古代的体系并非基于经济的公平，但却可行，可行到如果没有自然灾害和战争，农民就可以有一定程度安全感的地步。在农闲季节，多余的劳动力从事手工业可以带来额外收入。他们必须供养士绅，但是在与帝国权力的代表人物交涉以避免厄运时，他们所供养的这一阶层中的文官对他们又是有用的。并且，如果一个农民既勤劳又幸运，他也许能在有生之年看到自己的儿子或孙子成为文人和官吏，那么，他自己的地位也会因此而提高。古代圣人的教导便是通过这些文人来传递给农民的，并且一次又一次重新界定农民和士绅都共同认可的道德目的的意义。孔子“无欲”的理想既调和了农民对于命运的伦理思想，又限制了皇权，否则皇权将毫无节制。

从政治的角度看，如果我们把这种统治叫做民主或独裁，那就可能歪曲了事实。在决定本村的事务时，众多村民的参加几乎并非平等的参与。士绅单单凭借他们在经济上的实力而对当地生活造成的影响就是相当巨大的。中央政府的威权主义有时存在，而且的确十分专制，但这种统治理论上是根基于道德权威而非武力，儒家学说曾多次指出过这一点。正是一种理想而非专制主义的存在这一事实影响到了这些现实，这与在美国人人平等的理想影响到了美国的那些现实是一样的。

因此在传统的中国，士绅和农民的对立局限在一定的范围之内：他们经济上互相依赖；在某种程度上，他们之间可以流动；在同皇权打交道时互相合作；享有共同的伦理概念。那么，这一体制发生了什么而导致了中国一场真正的社会革命？费先生并没有在书中对这一问题或任何其他问题作系统研究，但却的确暗示了部分的答案。中国在与西方接触的过程中发生的变化破坏了这种体制，使其丧失效力，并使士绅和农民之间不平等的生活差异变得更为严重。费先生没有讨论占世界人口三分之二、主要居住在亚洲、食不果腹、过度劳累的人民的伟大觉醒所带来的影响，但对此作了假设。这一觉醒是当今时代的一件大事：无处不在的被压迫者对现实新生的不满与日俱增。费先生将物品(而不是资本)的进口和新学的出现这样的特殊影响看作是首当其冲的。费先生确信，西方资本主义在中国的发展对老百姓有害无利。随着士绅们逐渐培养起对洋货的品味，当他们中的某些人在与西方贸易的过程中发现新的发财之路时，他们便会开始用收取地租和利息得来的钱去购买洋货。农民的手工业品失去了市场，并且通常很难将除自用之外有幸剩下的农产品拿到集市上去出售。无论费先生的描述是否能站得住脚，近几年到过中国的人都不难感受到某些凄凉之处，许多中国人正是带着这种凄凉来看待上海以及其他通商口岸的：在那里居住着享有特权的中国人或洋人，他们“为享受荣华富贵而榨取中国人民的财富”。因此，在这种背景下，国民党和共产党的斗争就不是被看作中国被国外的势力或意识形态所征服，而是来自传统的靠收取地租和利息生存的特权阶层和农民的内部冲突。

接受现代教育的中国人，越来越同情农民而反对收取地租的阶层。他们开始寄希望于毛泽东，希望他的改革能祛除某些严重经济不平等现象。他们看到了可以用自己掌握的专门的科学知识去解决城乡互惠互利问题的那种机会。他们着力解决如何巧妙地在中国实施工业化，从而使得普通民众可以受益这一问题。他们开始发现自己个人的和职业上所面对的问题是何等地重要，那就是要学会政治上的行为方式，要帮助制定乡村社区的公共政策，还要与在传统上跟他们分离开来的农民并肩工作。

费孝通本人出身于士绅阶层，他所写的这些文章可能是那些想着民众的福利、主张依靠科学解决中国问题的人们的先声。他在西方学习和逗留期间逐渐认识到：“该做点帮忙的事情了。”这一立场对传统中国知识分子来说有些生疏，他同国内另外几个人因此遭到其他知识分子的批判。由于他对美国的民主和英国的社会主义感兴趣，认定中国人要负起经济与社会改革的责任，所以才会写下本书中所收录的文章，这里有一部分原因就是考虑到持怀疑态度的国民党政府可能不允许他去进行实地的田野研究。这些文章实际上委婉地批判了国民党政府的失败。费先生今天是否有依其信念的言行自由，本文作者不得而知，但认识费先生的人都确信，他会尽其可能继续不畏艰险、鞠躬尽瘁地帮助中国人民。V

The correctness of Fei’s interpretations of the origins of economic and political problems in China may be open to criticism. There are other minds and other books to do this. Another aspect of the book is also open to criticism: the use and interpretation of references to classical Chinese literature. Such references occur especially in the first two essays. To me the correctness of Fei’s philological and philosophical understandings is, in the general context of this work, less important than the fact that he used the Chinese classics at all. The old literati had ceased to perpetuate themselves; they are gone forever; Fei’s face was turned hopefully to the Communists, whose doctrines he knew to be anti-Confucian and Marxist. Yet Fei, talking to his own people, “the plain people,” elaborates and demonstrates his views with etymologies and quotations from the traditional poets and philosophers. Also he quotes Lilienthal, R. H. Tawney, and Sorokin! There is something in these pages that tells us about the forms of thought appropriate to the persuasion of literate Chinese at the turn of the revolutionary tide.五

费先生对中国经济和社会问题的解释的正确性可能会引起批评意见。这是其他人和其他书要做的事了。本书的另外一个方面也许同样会遭到批评，那就是对本书所参考的中国古典文献的运用和解释方面。这些文献尤其在前两篇文章中居多。在我看来，费先生在文献学和哲学方面理解的正确性，从本书的一般脉络上来看，并不及他运用了中国经典这一事实来得重要。古代的文人学士已离我们而去，无法再永垂不朽。费先生转而憧憬共产主义，他深知共产党人的主张与儒家思想相左，他们是坚持马克思主义的。然而他引用古代诗人和哲人的语句来向他的“纯朴的人民”阐明自己的观点。他竟然还引用到了李林塞尔、理查德·亨利·托尼和索罗金!本书的字里行间向我们讲述了在革命浪潮转折时期，合乎中国文人信念的思维方式。

VI

Fei’s seven essays are followed in this volume by six life-histories of Chinese gentry collected by Mr. Yung-teh Chow in Yunnan between1943 and 1946. Mr. Chow has translated these into English and kindly allowed their inclusion in this book. The accounts seem to us to exhibit,in terms of the life-careers of particular individuals, some of the principal generalizations Fei offers as to the role, partly beneficial, partly predatory,of the traditional Chinese gentry. Further comment on these life-histories appears on pages 145–148.

A Chinese sociologist in this country said to my wife and me: “When a Chinese sociologist writes for Chinese, he writes very differently from the way he writes for Americans.” The remark suggests something of the incompleteness with which Western social science and traditional Chinese forms of thought have become fused. It helps to explain, also,why my wife left in the text the many references to Chinese classics which Fei put there and introduced in the footnotes some explanations of some of these references. These references are entirely superfluous to the Sinologist; they are inserted to help readers who are not Sinologists to recognize the sources of some of Fei’s allusions.

In the cases of Chinese who have written in English and have recorded their names with the surname in last position, we have followed this practice; in other cases we have written the names as the Chinese do:with the surname first.

My wife and I are indebted to Mr. William L. Holland and the Institute of Pacific Relations (which had previously given aid to Fei for his researches on the Chinese gentry) for guidance and encouragement in the course of the preparation of the manuscript; to Professor John K. Fairbank, Dr. Marion J. Levy, Jr., Dr. Derk Bodde, W. Lloyd Warner,and Dr. Sol Tax for their kindness in reading the work and making helpful suggestions; and to Dr. Shu-ching Lee for advice on points of Chinese language or history and in connection with the editing of the life-histories. None of the above, however, has any responsibility for the content or form of the book.ROBERT REDFIELDUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOMay 1952

六

本书除了费先生的七篇短论外，接下来是六篇中国士绅的生活史，由周荣德先生于1943年至1946年间在云南搜集整理。周先生已将其译成英文并惠允我加进本书中来。从这些个人生活经历的角度来说，这些描述似乎向我们展示了费先生所概括的传统士绅阶层作用的一些主要性质，其作用大可说是利弊参半。在本书的145页至148页有对这些生活史的进一步评论。[该附录部分非费孝通所作，故未收入本书——编者注]

一位中国社会学家对我和夫人说：“当一位中国社会学家为中国人写作时，他的写作风格与为美国人写作时截然不同。”这一见解暗示了西方的社会科学和中国人的传统思维方式相融合时某种程度的不完全。这也有助于解释为什么我夫人在正文中保留了费先生引用的众多中国古典文献，并在脚注中对其中一部分加以解释说明。这些引用对汉学家来讲完全多余，它们是为了帮助非汉学家的读者去认识费先生某些引述典故的出处。

对于那些曾用英文写作并以英文形式(姓氏在后)注名的中国人的姓名，我们姑且沿用这种形式。其余的名字我们仍按中国人的习惯，即姓氏在前。

在准备本书原稿的过程中，威廉·霍兰德先生和太平洋国际学会(该学会曾为费先生研究中国士绅阶层问题提供帮助)给予了我们指导和鼓励，我和夫人在此深表感激。费正清教授、小马利恩·利维博士、德克·卜德博士、劳埃德·沃纳和索尔·塔克斯博士都阅读了本书，并提出了宝贵建议；李树清博士在汉语语言和中国历史以及生活史编辑工作方面多有建议——我们在此都一并表示感谢。以上诸位对本书的内容和形式不负任何责任。罗伯特·雷德菲尔德1952年5月于芝加哥大学参考文献[1]Peasant Life in China (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.; New York: E. P.Dutton & Co., 1939).[2]Earthbound China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945; London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1948).[3]“Peasantry and Gentry: An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes,” American Journal of Sociology, LII, No. 1 (July, 1946), 1–17.[4]《江村经济——中国农民的生活》，伦敦：劳特里奇与基根·保罗出版有限公司；纽约：杜冬出版公司，1939年。[5]《被土地束缚的中国》，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1945年；伦敦：劳特里奇与基根·保罗出版有限公司，1948年。[6]《农民和士绅——中国社会结构及其变迁的一种解释》，载于《美国社会学学刊》第52卷第1期，1946年7月，1—17页。

第壹章 士绅与皇权

The term “gentry,” shen-shih, refers to a class of persons with a definite position and definite functions in the traditional society of China.Here, by “traditional society,” is meant the period after the breakdown of feudalism and the unification of the empire under a centralized monarchical power not long before 200 B.C. The development of the gentry class has a history; only through this history can we understand its characteristics.

The class that is here called gentry is also sometimes referred to asshih ta fu, “scholar-official.” Actually the gentry class, although closely linked with the group of scholar-officials, should be distinguished from it. To be born into a gentry family did not necessarily insure that one became a scholar or an official in traditional China. Under feudalism the situation was different. At that time the gap [1][2]between the nobles and the commoners was great. Shih and ta fu, although they were the bottom of the hierarchy of the ruling class, were still a part of that class and as such possessed real political power. But after the breakdown of feudalism political power was no longer portioned out but became concentrated in the person of one man, the monarch. In order to carry out his administrative functions, the monarch required assistance. This was given him by the officials. The officials then were no longer relatives or members of the ruler’s own family but rather employees—the servants,or tools, of the monarch.

After the breakdown of feudalism there was another important change. The throne became the object of capture by the strong, by the hunters after power. Under feudalism, in which political power was distributed to relatives and kin, anyone not born into a noble family was a common man who had no chance of reaching the throne, of touching or even of seeing the divine paraphernalia of monarchy. No more than a woman can change into a man could a common man become royal.But, when feudalism went, anyone could become emperor. Thus political power became an object of struggle. This is illustrated by the story told by the historian Ch’ien Ssu-ma of Xiang Yu, who during the Ch’in dynasty (221–206 B.C.), in watching an imperial procession, said to his friend, “This I can seize.” Since that time the struggle for political power has never ceased. Political power in the eyes of the people has become something precious to be sought after, an enterprise for large-scale entrepreneurs.

Unfortunately, since the breakdown of the feudal structure in China,political power has no longer been transmitted permanently in certain families, and up to the present no peaceful means of attaining it has ever been found. We continue to be convinced that the way to gain political power is through “taking up the stick” and fighting civil wars.Those few who emerge victorious in this struggle become emperors;the defeated become bandits. So we have had a succession of tyrants. A few people rule the mass. The nature of this despotic monarchy is not changed by the handing-on or relaying of power. In England, when a monarch was killed, monarchical power itself received a blow. Changes of monarchy led in time to a growth in the power of the people and to a government monarchic in name only. But, in China, blood flows from the people’s veins, while those who attain the throne are but a few fortunate adventurers, like Liu Pang, the first emperor of the Han, who was born a lowly peasant, or Chu Yuan-chang, the founder of the Ming dynasty.When we study official versions of Chinese history, we find presented to us a continuous line of dynastic descent; but we should not forget that the authority of these rulers was continuously challenged by civil wars and unscrupulous adventurers.

