地方政府与上市公司融资履约机制研究(财会文库)(txt+pdf+epub+mobi电子书下载)

作者:章铁生 等著

出版社:中国人民大学出版社

格式: AZW3, DOCX, EPUB, MOBI, PDF, TXT

地方政府与上市公司融资履约机制研究(财会文库)

地方政府与上市公司融资履约机制研究(财会文库)试读:

摘要

20世纪90年代以来,中国资本市场发展迅速,同时呈现出鲜明的新兴转型特征,其中地方政府在上市公司融资履约问题上施加了独特的影响。本课题试图探索这一影响机制及其不同侧面,主要采用新比较经济学履约能力意义上的交易成本分析。

中国经济转型的成功很大程度上要归功于中国在经济领域的分权式改革,作为分权过程的改革,地方政府可以对很多决策产生重大影响,因此,对我国上市公司融资契约实施问题的分析,需要把地方政府考虑进来。经济分权和特殊的政治激励,构成了中国地方政府发展经济的强大激励,引起了地区之间的激烈竞争。面临高强度激励的地方政府对上市公司融资契约的实施者——法庭和监管机构实施能力的影响是截然不同的,由此形成了我国地方政府深度参与其中的上市公司融资履约机制。一方面,由于地区之间的竞争,导致地方政府具有对地方法院涉及当地企业纠纷的案件进行干预的强烈动机,再加上我国地方法院在人事和财务上对地方政府的依赖,以及我国经济民事案件一般采用“原告就被告”原则,使这种动机变成了现实,削弱了法院作为第三方的实施能力。另一方面,同样是由于地区之间的竞争,引发了地区间对资源包括资本市场资源的争夺,我国证券监管机构则灵活运用其被赋予的资本市场资源分配权——证券发行管制权,充分调动了地方政府参与上市公司治理的积极性,从而增强了自己的实施能力。本课题循着从提出问题、分析问题到解决问题的基本思路,首先对公司融资引起的投资者保护问题,以及地方政府在其中的重要作用做了一项基于文献的分析;随后分别理论分析并实证检验了地方政府与辖内公司首次公开发行股票(IPO)机会的获取以及地方政府在辖内上市公司融资合约履行中出现问题(陷入财务困境或违规)时的履约行为及其经济后果;最后结合这些理论分析和实证研究的结果,找出了目前我国上市公司融资履约机制过分依赖证券行政监管和地方政府参与履约的局限之处,分别从强化证券侵权案件立法和执法、完善证券发行监管、全面理解并发挥地方政府作用等角度提出了优化我国上市公司融资履约机制的对策。

本课题具体的研究内容如下:

第1章是绪论。主要交代本课题的研究背景、研究问题、研究内容以及学术贡献等。

第2章对地方政府在上市公司融资契约中的重要作用做了一项基于文献的分析。本章在指出公司融资引起的公司治理问题和投资者法律保护对公司融资契约实施的重要意义后,分别梳理了投资者法律保护的经济后果、国别差异与原因的文献,以及政府管制对公司融资契约实施的重要价值的文献,为后续研究提供了基础。已有文献研究发现,投资者法律保护具有十分重要的经济后果,这些研究基于各国法律渊源不同,得出普通法系国家比民法法系国家给予了投资者更强的保护这一结论。由于法律是不断变化的,法律渊源一般不会变化,因此,对于如何加强投资者法律保护,已有研究还很有局限。由于投资者保护法律改革要求法律体系进行重大改革,困难很大,探求功能趋同可能更为明智,即利用其他一些功能性替代方式来发挥作用,如股权集中、完善的会计标准、行业自律、成立专门法院、利用外国监控人、声