To struggle for political power by violence is dangerous. If a man succeeds, he may become emperor; but, if he loses, he will be killed, and not only he himself but his whole family and clan. When he is challenging the established emperor, he is called a bandit and rebel, and the might of the army is directed against him. Moreover, the empire gained by violence may be lost by violence also. Twice in history, according to tradition,emperors tried to give up their power to other men who they thought would make better rulers. But those to whom the power was offered did not want it. They preferred to run away rather than to take on the responsibility. We do not know how far these two emperors were sincere in their desire to give up their power and to what extent this action was no more than a gesture or a piece of complicated political intrigue. There is no question of the fact, however, that in all of Chinese recorded history there is not a single case of voluntary abdication from the throne. Those abdications which did take place were forced. “The empire that was won on horseback will be lost [3]only on horseback,” as the popular saying goes.

To seek to become a monarch is to risk one’s life. The heir to the throne must uphold his succession. The emperor, who should be merciful,may pardon all other crimes but not the crime of attempted usurpation.That is the most terrible thing that can be attempted under heaven. To anyone who reads the records of the beginnings of the Ming dynasty, the account of tortures applied to those who menaced the throne sounds like an account of progress through hell. I was told that the models of the “eighteen hells” found in district Buddhist temples are reminiscent of what was really done in the Ming dynasty. The threat of torture was the emperor’s protection. I remember once as a boy calling out in play, “I am the emperor.” My grandmother stopped me at once, saying, “You must never say that.” This was not superstition or overcaution on her part but a recognition of a real danger in rash speaking. According to tradition at least, emperors used to have those children killed whom fortune-tellers foretold would one day become monarchs.

But this threat of violence has never really given effective protection to monarchical power. As Lao-tzu says, “When one does not fear death,how is it possible to threaten a man with death？” When it is possible to gain political power through violence, the throne is tempting. Though the brutality of those in authority may silence the majority, repression will never be entirely successful. The magnitude of the stakes, an imperial power which could be used to realize any whim, could not but make the effort attractive in spite of dangers. On the one hand, there were those who were willing to gamble with their lives; on the other, there were those who submitted quietly. One may ask, then, what it was that decided on which side a man should be.

Under monarchical rule the people had only duties without rights; the emperor’s word was law. If he wanted to build a great palace, an imposing tomb, or a grand canal, he ordered it done without regard for the people.If he wanted to expand the boundaries of his kingdom, he commanded his army to mobilize regardless of whether the people liked it or not. The paying of taxes, the conscription of soldiers—these were burdens for the people to accept without compensation. Those who have lived under despotic monarchical power will understand [4]Confucius’ saying, “A brutal monarch is even worse than a tiger.” This policy of despotism more fearful than a tiger has had a long history in China. So we say, when the tiger comes out from his cage, [5]the frightened people escape to the Liang hills.

Upon all who are unarmed, we may say, the threat of political tyranny falls with equal weight. Yet in this, too, there have always existed differences. The richer folk could afford to pay for security. In the Chinese traditional pattern conscription, for example, could be bought off.The breaking-up of a family such as is described in “Old [6]Poem” could never have happened in a rich family. Thus it was that people from this class became political adventurers.

The possession of riches or the lack of them was what was important for making some acquiesce and others rebel. “Man fears to be distinguished as a pig fears to be fat.” When the political tiger attacks, the man who is rich will have a greater difficulty in escaping than the man without property.In such a case property becomes a burden. Propertied families developed great alertness in watching the behavior of the tiger. The poor man who has become desperate may rebel, become a bandit in the mountains, and even, in time, challenge the royal authority itself. But a man of property and family cannot easily do this. He must find some way to avoid the attack of the tiger. Unfortunately, as the old saying goes, “From the water’s edge, all land is the emperor’s; under the heavens all are the emperor’s men.” At that time travel was not easy; one could not run away to Washington or Brazil,nor was there any International Settlement in a treaty port, nor even any Hong Kong. Physically there was no escape. Perhaps this is not quite true,after all, because we know that from early times certain individuals were able to escape to Korea or Japan. But the ordinary man had to find some means of protection within the structure of society itself.

There was a weak point, however, in this centralized monarchical system. He who held power, the emperor, as I have said, could not administer the country by himself. Even though he might not wish to share his authority, he still required help in ruling and must therefore employ officials. These officials, with whom the ruling house had no ties of kinship,functioned merely as servants with administrative power but no power of policy-making. It was within the inefficiencies of this system that the ordinary man found his opportunity to carry on his private concerns.

It is true that previous to the unification of Ch’in (221 B.C.) there were attempts to establish an efficient administrative system. This was done under the influence of the Fa Chia, or Legalist, school of thought.Theoretically, the system proposed by this school of thought [7]was a good one. In order to have an efficient administration of the country, a legal basis must be established, with everyone controlled by the same law.Shang Yang, as prime minister of Ch’in, attempted to put this theory into practice. But the theory unfortunately neglected one small point. One man, the emperor, was left outside the law. And this [8]omission destroyed the whole system of the Fa Chia.

Shang Yang himself lost his life on this account, for, though under the law he was able to punish the prince when he was only the heir to [9]the throne, as soon as the prince became emperor, he ordered Shang Yang killed. And the efficient system which Shang Yang himself had established prevented him from escaping.

If the highest authority were bound by law, then administrative authority would be able to cage the tiger. But in Chinese history this has never happened. As a result, the ruled, including the officials themselves,have never sought for efficiency in administration. Rather the opposite has been true. Inefficiency and parasitism, on the one hand, remoteness of imperial control and a do-nothing policy by the emperor, on the other—this has always been the ideal. Yet this ideal of government, of a“good emperor” as one who presided but did not rule, has rarely been attained. As far as the officials were concerned, the next best thing,then, could only be to protect themselves, to keep a back door open for their relatives, and to be able to use their position as a shield against the emperor’s whims. To protect not only themselves but their relatives and their whole clan from the unchecked power of the monarch, and to do this not by constitutional or by legal means but by personal influence—this is what they sought. Not by challenging the emperor’s authority but by coming close to him, by serving him and from this service gaining an advantage in being enabled to shift the burden of the emperor’s demands onto the backs of those lower down, did the propertied class attempt to neutralize the emperor’s power over them and to avoid the attack of the tiger. Groups of officials, with their relatives, formed, thus, in Chinese society a special class not affected by the laws, exempt from taxation and conscription. Nevertheless, they had no real political power.

To escape domination while approaching the source of power takes a highly developed skill. The position of the officials was not easy. As the old sayings go, “When the emperor orders your death, you must die”and “All the blame is mine; the emperor can do no wrong.” If the official relaxed his efforts on behalf of the emperor, he might lose his life. When the emperor required money or labor, he must be active in meeting these demands—a task he accomplished by shifting the burden onto the backs of the people. Yet, if the burdens became too heavy for the people to bear,they might rebel, and it was then the officials who would be attacked first and who would serve as [10]the scapegoats of the monarch. The officials must be two-faced: severe toward the people and compliant toward the emperor. They must know the art of going just so far and no further in order that they might not be caught either by the fury of the emperor or by the wrath of the people. Chinese officials’ life has been described as the art of maneuvering on a stormy sea. Experience through the ages was the teacher. It may be noted that in Chinese the expression, “Do not speak to me officially,” does not mean the same thing as in English but rather, “Speak to me sincerely.”

In normal times to be an official was no direct economic advantage.From the monarch’s point of view, for an official to use his position to enrich himself meant corruption of the system and a diminution of his own treasure. Thus, unless a monarch were very weak, he would not tolerate such officials. An official in ordinary times would not improperly profit from the office but would leave it with “two [11]sleeves full of wind.”

Why, then, should people want to be officials？ The poem of T’ao Yuan-ming expresses the feelings of one such man:

Why should I be an official？

I bend my back

For only three piculs of rice.[12]

Why should I not go back to till the land？

T’ao Yuan-ming was a typical unworldly poet. Yet, in spite of his talent and his interest in the things of the mind, even he had to “bend his back”and occupy an official position and withal receive only a small financial reward. Why did such a one accept this position instead of staying home where he was happy？ The fact is that, if he had shown his scorn of officialdom by leaving office, he would probably by now be [13]“a man without an arm.” The choice lay between “bending the back” or being disabled. The necessity for becoming an official was a little like the need for being inoculated. Just as one runs the risk of having a bad reaction to an inoculation, so in becoming an official one may risk having one’s property confiscated or even one’s head cut off. But, once the inoculation is over, one has gained protection. This analogy is not too apt, since from an inoculation one person becomes immune, whereas if one has been an official one can protect a whole group of people. As a result, it happened that sometimes a group would join to aid in the education of one man so as to enable him to reach officialdom. “One man rises to officialdom, then all his dogs and chickens will be promoted,” is the saying.

In Chinese traditional society the clan or big family naturally constituted a group which could take action of this sort, supporting one of their members until the time when he should become a scholar and be eligible for the official examinations. Once this individual attained official honors, the whole clan could rely upon him. Without any strong person at court, it was difficult to protect one’s property. Ku T’ing-lin was an official during the Ming dynasty,but, when the rule passed to the Manchus, he refused to continue in an official position, gave up traveling abroad, and shut himself up at home with his books. Yet for his own protection he was obliged to send his two nephews to the Ch’ing court to serve his enemies. This was made possible by the fact that, as we have said, Chinese officials did not share in the political power of the emperor but served their monarch by neutralizing and softening down his power rather than by supporting it. With his nephews in court, the uncle was protected even in secret rebellious activities. According to Chinese tradition, officials did not work seriously for the government, nor did they like to continue as officials for a long period. Their purpose in entering the government was to gain both immunity and wealth in this order. The Chinese officials when in office protected their relatives, but, when this duty to the family had been performed, they retired. Retirement and even a hermit’s life were the ideal. In retirement there was no longer any authority to be served with watchful care, while the relatives who had gained protection from their kinsman official owed him a debt of gratitude. Now he need only enjoy his social prestige and grow fat and happy. As we say in China, “To come back to one’s native soil, beautifully robed [14]and loaded with honors, is the best thing in life.” Such a man will not attempt to seize power; his children will not play at being emperor. Nor will he have any idea of reforming the social system, for that system will do him no harm. Once out of the way of imperial influences,he may enjoy the economic power of a landowner.

This is the sort of man I mean by gentry. The gentry may be returned officials or the relatives of officials or simply educated landowners. In any case, they have no real political power in shaping policies and may have no direct connection with politics whatsoever, yet they do tend to have influence at court and to be immune from political exploitation. And the more fearful the ruler and the more tiger-like, the more valuable is the gentry’s protective covering. In such circumstances it is difficult to survive except by attaching one’s self to some big family.“士绅”这个词，指的是在中国传统社会中占有一定地位、发挥一定功能的一个阶层。这里所谓的“传统社会”是指临近公元前3世纪时封建制度解体之后，由中央集权一统天下的帝国时期。士绅阶层有其自身的发展历史，只有通过这一历史，我们才能了解其特征。

本书所讲的士绅阶层有时也被称为“士大夫”。实际上，虽然士绅阶层与士大夫群体紧密相连，但仍应把他们区分开来。出身于士绅家庭，并不能确保此人将来一定会成为中国传统社会中的文人或官员。在封建时代，情形便不大一样。封建时代的贵族和平民之间存在[15][16]有不可逾越的鸿沟。“士”和“大夫”虽然处于统治阶级等级体系的最底层，但他们仍属于统治阶级的一部分，并拥有真正的政治权力。但封建制度解体后，政权不再分散，而是集中在最高统治者一人手里。为了实施管理，最高统治者需要辅佐。这种辅佐是由官吏来提供的。因此，这里的官吏不再是统治者的家族成员或亲戚，而是他的雇佣，即仆人或者统治工具。

封建制度解体后发生了另一重要的变化，皇权成为强者、权力追逐者竞相争夺的目标。在封建制度下，政权分配给统治者的亲戚和家属，出生在贵族家庭之外的人是平民，他们永远没有机会登上王位，没有机会触摸君王的神圣用具，甚至连看的机会也没有。平民要想成为皇室的成员就像女人要变成男人一样不大可能。但是，封建制度解体后，任何人都有可能成为皇帝。这样，政治权力就成为大家争夺的目标。历史学家司马迁描述过这样一个故事：秦朝(公元前221年—公元前206年)时的项羽在观看皇家列队时对他的朋友说：“彼可取而代之。”从那以后，争夺政治权力的斗争从来就没有停止过。政治权力在人们的眼里已成为竞相猎取的宝贝，要做大买卖的就干这个。

不幸的是，中国封建制度里解放出来的政权，固然不再专属一姓、万世一系了，但是到现在还没有找出一个夺取政权的和平方式。我们一说起夺取政权，就忘不了“揭竿而起”的内战手段。武力争夺的方式下，政权变成了“成则为王、败则为寇”的夺宝对象。夺来夺去，以暴易暴，总是极少数人统治着其他的人民，专制的皇权并没有在政权的传承和接替中发生任何性质上的改变。我们不像英国——杀了一个皇帝，皇权减少了一些，民权抬了一些头；赶走一个皇帝，皇权又减少了一些，民权再抬一些头；最后竟成了个挂名皇帝，取消了皇权——但是，在传统中国只有“取而代之”的故事，流的是人民的血，得到宝座的却是少数幸运的“流氓”，像下层农民出身的汉朝开国皇帝刘邦、明朝开国皇帝朱元璋等一派人物就是。在官方修撰的史籍上，固然有着一脉相承的正统；可事实上，大小规模的内战和肆无忌惮的冒险者恐怕是经常的现象，史不绝书，不断挑战着统治者的权威。

以武力争夺政权是危险的事。成固然可以称王，败则只有一死；非但一死，而且还会灭族。当他向当政的皇帝提出挑战时，他就成为寇匪或反贼，军队会冲他而来。况且，通过暴力得来的政权可能也会因暴力而丧失。历史上曾有过两次，依照传统，皇帝试图把政权让给他认为是更好的统治者的人。但是那些人并不想得到政权，他们宁可远离而不愿肩负责任。我们无从得知这两位皇帝让出政权的诚心有多大，也不清楚在何种程度上，这不过是一种姿态或是复杂的政治阴谋。但是有一个事实无法否认：中国有记载的历史中，没有一个皇帝主动退位让出皇权；曾经有过让位的例子，但那是出于被迫。常言道：马[17]背上得天下，亦只于马背上失天下。

想当君王实际上是拿生命去冒险。王位继承人肯定要保住其继承权。作为皇帝应该仁慈，他可以赦免其他所有罪行，而唯独不能对谋反篡权罪手软。谋反是天底下最可怕的事。任何读过明朝初期历史的人都知道，书中描写的对谋反分子施加的酷刑仿佛是在地狱中发生的一样。我们在城隍庙里所见到的“十八层地狱”的形象，据说是写实的，是明史的标本。酷刑的威胁便是皇帝的保护伞。记得小时候，有一次我在玩耍中大喊了一句：“我是皇帝!”祖母急忙阻止我说：“这是不能说的!”她并不是迷信，也非过于小心，而是意识到信口一句话会带来的实际的危险。至少依照传统来看，皇帝常会把那些据算命先生讲长大会做皇帝的孩子杀死。

但是，武力的威胁并没有真正有效地保护皇权。正如老子所言：“民不畏死，奈何以死惧之？”当通过暴力夺取政权成为可能时，王权就变得异常诱人。虽然统治者的暴行可以使多数人保持沉默，但压迫永远也不会完全奏效。在予取予夺的专制皇权下，政权可以用来谋取私人的幸福，社会也可以从顺逆的界限上分出敢于冒大不韪的人和不敢冒大不韪的人。那么，有人就会问了，敢与不敢这样的事情是怎样决定的呢？

在专制政权之下，人民只有义务而没有权利，皇帝的话就是法律。皇帝如果想要建造一座宏大的宫殿、巨大的陵墓，或是挖一条大运河，他不会顾及百姓，只是下令让手下人去做。如果他想开疆拓土，就会命令军队去动员，不管人民愿不愿意。赋税和兵役都是百姓难以接受的负担，并且没有任何的补偿。生活在暴虐的专制统治下的人们很容[18]易理解孔子的“苛政猛于虎也”这句话。这种比老虎更可怕的暴政在中国有很长的历史。所以我们说，这政治老虎出了栏，就会吓得人[19]逼上梁山了。

专政统治的威胁对所有手无寸铁的人来讲，其威力都是一样的，但常常也有不同。富人可以用银子来买安全。比如，古代中国的征兵制度中有用银子来代替服兵役的做法。古诗中描写的支离破碎的家庭[20]绝不会是富人家。因此恰恰是出自贫民阶层的人变成了政治上的冒险者。

财富的占有和匮乏是导致沉默和反抗的重要原因。“人怕出名猪怕壮。”当政治猛虎出击的时候，富有者比穷人更难以逃脱灾难，这时候财富变成了负担。富贵人家善于对“老虎”察言观色，而绝望的穷人也许会揭竿而起，或是落草为寇，甚至迟早直接向皇权发起挑战。一个有家室、有财产的人不会轻易这么做，他必须设法摆脱“老虎”的攻击。不幸的是，正如古人所言：“普天之下，莫非王土；率土之滨，莫非王臣。”那时出门可不容易，不能跑到华盛顿或巴西，也不可能在任何一个通商口岸寻求国际避难，甚至也没有香港这类地方。在地理空间上是无处可逃的。但也许并不完全如此，毕竟我们知道有些人在早年就逃到了朝鲜或日本。但是，一般人只能在现有的社会体制下寻找自我保护的途径。

不过，这种集权的专制统治有一个弱点，正如我说的那样，掌握政权的皇帝，不能独自管理国家。即使他不愿意让别人分享权力，他仍需要任命官吏做助手和代理，协助其实施统治。这些官吏与皇室没有亲戚关系，如同皇帝的雇佣，他们没有立法权，只有行政管理权。在这种效率低下的制度下，普通百姓才有机会产生私欲。

在秦朝统一国家(公元前221年)以前，确实曾有些人想要建立一个富有效率的行政机构。这是受到了法家学派的思想的影响。从理论[21]上来讲，这一学派提出的体系是好的。有效率的行政机构必须是一个法制的机构，所有人都要受到同样的法律的控制。作为秦国宰相的商鞅试图要将这一理论付诸实践。可不幸的是，这一理论有一点小小的疏忽——有一个人没有被纳入法律之内，那就是天子。这留在法[22]律之外的一个人却把法家的整个体系废黜了。

商鞅因此自己把命丢了，尽管在法律之下，他能够对还只是王位[23]继承人的太子加以惩罚，但是太子一当上皇帝就下令将商鞅杀掉，由商鞅自己所建立起来的高效率的体系也使他自己在劫难逃。

如果最高的权威受到了法律的约束，那么行政的权威就能够将这只老虎囚住。但是在中国的历史上，这样的事情从来没有发生过。结果，被统治者——包括官吏自己在内——从来就不追求行政上的效率。实际的情况正是与之相对立。一方面是无效率和寄生，另一方面是天高皇帝远以及皇帝的无为政策——这一直是一种理想的状态。然而这种政府的理想，即是说一位“好皇帝”应当统而不治，这样的皇帝很少有人能够做到。就官吏而言，退而求其次的办法就只能是保护他们自己，为他们的亲戚开后门，并且还能够利用他们的位置作为一种挡箭牌来抵御皇帝的变化无常。要保护的不仅是他们自己，还有他们的亲戚以及整个宗族免遭不受限制的君主权力的侵扰，而且这样做所依靠的并非是宪法或者法律的手段，而是依靠个人的影响力——这就是他们所追求的。有产阶级想要消磨掉皇帝加诸他们身上的权力，并以此来避开这只老虎的攻击，并非是靠对皇帝的权威加以挑战，而是靠亲近皇帝、为皇帝服务，从中获得的一种好处便是能够将皇帝各种要求的负担转移给比自己阶层更低者。官僚及其庇护下的亲友集团由此构成了中国社会所特有的一个不受法律影响的阶层，他们有免役免税的特权。虽然如此，但他们并没有真正的政治权力。

逃避自己想要接近的权力之源的支配，需要有高超的技能。官僚的位置并不轻松。正如古语所言：“君要臣死，臣不得不死”，还有“臣罪当诛，天王圣明”。他不能怠工而有损皇帝的利益，否则可能性命不保。当皇帝需要钱或劳力的时候，他必须特别卖力来满足这些需要，即通过把整个的政治负担转嫁到平民身上来完成这项差事。但是，一旦这种负担过重，人民无法承受之时，他们便可能起来造反，到时就是这些官僚们首当其冲地受到攻击，由此而成了国君的替罪

[24]羊。官僚们必须有两套面目：对人民严酷而对皇帝顺从。他们必须要知道进退有节，适可而止，以免走了极端而惹恼了皇帝，或者是引起人民的激愤。中国官僚们的生活曾被描述为是在风云变幻的海上运筹帷幄的艺术。代代相传的经验即为人师。应该注意的是，在汉语中所说的“不要打官腔”，并非与英语字面的意思一样，而实际是在说：“跟我说实话。”

在平常的日子里，做官并没有什么直接的经济上的好处。在皇帝看来，官员利用自己的职位来致富，不仅意味着腐化皇权所依赖的制度，而且是皇家财富的减缩。因此，除非某位皇帝软弱无能，否则，他是不会容许有这种官员存在的。处在太平盛世的官员不会不合法地[25]从官位上捞到好处，而只会在离任时留下“两袖清风”。

那么，为什么人们还想要做官呢？陶渊明的诗表达了这种感慨：我为什么要去做官呢？只为五斗米折腰。[26]我为什么不归耕田园？

陶渊明是一位典型的出世诗人。尽管他富有才气，也很有风雅，但他还是“折了腰”，身居一个官位，仅仅是为了得到那么一点俸禄。为什么这样的一个人要去接受这样的一个位置，而不是呆在他所喜欢的家里呢？事实恰恰是，如果他真的表现出自己看不上官职，弃官而[27]去，他就可能成为一位“折臂翁”了。这就是说必须在“折腰”和“折臂”之间作出选择。做官的必要性有点像打防疫针。正像打防疫针要冒打了过后有不良反应的风险一样，做官就可能要冒抄家和掉脑袋的危险。但是，一旦打了针后，人就可以有免疫力了。这样的比喻略有点不贴切，因为打了防疫针，只能够使一个人自己得到免疫，而做官所能庇护的是一整群的人。结果有时就出现了一大群人资助一个人去读书，以便使他能够获得个一官半职；一人升官，鸡犬安宁。

在中国传统社会中，宗族和大家庭自然就构成了这样的一个团体，这个团体所做的一件事情就是供其中一员去上学，一直到他考上了功名，得了一官半职，一族人就有靠山了。若在朝廷里没有靠山，在乡间想保持财产是困难的。顾亭林是明朝的一位官员，当改朝换代成了清朝，他拒绝再任官员，深居简出，闭门读书。但是为了安全和保障，他还是不得不派两名外甥到朝廷里去侍奉他的敌人。正如我们已经说过的，这之所以可能做到，是因为中国官员不是与皇帝分享政治权力，是通过淡化和弱化而非支持其权力来服务于君主。外甥做官，保障了舅舅的安全，甚至使舅舅能安心地去下革命的种子。中国传统的官吏并不认真做官，更不想终身做官：打防疫针的人绝不以打针为乐，目的在免疫和免了疫的健康。中国的官吏在做官时庇护其亲友，做了一阵，他任务完成，就要告老还乡了，即所谓“归去来兮”那一套。退隐山林是中国人的理想。这时，上边不必再小心伺候随时可以杀他的主子，周围是感激他的亲戚街坊。此时他只需要享受他的社会声望，生活富足，心宽体胖。正如中国人所说的，“衣锦还乡是人生[28]活中最美好的事情”。他绝不冒险去觊觎政权，他的孩子都不准玩“做皇帝”的游戏。他更不想改革社会制度，因为这种社会制度对他并没有害处。一旦他脱离开皇权的限制，他就可以享受地主的经济权利。

这种人就是我所谓的“士绅”。士绅可以是退任的官僚，或是官僚的亲属，甚至可以是受过教育的地主。在任何情况下，他们都没有左右政策的实际的政治权力，可能与政治也没有任何直接的联系，可是他们常常有势力，势力就是政治免疫性。统治者越可怕，越像猛虎一样，士绅的保护性的庇护作用就越大。在此情况下，托庇于豪门才有命。参考文献[1]Shih: “This word is often translated ‘scholar,’ but this is only a derived,metaphorical sense and the whole force of many passages in the Analects is lost if we do not understand that the term is a military one and means “knight.’ Ashih was a person entitled to go to battle in a war-chariot, in contrast with the common soldiers who followed on foot. Confucius, by a metaphor similar to those embodied in the phraseology of the Salvation Army, calls the stout-hearted defenders of his Way ‘Knights’; and hence in later Chinese the term came to be applied to upholders of Confucianism and finally to scholars and literary people in general. The burden of most of the references to shih in the Analects is that the Knight of the Way needs just the same qualities of endurance and resolution as the Soldier Knight” (Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938], pp. 33–34).[2]Ta fu: lower-ranking official under feudalism.[3]This phrase seems to refer back to the story told of Kao-tsu, the first emperor of Han, and the Confucian scholar Lu Chia. “After his [Lu Chia’s] return in 196 or195 B.C., he is said to have quoted the Book of Odes and the Book of History to Kaotsu, whereat the latter scolded him and said, ‘I got the empire on horseback; why should I bother with the Book of Odes or the Book of History？’ Lu Chia replied, ‘You got it on horseback, but can you rule it from horseback？’ Then he proceeded to quote cases, from ancient history, of kings who had lost their thrones through their wickedness, concluding with the Ch’in dynasty, which Kao-tsu had himself overthrown” (Pan Ku, The History of the Former Han Dynasty, trans. Homer H.Dubs [Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1938], I, 21).[4]“As they [Confucius and his disciples] passed by the T’ai mountain, the attention of the travellers was arrested by a woman weeping and wailing at a grave. The sage stopped, and sent one of his followers to ask the reason of her grief. ‘My husband’s father,’ said she, ‘was killed here by a tiger, and my husband also, and now my son has met the same fate.’ Being asked why she did not leave so fatal a spot, she replied that there was there no oppressive Government. ‘Remember this,’ said Confucius to his disciples, ‘remember this, my children, oppressive government is fiercer and more feared than a tiger’ ” (James Legge, Life of Confucius, in Vol. I of The Chinese Classics [2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895], quoted from Li Chi, pp. 67–68).[5]The Liang hills are here a reference to the Chinese novel, Ju Hu (All Men Are Brothers), in which it is told how men of many sorts, fleeing from harsh punishments of the authorities, came to band themselves together and lived by defying the government and preying upon the rich and powerful. Stories of this sort had a very real basis in fact. In Pan Ku’s History of the Former Han Dynasty we read, for example: “Ch’ên Shê was an ambitious farm boy who became one of the chiefs of a levy of men made in the present southern Honan.... In the latersummer of 209 B.C., a bad rain prevented this levy from reaching its destination on time. According to Ch’in laws, the officers and men of the levy would have been condemned to death; they accordingly conspired to rebel. As a slogan they falsely called themselves partisans of Fu-su, the displaced heir of the First Emperor, and fabricated miracles to legitimize themselves. The rebellion was not thus at first openly directed against the dynasty, but was merely the act of men driven to desperation by over-harsh laws” (I, 4).[6]“Old Poem,” translated by Arthur Waley from The Book of Songs, reads:“At fifteen I went with the army,At fourscore I came home.On the way I met a man from the village,I asked him who there was at home.‘That over there is your house,All covered with trees and bushes.’Rabbits had run in at the dog-hole,Pheasants flew down from the beams of the roof.In the courtyard was growing some wild grain;And by the well, some wild mallows.I’ll boil the grain and make porridge,I’ll pluck the mallows and make soup.Soup and porridge are both cooked,But there is no one to eat them with.I went out and looked towards the cast,While tears fell and wetted my clothes.”(Arthur Waley, Chinese Poems [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1946], p. 51.)[7]Waley discusses the social situation in which the Legalist school rose to power under the title “The Realists,” in The Way and Its Power (London: George Allen& Unwin, 1934), pp. 68–86. The Fa Chia system, in spite of its recognition of the importance of a “rule of law,” and its effort toward greater efficiency in government, does not appeal to the Western liberal mind. The Book of Lord Shang,trans. J. J. Duyvendak (London: A. Probsthain, 1928), supposedly the writing of Shang Yang, otherwise known as Wei Yang or Lord Shang, expresses the extreme position of the Legalists. Duyvendak comments: “Law, having been applied theoretically only in order to enforce the observance of the standards set by natural moral law, now became the instrument for enforcing the standard set up by the state. Here came a clash between the law and moral traditions. Never had this idea of law anything to do with the codification of the conceptions of justice living in the hearts of the people; it was merely penal laws and institutions,deemed expedient for the government’s centralising and imperialistic purposes;it was the expression of the state’s own growing self-consciousness. It is very remarkable that, when we find the necessity for publishing the laws urged, it is not, as elsewhere, an expression of the popular wish to safeguard the people’s rights and privileges for the future; on the contrary, it is government itself that desires their publication as a safeguard of its own power, as it expects that the laws will be better observed if people know exactly what punishments and nonobservances will entail. Consequently, to have a deterrent effect, the laws have to be severe” (p. 81).[8]But, according to Fung Yu-lan, the highest ideal of the Legalist school actually was that “ruler and minister, superior and inferior, noble and humble, all obey the law.” Fung quotes from Han Fei-tzu, a leading Legalist: “Therefore, the intelligent ruler carries out his regulations as would Heaven and employs men as if he were a spirit. Being like Heaven, he commits no wrong, and being like a spirit, he falls into no difficulties. His shih (power) enforces his strict teachings, and nothing that he encounters resists him.” Fung interprets this passage as follows: “By comparing the ruler with Heaven, Han Fei-tzu means that he acts only according to the law,fairly and impartially. That he employs men ‘as if he were a spirit’ means that he makes use of them according to this “method’ or shu, secretly and unfathomably.”The gulf between this conception of law and the conception held in the West may be one reason why the ideal of “Great Good Government” has, as Fung says, “never yet actually been attained in China” (Fang Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy,trans. Derk Bodde [Peiping: H. Vetch, 1937], I, 320–322).[9]Even in this case the punishment was only indirect. “Then, the Crown Prince infringed the law. Wei Yang said: ‘It is owing to the infringements by the highlyplaced, that the law is not carried out. We shall apply the law to the Crown Prince; as, however, he is Your Highness’s Heir, we cannot subject him to capital punishment. Let his tutor, Prince Ch’ien, be punished and his teacher, Kung-sun Chia, be branded’ ” (Introduction to The Book of Lord Shang, p. 16).[10]“We have an ancient saying that if the dragon left its water and the tiger left the mountains, even they would be insulted. Take those officers in the imperial court, they take in all sorts of humiliations and never dare protest; but when they reach their homes, they scold and beat their children and wife to give vent to their angers. Yet the officers dare not resign, just like the tigers dare not leave the mountains and the dragons the waters” (Liu ê, A Tramp Doctor’s Travelogue:A Story Laid in the Manchu Regime, trans. Lin Yi-chin and Ko Te-chun [Shanghai:Commercial Press, 1939], p. 114).[11]“A poetic expression dating back to the Ming dynasty when Yu Ch’ien as a provincial official refused to follow the custom of handing out gifts exacted without payment from the populace to the dignitaries of the imperial court but instead presented himself empty-handed. The term has come to refer to officials who hold office and retire without having enriched themselves. In spite of pressures and practices to the contrary, this type of official has always been an ideal of Confucian teaching…. The China of the nineteenth century still kept green the memory of past officials who had been incorruptible. Their names were household words; stories about them had been treasured for centuries. Thus,the Ancestral Hall of the Yang family was still called the Hall of the Four Knows because of what had happened there seven centuries earlier. In A.D. 112, when a friend remonstrated with Yang Chen for leaving nothing to his sons, he replied:‘If posterity speaks of me as an incorruptible official, will that be nothing？’ And when a man offered him a bribe and said: ‘It is after dark and no one will know,’Yang Chen was recorded as saying: ‘Not know？ Why, Heaven will know, Earth will know, you will know, I will know.’ There was a later Yang, Yang Ch’eng, who lived a thousand years before the time of Tao Kuang. Ordered to collect taxes during the famine, he refused, and threw himself into prison where he slept on a plank.Many other old stories of official rectitude were current” (Maurice Collis, Foreign Mud [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947], p. 95).[12]“T’ao, who lived in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., was our poet of nature par excellence. Once he served as a district magistrate. When he could not longer stand the ordeal of formality he burst out upon the occasion of the arrival of the provincial inspector, his superior, ‘I cannot bow to a mean fellow from the street just for five pecks of rice.’ So saying, he left his official hat hanging on the wall and went right home” (C. W. Luh, On Chinese Poetry [Peiping, 1935], p. 16).“What folly to spend one’s life like a dropped leafSnared under the dust of streets,But for thirty years it was so I lived.…There is no dust or clatterIn the courtyard before my house.My private rooms are quiet,And calm with the leisure of moonlight through an open door.For a long time I lived in a cage;Now I have returned.For one must returnTo fulfill one’s nature.”(“Once More Fields and Gardens,” by T’ao Yuan-ming, in Fir-Flower Tablets,translated from the Chinese by Florence Ayscough, English versions by Amy Lowell [Boston: Houghton Mi？　in Co., 1930], p. 133.)[13]In “The Old Man with the Broken Arm (A Satire on Militarism),” ca. A.D. 809, by Po Chü-i, we read:“Everyone says that in expeditions against the Man tribesOf a million men who are sent out, not one returns.I, that am old, was then twenty-four;My name and fore-name were written down in the rolls of the Board of War.In the depth of the night not daring to let anyone know,I secretly took a huge stone and dashed it against my arm.For drawing the bow and waving the banner now wholly unfit,I knew henceforward I should not be sent to fight in Yun-nan.Bones broken and sinews wounded could not fail to hurt;My plan was to be rejected and sent back to my home.My arm—broken ever since; it was sixty years ago.One limb, although destroyed—whole body safe!But even now on winter nights when the wind and rains blowFrom evening on till day’s dawn I cannot sleep for pain.Not sleeping for painIs a small thing to bear,Compared with the joy of being alive when all the rest are dead.For otherwise, years ago, at the ford of Lu RiverMy body would have died and my soul hovered by the bones that no one gathered.A ghost, I’d have wandered in Yun-nan, always looking for home.Over the graves of ten thousand soldiers, mournfully hovering.”(From Chinese Poems, trans. Arthur Waley, pp. 129–131.)[14]Po Chü-i thus congratulates himself on the comforts of his life after his retirement from office:“Lined coat, warm cap and easy felt slippers,In the little tower, at the low window, sitting over the sunken brazier.Body at rest, heart at peace; no need to rise early.I wonder if the courtiers at the Western Capital know of these things or not？”(From A Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems, trans. Arthur Waley [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1919], p. 239.)[15]“士”这个字“英文经常译成‘scholar(学者)’，这只是一个引申出的比喻义，实际上此词与军事有关，是‘骑士’的意思，如果我们不这样理解，《论语》中很多篇幅就会完全丧失意义。‘士’是可以乘战车奔赴战场的，而普通士兵只能徒步其后。孔子打了一个比方，这个比方所指的人与有着‘救世军’称号的人是相似的，孔子把英勇护卫其道的人称作‘骑士’。因此，在后来的汉语中，这个词用来指拥护孔子思想的人，最后统指文人。《论语》中大多数关乎‘士’这个字的重点都是指需要像战士中的骑士一样具有那种忍耐力和不屈不挠禀性的卫道士”。引自《论语》英文版，阿瑟·韦利译，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1938年，第33—34页。[16]“大夫”：封建制度下地位较低的官吏。[17]此句源于汉代开国皇帝高祖与儒生陆贾的故事。“公元前196年或前195年，陆贾出使回来后，据说他对高祖引述了《诗经》和《书经》的话。高祖责备他说：我从马上得到天下，何必计较《诗经》和《书经》呢？!(乃公居马上而得之，安事《诗》、《书》!)陆贾则回答道：您可以在马上得天下，但是您能在马上治理天下吗？(马上得之，宁可以马上治之乎？)然后，他引经据典，历数古代帝王由于暴虐丢掉王位的史实，直到高祖推翻的秦朝。”引自班固《汉书》英文版，德效骞译，1938年，巴尔的摩：韦弗利出版社，第1卷，第21页。[18]“当他们(孔子和他的学生)路过泰山时，发现一个妇人在坟前哭。孔子停下脚步，让学生前去打探原因。妇人说：‘我的公公和丈夫都在这里被老虎吃掉了，如今我的儿子也没能逃脱这个厄运。’当问她为什么不离开这个不幸的地方时，妇人说这里没有官府的压迫。孔子对学生说：‘记住啊，学生们，残暴的统治比老虎更可怕。’”(孔子过泰山侧，有妇人哭于墓者而哀。夫子式而听之，使子路问之，曰：“子之哭也，壹似重有忧者。”而曰：“然。昔者吾舅死于虎，吾夫又死焉，吾子又死焉。”夫子问：“何为不去也？”曰：“无苛政。”夫子曰：“小子识之，苛政猛于虎也。)出自《礼记》，引自《中国典籍》第1卷之“孔子生平”，理雅各编译，伦敦：克拉伦登出版社，1895年，第2版，第67—68页。[19]梁山典故出自中国古典小说《水浒》，该书讲述了各色人等为逃避官府压迫而聚集在一起，杀富济贫，公然反对官府的故事。事实上，这类故事有深厚的现实基础。例如，班固在《汉书》中写道，陈胜(字涉)是一名有鸿鹄之志的农民，后来成为今属河南南部征募上来的兵卒的屯长……公元前209年夏末，一场大雨使得他们无法及时到达目的地。根据秦朝的法律，他们都将被处死。于是他们共谋起义大计。他们谎冒被废的皇太子扶苏的拥护者，通过编造鬼神启示来使他们的行为具有正当性。因此这一起义最初并非直接要反抗朝廷，而仅仅是一帮被严刑峻法逼上绝路的人的负隅之举。[20]这首古诗名为《十五从军征》，全诗如下：“十五从军征，八十始得归。道逢乡里人：‘家中有阿谁？’‘遥看是君家，松柏冢累累。’兔从狗窦入，雉从梁上飞；中庭生旅谷，井上生旅葵。舂谷持作饭，采葵持作羹；羹饭一时熟，不知贻阿谁。出门东向看，泪落沾我衣。”引自《中国诗歌》，阿瑟·韦利译，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1946年，第51页。(参考林庚和冯沅君主编《中国历代诗歌选》[上编]，第1册，人民文学出版社，1983年，第128页。——译者注)[21]韦利在《道及其力量》一书中以“实在论者”为题讨论了法家学派执掌权力的社会背景(伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1934年，第68—86页)。尽管法家的制度认识到了“法治”的重要性，并且努力使政府的运作更具效率，但这对西方倡导自由主义者来说并不具吸引力。戴闻达翻译的《商君书》英文版(伦敦：阿瑟·普罗赛因出版公司，1928年)一书，据说是由商鞅(又称卫鞅、商君)所写，它表达了法家的极端的观点。戴闻达评论道：“仅仅是为了强制人们遵守由自然道德律所建立的标准，并要在理论上贯彻的那种法律，现在则成了实施由国家所建立的标准的工具。这里就出现了法律与道德传统之间的撞击。这种法律观念与人们心中正义观念的法典化从来毫无关系，它仅仅是一种刑法和制度，并被看作是政府的中央集权和帝国统治的权宜之计而已。这是国家自己日益成长的自我意识的表达。显而易见的是，当我们发现有要颁布法律的愿望的时候，与别处不同的是，这并非是一种未来要保护人民权利和利益的民间愿望的表达；正相反，这恰恰是政府自己想要保护它自己的权力而想着要颁布法律，因为政府期望如果人民对违反法律所必须承担的惩罚有准确的了解，就会更好地遵守法律；因此，为了达到其威慑性，法律必须极为严苛。”(第81页)[22]照冯友兰的看法，法家的最高理想实际上是“君臣上下贵贱皆从法”。冯友兰引述著名的法家人物韩非子的话说：“故明主之行制也天，其用人也鬼。天则不非，鬼则不困，势行教严，逆而不违。”冯友兰对这一段文字有如下的解释：“‘明主之行制也天’，言其依法而行，公而无私也。‘其用人也鬼’，言其御人有术，密而不可测也。”这种法律观念与西方法律观念之间的沟壑可能就是为什么像冯友兰所说的“大治”“在中国历史中盖未尝实现”的一个原因。引自《中国哲学史》英文版，冯友兰著，德克·卜德译，北平：亨利·维奇出版公司，1937年，第1卷，第320—322页。[中文版参见冯友兰《中国哲学史》(上册)，中华书局，1961年，第391—392页。——译者注][23]即使在这种情况下，惩罚也仅仅是间接的。“于是太子犯法。卫鞅曰：‘法之不行，自上犯之。’将法太子。太子，君嗣也，不可施刑，刑其傅公子虔，黥其师公孙贾。”引自《商君书》英文版“导论”，第16页。[24]“所以古人说：龙若离水，虎若离山，便要受人狎侮的。即如朝廷里做官的人，无论为了甚么难，受了甚么气，只是回家来对着老婆孩子发发标，在外边决不敢发半句硬话，也是不敢离了那个官。同那虎不敢去山，龙不敢失水的道理，是一样的。”引自《老残游记》英文版，刘鹗著，林疑今、葛德顺译，上海：商务印书馆，1939年，第114页。[25]“这一诗意的表达要回溯到明朝的时候，作为省级官员的于谦拒绝同流合污，搜刮老百姓来给朝廷中的达官显贵送礼，而是两手空空前去。这一成语指的是官僚们身居官位及至退休的时候并没有使自己发财致富。尽管有来自反面的压力和做法，这种类型的官员一直是儒家教育推崇的理想典范……19世纪的中国还牢牢记着过去的一身廉洁的官员们。他们的名字家喻户晓，有关他们的故事被世代铭记珍视。因此，杨姓堂号仍旧被称作‘四知堂’，源于七个世纪以前发生的一桩逸事。在公元112年，当一位朋友指责杨震没有给他的儿子们留下任何东西时，他就回答说：‘如果子孙后代把我说成是一位清官的话，那不应该说是什么都没留下吧？’有人向他行贿时说：‘现在天色已晚，不会有人知道。’据记载杨震当时说：‘为什么没有人知道？天知、地知、你知、我知。’后来还出了个阳城，他的生活年代要早于道光朝一千多年[实际为唐代，不到一千年；见《新唐书·列传第一百一十九》——编者注]。皇帝命令他在饥荒的年代去收税，他拒绝了，并自囚于狱中，睡在狱中的一块木板上面。其他许多正直官员仗义执言的古老故事都流传至今。”引自《外来的泥土》，莫里斯·科利斯著，纽约：艾尔弗雷德·克诺夫出版公司，1947年，第95页。[26]“陶渊明生活在公元4世纪—5世纪，他是一位优秀的崇尚自然的诗人。他曾经做过县令，但无法忍受繁文缛节的束缚。当他的上级郡监察官来巡察的时候，他的情绪一下子爆发出来，他说：‘吾不能为五斗米折腰，拳拳事乡里小人邪!’说完这样的话之后，他便挂冠归隐。”引自陆志韦著，《中国诗五讲》英文版(英文书名应为Five Lectures on Chinese Poetry——编者注)，1935年，第16页。“误落尘网中，一去三十年。……户庭无尘杂，虚室有余闲。久在樊笼里，复得返自然。”引自陶渊明诗《归园田居》，载于埃米·洛厄尔、弗洛伦丝·艾斯库合译诗集《松花笺》，波士顿：霍顿·米夫林出版集团，1930年，第133页。(可参见林庚和冯沅君主编《中国历代诗歌选》[上编]，人民文学出版社，1983年，第128页。——译者注)[27]白居易于公元809年在《新丰折臂翁》这首诗中写道：“皆云前后征蛮者，千万人行无一回。是时翁年二十四，兵部牒中有名字。夜深不敢使人知，偷将大石槌折臂。张弓簸旗俱不堪，从兹始免征云南。骨碎筋伤非不苦，且图拣退归乡土。此臂折来六十年，一肢虽废一身全。至今风雨阴寒夜，直到天明痛不眠。痛不眠，终不悔，且喜老身今独在。不然当时泸水头，身死魂孤骨不收。应作云南望乡鬼，万人冢上哭呦呦。”引自《中国诗歌》，韦利译，第129—131页。(中文参见《白居易诗译析》，霍松林著，黑龙江人民出版社，1981年，第152—153页。——译者注)[28]白居易曾作诗来形容他辞官还乡后的舒适生活，诗中写道：“重裘暖帽宽毡履，小阁低窗深地炉。身稳心安眠未起，西京朝士得知无。”引自《中国诗歌170首》，韦利译，纽约：艾尔弗雷德·克诺夫出版公司，1919年，第239页。

第贰章 文人当官

In my first chapter I tried to analyze the position of the gentry in the political structure. My view is that, since the establishment of a central unified political power in the third century B.C., the gentry as a class have never attempted to control political power. That is, although occupying official positions, they have not exercised any decisive powers as to policy. Under the feudal system sovereignty belonged to the aristocracy;under the monarchy, to the king-emperor. The question which arises,then, is this: Why in Chinese history has there been no period in which the power of the aristocracy revived or in which a bourgeois middle class took over political power？ The answer to this question leads us to a study of the political consciousness of the gentry and their attitude toward their own position. Why did they not struggle with the monarch to gain control？ Why was there no movement similar to Magna Carta in England？ The class who were landowners in the economic structure were gentry in the social structure. Why did they become so neutral, so negative in politics？ In this chapter I shall be especially attentive to one question: What was the attitude of the gentry class toward their political position？ It is true that their attitude was not cause but rather effect of the political system upon them. Nevertheless, it may be said that the attitudes of acquiescence which developed within the political system tended to reinforce the system.

Every social structure has a system of attitudes which define proper behavior and support the structure. What I am going to discuss in this chapter is the attitude of the gentry toward the monarchical power after they had come to be controlled by that power.

In the political philosophy of the traditional gentry class there was [1]an important idea called tao-t’ung. This idea took shape before the firm establishment of monarchical power and was probably necessary for its development. In my analysis I am concerned particularly with the period before the firm establishment of monarchical power when feudalism was in process of breaking down.

I am not inclined to think that this social philosophy originated in the minds of a few scholars. On the contrary, I believe that the scholars’elaboration of the system was accepted by society because it reflected a point of view which was generally shared. The function of the scholar was to formulate, to clarify, and to crystallize this point of view into a doctrine. In the period of transition between feudalism and imperialism the school of thought which reflected the philosophic trend of the times best was that of Confucius and his followers. But the Confucian school was only one of many in this period of the “hundred schools.” It was only later, after the stabilization of the imperial power, that Confucianism came to be so popular and dominating. This shows, I think, that the ideology of the Confucian school represented the point of view best adapted to the Chinese imperial system.

The conception of tao-t’ung developed from a set of social facts,of which one important element was that a class of socially important people had lost their political power. Confucian ideas, as formulated and organized into the Confucian system, following the concentration of monarchical power and the disintegration of the feudal system,underwent, it is true, an understandable process of change. And the writings we now have about Confucian ideas have been much modified by later scholars. I should like, however, to start here with the basic Confucian ideas and to try to trace their development to a later period.But, in discussing the influence of Confucius on the social history of China, we are not concerned with the question of whether the idea oftao-t’ung was that of Confucius himself but rather with the fact that this concept was selected and elaborated in his name by later scholars.

It appears to me that the development of the idea of tao-t’ung took place in Chinese traditional society because there had appeared a new type of person, the scholar-intellectual, one excluded from political authority but still possessing social prestige. Since he did not have political power,such a man could not decide political issues. Yet he might, through making known his opinions and formulating his principles, exercise a real influence. Such men did not try to control political power in their own interest but endeavored rather to put forward a set of ethical principles which should restrict the force of political power. The system of tao-t’ungwhich they developed came to be accepted by the gentry as the norm for their activity in politics. Eventually it came to serve the gentry not only as an ethical system but also as a protection for economic interests.

As the gentry attempted to restrict political power by ethical means,they put forward the teachings of Confucius, calling the latter the creator of tao, and a “king without a throne.” And his spiritual descendants are those whom we now call master-scholars.

Legends which grew up concerning Confucius and his origins symbolize the separation of the ethical from the political line. In the early period of mythical history going back to such culture heroes as Sui Jen,the inventor of fire, and Shen Nung, who started agriculture, through the reigns of all San Huang and Wu Ti (the Three August Ones and the Five Sovereigns) through the recorded history of the [2]feudal kings of Chou, Wen Wang, and Wu Wang, one finds the tradition of ethics and politics united.The Confucian school upheld these ancient rulers as ideals. Here were men who both knew and followed the principles of right rulership. Following the rulers of Chou mentioned above, came Chou Kung, or the Duke of Chou,who, as uncle of the heir to the throne, ruled as regent. Much importance was attached to this individual by Confucius’ school, because even under the feudal system he was able to attain high authority, being actually a sovereign. The regency itself was meaningful in that it symbolized the idea that, when the sovereign is unable to rule, the one who knows should take his place. Here was the beginning of the separation of the political and ethical lines. Confucius himself identified himself closely with Chou Kung. He said: “How utterly have things gone to the bad with me! It is long now indeed since I dreamed that I saw the Duke of [3]Chou.” In the legend of Chou Kung there is, to be sure, not a very marked separation between the political and ethical lines, since, as uncle of the king, Chou Kung was entitled to rule as regent. But the later followers of Confucius put him next to Chou Kung in a line of descent of noted and wise leaders. Thus Chou Kung is the starting point of the political line deviating from the ethical.

The separation of ethical and political lines was, according to the stories of the Confucian school, more clearly established by saying that this “king without a throne” was the descendant of an aristocratic family.Actually, his connection was rather remote. He was not at all comparable in this way to a Chou Kung. Confucius had no qualifications for attaining power through his kinship status. But myths which tried to find a source of authority for him in the feudal system [4]persisted. According to the Shihchi, Confucius’ origins were quite doubtful. He was said to be the child of an illegitimate union. His mother would not tell him where his father’s tomb was, and only when his mother died did he learn from someone else where his father was buried so that he could bury his mother also in that spot. Here also is recorded the incident of a man called Chih, Baron of Lu, giving a feast to the shih, to which Confucius went also. But he met with a rebuff when a man called Yang Huo, a corrupt official, said, “The Baron invited shih (knights), not you.” From this we may infer that his status as a shih was doubtful, although the shih were in the lowest rank in the feudal system. Yet such accounts are told not to demean Confucius but to raise him still higher, as when an account later on in the same book adds that Confucius was born after his mother had prayed on a hill—the implication being that Confucius was of divine, not merely mortal, origin.

The importance of all these myths was not so much to establish the origins of Confucius as to set up divine authority for the ethical line which he represented. Thus, if Confucius derived his power not through his kinship with a feudal lord but from divine sources, his spiritual throne must be as high as the actual kingly throne. So from Confucius there derived a line of important and authoritative figures of those who followed the tao-t’ung. These people might lack political power, but in the society about them they were as important as the actual monarchs in that they ruled the people by ethical and social influence.

The separation of political power from ethical power is one of the fundamental ideas in Confucian philosophy and is also an important factor in the Chinese power structure. It may be compared to the separation of church and state in the West but is not exactly the same.Theoretically, when Jesus said, “Render unto Caesar those things which are Caesar’s,” he recognized a duality of power. When the priests asked Jesus what authority he had in doing the things he did, he countered with, “The baptism of John, whence was it？ From heaven or of men？” And the priests were in doubt what to reply and at last answered Jesus, “We cannot tell.” And he said to them, “Neither [5]tell I you by what authority I do these things.”

We see clearly that to Christ there were two possible sources of power, worldly and divine. But these two powers were not on the same level. Rather, one was subordinate to the other. So in European medieval history worldly power submitted to divine power, monarchical power submitted to religious power. When, in a later period, these two powers became separate as the powers of church and state, the civil rights of the people came to be recognized. In Western political thinking it came to be accepted that the power which does not come from heaven could come only from the people, the common man. So long as the monarch derived his authority from his divine origin, he might slight the popular will. But once the throne was separated from the church, and it was recognized that the king’s power was secular, it was quite natural that the people should be allowed to have their say and to share in government. It seems to me that in the Western political system power was never entirely independent and self-justified but was always based on an authority derived from either divine or popular sources. The situation in China was somewhat different.

In China, Confucius also recognized a duality of power, but for him the two systems were not in the same order. One was not necessarily subordinate to the other; rather they were seen to be parallel. In China political power was like Caesar’s, but the other type of power, in contrast to the West, was not viewed as having a divine origin. Some people think that Confucianism is a system of religion, yet it recognizes no supernatural force. This is not the only way, however, in which it may be distinguished from Western religions. Another aspect of Confucianism in which it differs from the West is its relation to action. Jesus Christ was using his power in the same domain to control human affairs. As a result of this conflict, one power became subordinate to the other. But the Confucian tao-t’ung stands not for action but for the upholding of a standard or norm which defines the Way of a good emperor (and a good citizen). It is one thing whether the monarch acts according to the Way or not. It is another whether we have made clear the Way to be a good ruler. Christ made clear the good and wanted action toward that good.But Confucianism is divided into two parts: (1) the knowing what is good and (2) the doing what is good. Thus the man who knows what is good does not necessarily have an obligation to carry it out. In fact, he may not be able to do so, since what he is able to do depends upon his social position. So we have the differentiation into separate categories of the scholar who knows and the monarch who does. The following quotation explains the psychology of Confucius. Confucius said to his student: “Hui,the poem says that tigers and wild beasts are running wild in the fields. Is my Way wrong？ Why should I become so poor？”

Then the student Yen Hui answered: “The Way of my master is very great—the world cannot accept it. But, my master, try to carry out your Way. If others don’t accept you, it shows that you are a gentleman. If we don’t work out the Way for doing things, that is our shame. If those who have the power don’t follow the right Way, that is their shame.”

Then Confucius smiled and said: “You are right. If you were rich, I [6]should become your secretary.”

This quotation explains how even in a world in which brute beasts are running wild it is still possible for scholars to work out the Way. For thetao, or Way, is detached from worldly events. The Way can be perfected irrespective of actual happenings in the world. To make this Way effective, to practice it, is not the duty of a man who is not in a position to do so; in other words, of the man without political power. The man who has control of political power may administer his affairs according to the Way or may utterly disregard it. Those who are not in his position of authority may themselves maintain the Way, and they may “push it and try to make it work,” so that the Way will be followed by the man who controls the country. But they must not try to usurp the position of the man in power. What Confucius means when he speaks of “push it and make it work” is simply the use of persuasion. Confucius never assumes the authority assumed by Christ. As a result, in the Chinese scheme,the political line is active, the ethical line passive. Those who follow the ethical line will behave according to the popular saying:When wanted, then go;[7]When set aside; then hide.

To employ and to discharge belongs to the man who has power; to work or to hide is the role of the man who has the Way. According to this system, there will be no conflict. From the point of view of the person who upholds the norms, practical politics may sometimes coincide with the norm and sometimes not. One may distinguish those nations which have tao and those which have not. Yao and Shun are [8]examples of those who ruled the nation according to the tao. Yü and T’ang are other examples. So also monarchical power may lose its Way, and, when this occurs, the man who knows it, and through this knowledge possesses it, should guard it and keep it safe from harm. Such a man must work hard to cultivate himself so that the norms will not disappear entirely.But he will have no idea of trying to correct the conduct of the monarch.This, then, is the Confucian view: the one who knows should be ready to present his views when asked but when not asked should keep them hidden. These scholar-masters do not desert the Way in time of difficulty,but only when the monarch in his behavior approaches the Way will they come forth and act as officials.

The Master said, “Be of unwavering good faith, love learning, if attacked be ready to die for the good Way. Do not enter a State that pursues dangerous courses, nor stay in one where the people have rebelled. When the Way prevails under Heaven, then show yourself;when it does not prevail, then hide. When the Way prevails in your own land, count it a disgrace to be needy and obscure; when the Way does not prevail in your land, then count it a disgrace to be rich and honoured.”

“A gentleman indeed is Ch’u Po Yü. When the Way prevailed in his land, he served the State; but when the Way ceased to prevail, he [9]knew how to ‘wrap it up and hide it in the folds of his dress.’”

The real problem, then, is the link between the political and the ethical lines. The ideal of the Confucian school was that of the kingly Way—wangtao—in which both political and ethical lines coincided. But how could that ideal be realized？ Here we find the conflict in Confucius’ ideas.Since he had been brought up under a feudal system, he valued a social order of this sort, one in which a stable society was ruled according to wellestablished traditions. The feudal tradition prevented him from breaking the connection between the political line and kinship; the static ideal made him abhor social changes. This is the first point to be noted with regard to Confucius’ attitude. He took for granted the political system and did not wish it to be changed. At the same time, he was living when the system was actually disintegrating; men in a certain position no longer behaved according to the norm set up for them. To meet this difficulty, Confucius detached the norms from actual practice and set them up as an ideal type of behavior which was not to be deviated from. In this he was very stubborn and persistent. The student Tzu-kung said to him: “The Master’s teachings are too great for the people, and that is why the world cannot accept them. Why don’t you come down a little from your heights？”

Confucius replied: “Ah Ssu, a good farmer plants the field but cannot guarantee the harvest, and a good artisan can do a skillful job, but he cannot guarantee to please his customers. Now you are not interested in cultivating yourselves, but are only interested in being accepted by the people. I am afraid you are not setting the highest [10]standard for yourself.”

We may wonder how, in such a case, the norms are ever to be brought into close contact with reality. It seems that this must depend largely on chance, since, on the one hand, one is bound to wait with patience and,on the other, to retire and let others seek one out. But Confucius did express himself on this matter of chance. The student Tzu-kung said:“Suppose one has a lovely jewel, should one wrap it up, put it in a box and keep it, or try to get the best price one can for it？”

The Master said: “Sell it! Most certainly sell it! I myself am one [11]who is waiting for an offer.”

Confucius actually did go about and offer his services to more than seventy lords. The following quotation makes this point even more clear.When Confucius was fifty years old, Kung-San Po-niu started a rebellion against Baron Huan in the city of Pi. Baron Huan sent for Confucius,and Confucius was eager to go. He said: “The kings Wen and Wu rose to power from the small cities of Feng and K’ao and finally established the empire of Chou. Pi, I know, is a small place, but perhaps I may try.”But Confucius’ student, Tzu-lu, was displeased and tried to dissuade him from going. Confucius said, “Since the Baron asks to see me, he must have a plan in his mind, and if he would put me in power, we might achieve something resembling the work of [12]Emperor P’ing.” But after all he did not go. Confucius felt the urge to be employed, and, when he was,he endeavored to carry out good projects. At the age of fifty-six he was pleased when in a certain principality he was made chief minister. His disciples said to him, “I hear that a gentleman is not afraid at the sight of disaster and not delighted at success.”

“Is that so？” remarked Confucius. “Is it not said that one is happy because he rises to a position above the common people？” But he stayed in office only about three months, during which time he had executed a minister who opposed him. But it was said that during the time of his office there was no cheating in the markets, men and women did not walk together, people did not take things which belonged to others, and there was no litigation.

But, although Confucius waited patiently, he had little real chance to enter politics. Even when he did get his chance, there was no assurance that his way of merging ethics with politics would be continued. So at last Confucius left Lu and said, “How free I am. I can now spend my life in a leisurely way.” Yet he still felt disheartened at times, saying, “The Way makes no progress. I shall get upon a raft and [13]float out to sea.” Actually,as far as a practical career was concerned, he had accomplished nothing.But we may imagine that if he had had a chance to remain in office for three years, as he wished, he might have accomplished some of the great results he had hoped for. Yet, in such a case, Confucius’ death might have been like those of Tu Ming-tu and Shun Hua, two officials who attained high office but were later killed by their lords. When this news came to Confucius, he sighed. He was standing at the time near a stream and said:“How beautiful is the water! Eternally it flows! Fate has decreed that I should not cross this river.”

“What do you mean？” asked Tzu-kung, coming forward.

And Confucius replied, “Tu Ming-tu and Shun Hua were good ministers of Chin. Before Baron Chien Chao got into power, he said that he would insist on taking these two men, should he get into power, and now that he is in power, he has killed them. I have heard that when people disembowel embryos or kill the young, the unicorn refuses to appear in the countryside, and that when people dry up a pond in order to catch fish, the dragon refuses to bring the yin and [14]yang principles into harmony (resulting in famine and flood), and that when people snatch birds’ nests and break birds’ eggs, the phoenix refuses to come. Why？ Because a gentleman avoids those who kill their own kind. If even the birds and beasts avoid the unrighteous, how [15]much more should I do the same？”

These remarks show Confucius’ recognition of the difficulty of applying his Way in practical politics. Let me quote another passage from the Shihchi. The lords of Lu had a hunting party and caught a strange animal which Confucius declared was a unicorn. Then Confucius said: “This is the end of it all. There is no one in this world who understands me.”

His disciple Tzu-kung said, “Why do you say that there is no one who understands you？”

And Confucius said, “I don’t blame Heaven, and I don’t blame mankind. All I try to do is my best to acquire knowledge and to aim for a higher ideal. Perhaps Heaven is the only one who understands me!Po-yi and Shu-ch’i were two sages who loved their ideals and their selfrespect! (These persons and the following were famous scholars living as recluses.) Liu-hsia Hui and Shao-lien lowered their ideals and lost their self-respect. Yu-chung and Yi-yi remained active and outspoken, but their conduct was clean and they had good judgment. But I am different from all of them. I will insist on nothing.” Then he added: “A gentleman will suffer pain to die without having lived up to his name. My Way will not be carried out. What can I do to explain [16]myself to those who come after？” He chose to compile the book of Spring and Autumn Annalsfrom historical sources.

The Spring and Autumn Annals is a Chinese grammar of politics. It reveals the norms of good government but does not necessarily give any practical advice for realizing them. From this work one may learn the tao, or Way, which runs side by side but does not merge with practical politics. The title given to Confucius of a “king without a throne,” that is,a king without any political position, makes clear this peculiarly Chinese concept.

If the ethical line cannot control the political line, though scholars may repeatedly criticize the government as not acting according to the tao, in actual everyday politics the emperor, or the man who possesses political power, will not feel shame and will disregard them. In a state which is misgoverned, in which the scholar folds up his norm and hides it in his bosom, what happens to the people？ Scholars may say, as Confucius once did, “If Heaven will not destroy this work what harm can my enemy do to me？” But Confucius also said, “Heaven may destroy this work, and those who come later will never again have a chance to learn the Way.” Scholars may die, for they are men of this world, not of another.How can they hide when the imperial power rules the entire land？ The imperial power may burn the books and bury the [17]scholars alive. It may kill students because of some writing which injures the emperor. It may block the ethical line entirely for a time. Confucius was not able to solve this difficulty, namely, that, living together in the same world, the two lines, ethical and political, cannot let each other alone. Although the ethical line of the scholars may be willing not to struggle against the political line, the political line can, and often does, suppress the ethical.When this happens, what can scholars do？ The positive way to meet this dilemma is, as was done in the West, to conquer the imperial power and subordinate practical politics to the socially accepted norms. But positive measures of this sort are not in accordance with the feudal tradition, and we find very little in Chinese history of this sort of positive resistance.Another line was taken.

When Confucius appealed to Heaven, that Heaven was an [18]indifferent abstraction which would not interfere with worldly events. But when the ethical line of the scholars was suppressed by the emperors to such a degree that there was no possibility of their gaining any power in politics,they tried to convert Heaven into a really active force. Confucian tao has no inherent power. It cannot do things, for doing things is the emperor’s task. In the Han dynasty, however, the conception of a realistic God who would interfere in human affairs gradually took shape. Tung Chung-shu(179？–104？ B.C.), a scholar of the Han dynasty, interpreted the Spring and Autumn Annals in such a way as to threaten the royal power with heavenly anger. In a statement addressed to the emperor Wu he said:“Your servant, in reading the Spring and Autumn Annals, has come to see that, in this work done by previous generations, there is presented a relation between Heaven and Man. I realize the awfulness of this relation. When a nation loses its tao, Heaven will first warn the people by famines and disasters. If the emperor does not look back upon himself to criticize himself, then Heaven will warn him by portents. If he still does not change his way, then he will court real disaster. This shows the benevolence of Heaven, which wishes to stop disturbances in the world.”

In Tung’s formula Heaven comes first, the emperor second, the scholars third, and, at the bottom, the people. Following this formula,the emperor should no longer be repressive but should be awed and restrained by the behavior of Heaven. But the question is: Since Heaven expresses approval or disapproval through natural phenomena, who knows the meaning of the heavenly signs？ Who is able to interpret these signs but the scholar？ Thus Tung really emphasizes the importance of the scholar, in that he alone could interpret Heaven. The first part of this conception was different from the usual Confucian point of view and especially that developed by Mencius, according to which the will of Heaven is to be expressed in the will of the people. According to this new idea, scholars should interpret the will of Heaven as expressed in natural phenomena. It was not an attempt to control political power democratically but rather, indirectly, through religion. The role of the scholar was simply to help the monarch to meet Heaven’s demands; and the punishment of the emperor, if it came, would be through natural disasters and not by the people. Theoretically, monarchical power was thus subordinated to religious power, and the scholar given a position of some independence. In other words, the scholar’s ethical line was no longer to be held down by the political line of the emperor.

If Tung Chung-shu had advanced a step further, perhaps he might have gone so far as eventually to transform the scholar from an interpreter of Heaven into a priest. Then the scholar-priests might have formed an organized church, which, with divine sanction, might have been strong enough to check the unlimited monarchical power. If this had taken place,we might have had in China something similar to the relations between church and state in the West. But when this theory came to challenge the supremacy of the monarchical power, it was suppressed at once. Tung Chung-shu developed a theory of omens and could even predict natural disasters from the yin and the yang. “When you want rain,” he said, “stop the yang and open the yin. If you want the rain to stop, reverse the process.Practice this throughout the nation, and it will not fail.” Once in Liao-tung,a hall in the tomb of the emperor caught fire. Tung interpreted this to mean that the emperor had done something wrong. A friend of his called Yen Chu-fu, who knew of this and who was jealous of Tung, stole the writings which made clear this interpretation and showed them to the emperor. The emperor called together all the scholars and showed the writings to them.A student of Tung’s called Lu, who did not know the writings were his master’s, said it was all “nonsense.” Then the emperor was relieved. He put Tung into prison and condemned him to death. Later Tung was pardoned but never again dared to interpret in this way.

The theory of heavenly anger expressed through portents did not succeed in controlling monarchical power. But it encouraged the people in that it destroyed the theory of imperial absolutism. If Heaven dislikes the ruler, then the ruler must be changed. During the Han dynasty, and afterward, whenever there were social disturbances, this theory was used to justify the rebellion of the people. But, although as a popularly accepted theory it might be a justification for revolt, it did not change the nature of the imperial power.

At the same period as Tung, under the Han emperor Wu, there was another scholar who had also studied the Spring and Autumn Annals,namely, Hung Kung-sun. This man, who took part in the persecution and exile of Tung, presents another form of adjustment to the imperial power. That is, to become an official and serve the emperor. Orthodox Confucianism scorned Hung Kung-sun because he sold out the spirit of Confucianism, the keeping of the tao. An old scholar, ninety years of age, Yuan Ku-sun, who had retired because he would not modify his opinions to please the emperor, looked askance at Kung-sun, and said:“You, Kung-sun, should say what you have learned. You should not bend your teaching to please the world.” This meant that it was the duty of the scholar to hold to the ethical line and not to be an opportunist.Kung-sun had come of humble origins; he had been a jailer and at one time had even herded pigs. Yet he came to be prime minister, the first who had reached this position without being related to the emperor. He thus, very well, saw the advantage of selling out the ethical line to the emperor and of subordinating the Confucian norms to the monarchical power. Actually, unless one retired from the world entirely, there were,practically speaking, only two alternatives: either to subordinate ethical power to political power or to become unpopular. Yuan Ku-sun, the old scholar, and Tung Chung-shu did not submit and were exiled. But Hung Kung-sun submitted and became prime minister.

As prime minister, Kung-sun advocated the principle that monarchy should rule the people through the scholars of his ilk. He said: “The leopard, the wild horse, the untamed ox, all wild beasts and birds are difficult to control. But, when they are domesticated, they may be used for human purposes. To bend wood takes less than a day. Gold and other metals can be melted in less than a month. A man who has a mind of his own and can judge the good from the bad, advantage from disadvantage,must be more difficult to handle than animals, birds, wood, or metal.But in a year’s time he too may be molded.” Kung-sun developed the technique of how to serve the emperor as a good official as follows:Each morning, when there is a conference, he will present the choices of action to the emperor and let him make his selection. He will not argue or insist upon anything. Then the emperor will see that he is discreet and understanding and that he knows administrative work and is an expert scholar. The emperor will be glad to have him near him. When the emperor grants him an audience, and he finds that they are not in agreement, he will not argue but will go back and find someone else to mediate. This man will present the case first to the emperor, Kung-sun following him. For this tactful approach the emperor will be very pleased with him. Moreover, even when a conference of ministers has decided a matter, the man who is wise will not speak according to the agreement but will fit in with the emperor’s mood.

For following the latter precept, Kung-sun was attacked by other officials. They said: “This man is most treacherous and unfeeling. He turns his face against his friends. He suggests the idea himself first and then abandons it; he isn’t loyal.” The emperor asked Kung-sun if this were true. He replied: “Those who understand me will think that I am loyal.Those who do not understand me will think that I am not.”

Another critic of Kung-sun said: “Hung Kung-sun has a high position among the top men. His salary is very high, but still he affects cotton gowns. That is not honest. He gives the impression of being modest and frugal when he really is not. Kung-sun started from a lowly position but in only a few years has climbed so far that he has become a minister and a lord. Outwardly his personality seems that of a temperate and hospitable man. He has built a guest house and filled it with guests whom he invites to participate in his work. While he himself takes only one piece of meat,they are entertained lavishly, and even his family neglected on their account. But, in spite of all this outward good will, inwardly he is jealous of everyone. He makes up to those officials who are not on good terms with him and then finds some way to hurt them. He killed Yen Chu-fu and exiled Tung Chung-shu. These are his plots.”

From these old quotations we can see that here was a man without principles, one who merely tried to follow the emperor’s whims, did not keep his word, sold out his friends, and formed his own party to [19]help maintain his high position in the government. This is a type of official which has often been seen in China.

Following the example of Hung Kung-sun, the ethical line which had been maintained by Confucius and his followers no longer was the norm.Scholars took to supporting monarchical power. This transformation was completed in the person of one Han Yü who, though considering himself directly descended from the ethical line, converted his position not into that of a critic but into a way of showing the emperor’s tolerance. Han Yü was a man without academic honors, a hermit, but the emperor liked his conduct so well that he took him out of obscurity and created for him the office of imperial censor, an official who should tell the emperor what was wrong throughout his domain. His role was to convince the world at large that in the court people were allowed to speak freely and honestly,to make it evident that the emperor did not confer rewards unjustly, and to show that the emperor had the great virtue of being willing to follow suggestions disagreeable [20]to him. This, it was thought, would make the“people in the caves,” the common people, “put on their finery and come to court to tell their wants.” And this would make the emperor approach in virtue Yao and Shun, and his name would go down in history for ever and aye.

Han Yü no longer asked whether the imperial power followed the tao or not. To him this was no longer a problem, for he believed that the political line must be the same as the ethical. The emperor could do no wrong. Moreover, the emperor had the obligation to use the scholars,and the scholars, in turn, had the obligation to present themselves in court. His reasoning went thus: “In ancient times scholars were sorry for one another if one or another of them went as long as three months without being in office. Such a one, leaving his own country, would go to bear gifts to the court of another lord. He would feel so anxious to find an opportunity to serve in government that, if he could not find a job in Lu, he would go to Ch’i, if not in Ch’i, he would go to Sung and Chien[Cheng？].... But now we have a centralized government. Within the four seas there is but one rule. If a man is to leave, he must go live with savage tribes, leaving behind the country of his father and mother. The scholar who wishes to practice his tao must do so at court or else go off to the wilds. In the mountains and forests he can do nothing but cultivate himself; this is a way out only for those who care very little for the world,not for those who care for people.”

From Han Yü on, Chinese scholars ceased to bother themselves about whether the emperor was good or not. Their function as scholars they now saw was to uphold the emperor. As people who simply read the orders of the emperor, they became caricatures of the real scholar.

Thus the relation between the scholar and political power changed in the course of history. In the beginning they were separated from practical politics; they were regarded as maintainers of the ethical way but not as positively effective in government. In the process of concentration of monarchical power this same class was unable to protect its own interest;its members turned to religious sanctions in the hope that divine authority,in controlling the monarch, would at the same time offer them protection.But the divine sanctions were not effective, and thus the only alternatives came to be either to rebel or to surrender. Since the scholar class were never in any sense revolutionary, they chose the latter course, becoming officials.And they even degraded themselves by becoming utterly subservient to the emperor. This is the historical process which determined the later position of the gentry in the social structure. They did not themselves attempt to take over political power but found security by subordinating themselves to the mercy of the imperial court. In the power structure of traditional China the gentry were a distinctly noncombative element.

我在第一章里试图分析士大夫在政治结构中的地位。我的观点是，自从大一统的集权政治在公元前3世纪确立之后，士大夫阶层从未试图掌握政治权力，即使做了官，也从未行使过政策决定权。在封建时代，主权属于贵族；在皇权时代，主权属于皇帝。这样就产生了一个问题，即为什么中国历史中不曾有过贵族权力复兴或中层阶级执政的政治结构？要回答这个问题，我们必须研究士大夫这个阶层的政治意识以及他们对于自己的政治地位的看法。为什么他们不去和皇帝争夺政权？为什么中国没有发生像英国宪章运动那样的政治事件？这个阶层在经济上是地主，在社会上是士绅，他们为什么对政治如此中立和消极？在本章里我想特别关注一个问题，即他们如何看待自己的政治地位。的确，他们的观点不是这种政治制度的原因，而是其结果。但是，可以说，在这种政治结构中形成的默许态度本身是一种支持这种结构的力量。

任何一种社会结构都有一套意识形态来界定正当的行为，以维持这个结构。我在本章所要讨论的是被皇权所控制的士大夫对于皇权的态度。

传统士大夫阶层的政治意识中有一个特别重要的观念是“道[21]统”。这个观念在皇权牢固确立之前已经产生，并且可能对于皇权结构的发展是必要的。在我的分析中，我特别要追溯到皇权牢固确立之前，即封建制度行将崩溃、封建和皇权交替的过渡时期。

我不愿意把这一社会意识的形成归结为出自几个思想家。相反，我认为思想家的言行能被社会所接受是因为他们反映了社会上一般的观点，他们的作用是将这一观点明白清晰地表达出来。在由封建过渡到皇权时，最能反映出这一时期趋势的是儒家。但是儒家只是当时“百家”中的一家，直到后来皇权稳固之后，儒学才开始广为传播并起主导作用。我认为这表明了儒家最能代表适合中国皇权制度的意识形态。“道统”这个观念有它所根据的社会事实，其中一个重要事实是一个社会重要阶层失去了政治权力。归纳和组织成为儒家体系的儒家思想，伴随着中央集权的形成和封建体制的解体，的确经历了一个可理解的变迁过程。我们现在看到的儒家思想的记录已经由后来的学者修改了许多。然而，我愿意在此从儒家的基本观点开始，试图来追溯它的发展。在讨论儒家思想对中国社会历史的影响时，我们关注的不是“道统”的观念是否出自孔子本人，而是后代的学者以他的名义选用并深化了这一概念。

在我看来，中国传统社会中“道统”观念的发展，是由于社会上产生了一类新的人物，即文人知识分子，他们被排斥于政治权力的圈子之外，但仍享有社会威望。由于没有政治权力，他们不能决定政治事务，但他们可以通过表达意见、归纳原则来产生实际的影响。他们不从占有政治权力来保障自己的利益，而是尽力提出一套伦理规范来限制政治权力的威力。“道统”的思想被士大夫接受为他们政治活动的标准。最终，它不仅仅是作为一种伦理道德体系服务于士大夫，还可以维护他们的经济利益。

当士大夫阶层要用“道统”来限制政治权力时，他们推出了孔子的学说，把他作为“道”的创始者，称他为“素王”。我们现在把那些“道统”的精神传承者叫做“师儒”。

关于孔子身世的传说象征着政统和道统的分离。从早期神话历史中的文化英雄，如火的发明者燧人氏、农业的鼻祖神农氏，传到“三[22]皇”、“五帝”，再到有文字记载历史的封建君王周文王和周武王，我们可以发现政道合一的传统。儒家把这些古老的君王奉为圭臬。这些人了解并且遵守了正确的统治原则。在上面所提到的周文王、周武王之后有一个周公，他作为王位继承人的叔叔，摄政主持国家大权。周公受到儒家推崇，因为即使在封建体制下他仍能得到最高权力，实际上是最高统治者。这种摄政统治本身意义深远，象征着这样一个观念，即在位的人如果没有能力治理天下，可以由有能力的人去代替，这是政道分离的开始。孔子把自己和周公紧紧联系在一起，他说：[23]“甚矣吾衰也!久矣吾不复梦见周公。”在关于周公的传说里，政统和道统确实没有明显的分离，因为作为王叔，周公在宗法上是有地位的。但是儒家后来的追随者在著名的英明统治者系列中把孔子列在周公之后，这样周公便成了政道分离的起点。

根据儒家的传说，孔子这位“素王”乃贵族之后，由此道统和政统的分离才较为明确地建立起来。实际上，孔子与贵族的联系很远，在这一点上他完全无法与周公相比，他没有资格从血统的身份上得到任何权力。但是，试图为他找到在封建体制下的权威根源的传说经久[24]不绝。《史记》对孔子的出身非常怀疑，据说他是“野合”的产物。他的母亲不把父亲的墓地所在告诉他，直到母亲死后，他才从别人那里得知，使父母得以合葬。这里还记载了鲁国贵族季氏招待士的一件事：“季氏飨士，孔子与往。阳虎绌曰：‘季氏飨士，非敢飨子也。’”这表明当时人们对孔子“士”的身份也很怀疑，尽管“士”只位列封建制度的底层。但这些描写不是贬低而是提高了孔子。《史记》又有“祷于尼丘得孔子”，暗示孔子由神所授，不是凡人出身。

这些神话的作用不单是确立孔子的身世，更多的是为他代表的道统建立神话权威。这样，既然孔子不是从贵族血统中而是从神那里获得权力，那么他的地位就会和实际的王位一样高。因此，从孔子后出现了一系列重要和权威的人物追随道统，他们可能缺乏政治权力，但在他们所处的社会中，他们和实际的君王一样重要，因为他们用道德和社会的影响来统治人民。

政统和道统的分离是儒家理论的基础理念之一，也是中国权力结构中的一个重要事实，这和西方的政治和宗教的分离相似但又不完全相同。在理论上，当耶稣说“恺撒的归恺撒”时，他也是认识到了权力的双重系统。当牧师责问耶稣他仗着什么权柄做这些事时，耶稣反问他们：“约翰的洗礼是从天上来的，是从人间来的？”牧师很疑惑，不知如何回答，最后他们说：“我们不能告诉你。”耶稣对他们说：[25]“我也不告诉你们我仗着什么权柄做这些事。”

我们可以清楚地看到，在耶稣眼里有两个可能的权力来源：一个来自人间，一个来自上天。这两种权力并不在同一层次上，前者从属于后者。在欧洲中世纪的历史中，来自人间的权力降服在天上的权力之下，皇权降服在宗教权力之下。后来政教分离时，人民的权力开始抬头。西方政治思想中公认的是，权力不从天上来就得从人间来，人间即是民间。只要君王的权力来自上天，他就可能忽视民间的意愿。但是一旦政教分离，君王的权力被认定为世俗的，人们自然应该享有发言权和政治权利。在我看来，西方的政治体制权力从未完全独立和自我证成，而总是以来自上天或民间的权威为基础。这与中国的情况有所不同。

在中国，孔子也认识到了权力的双重系统，但是在他看来这两个系统并不在一个层次上，一个不必从属于另一个，而是互相平行。在中国，政治权力如同恺撒的权力，但另一种权力与西方不同，不被视为来自上天。有些人认为儒家思想是宗教体系，只是它没有认可超自然的力量，然而这不是与西方宗教区分的唯一途径。儒家思想与西方不同的另一方面是与人类行为的关系。耶稣用他在同一领域(即人间)的权力来控制人间的事。这种冲突的结果是一种权力降服另一种。但是儒家的道统不代表行为，而是提出一个好的君王(和好的平民)应当怎样做的规范。君王按不按“理”做是一回事，有没有弄清一个好的统治者的“理”是另一回事。耶稣明确了好的规范，希望人的行为朝着好的规范去做。但是儒家思想分成了两部分：(1)知道什么是善的以及(2)履行这种善。因此，一个知道如何是好的规范的人，并没有义务一定要遵照去做，实际上他也许不能去做，因为他的行为由他的社会地位来决定。所以我们要在概念范畴上作出区分：文人学者在知，而君主则是在行。下面的引述解释了儒家的心理学。孔子对他的学生说：“回，诗云‘匪兕匪虎，率彼旷野’。吾道非邪，吾何为于此？”

颜回回答说：“夫子之道至大，故天下莫能容。虽然，夫子推而行之，不容何病，不容然后见君子!夫道之不修也，是吾丑也。夫道既已大修而不用，是有国者之丑也。不容何病，不容然后见君子!”[26]

孔子欣然而笑曰：“有是哉颜氏之子!使尔多财，吾为尔宰。”

这一段引文说明，即使在“匪兕匪虎，率彼旷野”的乱世，道还是可以“既已大修”的，因为道与事是分开的，道是可以离事而修的。用道于事，并不是“不在其位”的人的责任，换言之，并不是没有政治权力的人的责任。有国者可以用道来管理事务，也可以彻底无视道。“不在其位”的人可能自行维持道，“推而行之”，以使有国者来遵守道。但是他们不能有篡夺有国者地位的企图。孔子所讲的“推而行之”只不过是游说。孔子从来也没有取得过基督耶稣所取得的权柄。结果，在中国的制度中，政统是积极主动的，而道统是消极被动的。那些追随道统的人则将：用之则行，[27]舍之则藏。

用舍是有权者决定的，行藏是有道者采取的。依照这种体系，就不会有矛盾。在持执规范的人看来，实际的政治有时合于规范，有时则不合，于是可以分出“邦有道”和“邦无道”。尧舜是有道的例子[28]，禹汤亦同。皇权可以失道，此时明道、有道者可以维护道，使之不受侵害。这样的人必须勤于修身，以使道不会完全消失，但他们并不会有修正皇权的想法。因此，根据孔子的看法，明白规范的人可以在被用的时候把道摆出来，不被用的时候把道藏好。当皇权和道分离时，这些师儒退而守；皇权和道接近时，师儒出而仕。

孔子说：“笃信好学，守死善道。危邦不入，乱邦不居。天下有道则见，无道则隐。邦有道，贫且贱焉，耻也；邦无道，富且贵，耻也。”[29]“君子哉蘧伯玉!邦有道，则仕，邦无道，则可卷而怀之。”

因此，真正的问题是政统和道统的连接。师儒的理想是“王道”，王道是政统加道统。怎样实现这种理想呢？这里我们看到了孔子思想的矛盾。他在封建制度下长大，关注这种社会秩序，这是一个按照建立完好的传统来统治的静态社会。封建传统阻止他打破政统和血统的联系，静态的理想使他厌恶社会结构的改变。这是在考虑孔子的态度时首先要注意到的。他把政统看成是既成的，不希望有所改变。同时，他生活在道统正在分解的时代，人们不再遵循既成的规范来做事。为解决这一困难，孔子将规范和实际行为划分开来，把规范立为不可背离的理想的行为方式。在这一点上，孔子很固执并锲而不舍。他的学生子贡对他说：“夫子之道至大也，故天下莫能容夫子。夫子盖少贬焉？”

孔子曰：“赐，良农能稼而不能为穑；良工能巧而不能为顺；君子能修其道，纲而纪之，统而理之，而不能为容。今尔不修尔道而求[30]为容。赐，而志不远矣!”

在这种情况下，我们也许会问，规范如何与现实紧密连接呢？似乎很大程度上是要靠机会，一方面是耐心等待，另一方面是退出，让别人来寻求。不过，孔子在等待机会这一点上表达得很清楚——子贡曰：“有美玉于斯，韫椟而藏诸？求善贾而沽诸？”[31]

子曰：“沽之哉，沽之哉，我待贾者也。”

实际上，孔子的确周游列国，曾“干七十余君”，下面的引述表达得更清楚：“……孔子年五十。公山不狃以费畔季氏，使人召孔子。孔子循道弥久，温温无所试，莫能己用，曰：‘盖周文武起丰镐而王，今费虽小，傥庶几乎!’欲往。子路不说，止孔子。孔子曰：[32]‘夫召我者岂徙哉？如用我，其为东周乎!’”但最终他还是没有成行。孔子是很想做事的，而且当有人用他时，他努力施行善举：“孔子年五十六，由大司寇行摄相事，有喜色。门人曰：‘闻君子祸至不惧，福至不喜。’“孔子曰：‘有是言也。不曰“乐其以贵下人乎”？’于是诛鲁大夫乱政者少正卯。与闻国政三月，粥羔豚者弗饰贾；男女行者别于涂；涂不拾遗；四方之客至乎邑者不求有司……”

但是尽管孔子耐心等待，他真正与闻政事的机会并不多，即使有机会，也不能确保他的政道结合能继续下去。最后他还是离开了鲁国，感慨“优哉游哉，维以卒岁”，然而他仍时感沮丧，说“道不行，乘[33]桴浮于海”。实际上，从现实业绩来讲，他什么也没有达成。但是我们设想，如果他真的像他希望的那样“三年有成”，他也许会如愿取得一些不错的成就。不过，如果这样，他的结局就如同窦鸣犊和舜华了——他们两人做到很高的官位，但最终还是被统治者所杀。孔子得知后怅然叹息：“美哉水，洋洋乎？丘之不济此，命也夫？”“子贡趋而进曰：‘敢问何谓也!’“孔子曰：‘窦鸣犊，舜华，晋国之贤大夫也。赵简子未得志之时，须此两人而后从政；及其已得志，杀之乃从政。丘闻之也，刳胎杀夭[34]则麒麟不至郊，竭泽涸渔则蛟龙不合阴阳，覆巢毁卵则凤凰不翔。何则？君子讳伤其类也。夫鸟兽之于不义也尚知辟之，而况乎丘[35]哉!’”

这番话表明孔子认识到将他的“理”用于实际政治的困难。我再引用《史记》中的一段：“及西狩见麟，曰：‘吾道穷矣。’喟然叹曰：‘莫知我夫？’“子贡曰：‘何为莫知子？’“子曰：‘不怨天，不尤人，下学而上达，知我者其天乎!’‘不降其志，不辱其身，伯夷、叔齐乎!’谓‘柳下惠、少连降志辱身矣’。谓‘虞仲、夷逸隐居放言，行中清，废中权’。‘我则异于是，无可不无可。’子曰：‘弗乎，弗乎!君子病没世而名不称焉。吾道不行矣，[36]吾何以自见于后世哉？’，乃因史记作春秋……”《春秋》是一部中国政治的典范。它揭示了好的统治的规范，但没有对其实施提出实际的建议。我们可从中学到“道”或“理”，与政平行，二者没有统一。孔子的尊号是“素王”，就是没有政治地位的王，这是中国政治概念中的特色。

如果道统不能控制政统，尽管推崇道统的人不停地斥责有国者失道，但在日常政治活动中，帝王或是掌握政治权力的人并不觉得可耻且置之不理。邦无道时，师儒们固然不妨把道卷而怀之，可是那些百姓怎么样呢？正像孔子曾经说过的那样，师儒们可以说：“天之未丧斯文也，匡人其如予何？”但是孔子还说：“天之将丧斯文也，后死者不得与于斯文也。”师儒们终将死去，因为他们是地球上的生命，不是其他星球上的。当皇权控制整个国土的时候，他们怎么能隐藏起[37]来呢？皇权可以“焚书坑儒”，可以兴文字狱，可以在一个时期内完全阻碍道统。孔子无法解决这一矛盾，即只要在同一个世界上，道统和政统实际上是无法各行其是的。尽管道统不与政统相争，但实际上，政统可以而且的确常常压迫道统。那么这时师儒们该怎么办呢？积极的出路是依照西方的做法，制约皇权，把政统压迫在社会公认的道统之下，但这与封建传统不合，在中国历史中很少有这种积极的反抗，他们采取的是另一种方式。[38]

孔子呼天，这个天是空洞的，即使有知也不干涉人事。可是当道统被帝王压迫得无法翻身、完全丧失政治权力的时候，他们试图请天来干涉人事，以发挥其实际的积极作用。孔子的道统没有权柄，不能做事，因为做事是帝王的任务。但在汉代，一个可以干涉人事的现实的“天”逐渐成型。汉代的师儒董仲舒(约公元前179—公元前104年)在对《春秋》的解释中用上天的愤怒来吓唬皇权。他对汉武帝说：“臣谨案春秋之中，视前世已行之事，以观天人相与之际，甚可畏也。国家将有失道之败，而天乃先出灾害以谴告之，不知自省，又出怪异以警惧之，尚不知变，而伤败乃至。以此见天心之仁爱人君而欲止其乱也。”

在董仲舒的公式里，上是天，中是皇，次是儒，末是民。根据他的公式，皇权不再处于压迫别人的地位而应敬畏上天，受上天的限制。但问题是，既然上天通过自然现象来表达赞赏或责备，那谁能明白这些天相符兆的意义呢？除了师儒，还有谁能解读这些符兆呢？董仲舒就这样实际强调了师儒的重要性，即只有师儒能解释天意。这个概念的前一部分与儒家通常的观点有所不同，特别是与孟子所发展的“天意表达于民意”的观点不同。根据这种新观点，师儒应该通过自然现象来解释天意，这不是试图通过民主的方式来限制政权，而是间接通过宗教。师儒不过是帮着皇权去应天。天要降刑罚于君主时，不经由民众而是通过自然灾害。理论上，皇权就这样屈服于宗教的力量，师儒被赋予了一定独立的地位。换句话说，师儒的道统不再为皇帝的政统所压制。

如果董仲舒再进一步，也许会最终把解释天意的师儒发展成宗教的牧师。然后这些牧师型的师儒可以组织成教会，获得上帝的认可，也许会发展到可以控制无限制的皇权。如果这样，中国就会有像西方那样的政教关系。但是当这种理论开始向皇权的至高无上发出挑战时，就立刻被镇压下去了。董仲舒发展了灾异论，甚至能通过阴阳来预言自然灾害。他说：“求雨，闭诸阳，纵诸阴，其止雨反是；行之一国，未尝不得所欲。”“先是辽东高庙、长陵高园殿灾，仲舒居家推说其意，草稿未上，主父偃候仲舒，私见，嫉之，窃其书而奏焉。上召视诸儒，仲舒弟子吕步舒不知其师书，以为大愚。于是下仲舒吏，当死，诏赦之。仲舒遂不敢复言灾异。”

通过自然征兆来表达上天之怒的灾异论，虽没有获得控制皇权的成功，但它鼓励了民间百姓，因为它打破了皇权的绝对性——如果上天厌恶皇帝，皇权就要改统。于是在汉代期间以及之后，每一次社会暴动，都用这种理论来正名。虽然这种被民间广泛接受的理论成了造反改统的根据，但它没有改变皇权的性质。

在汉武帝时代，与董仲舒同一时期的还有一个研究《春秋》的儒家公孙弘，他是参与迫害和流放董仲舒的阴谋家，提出了另一种适应

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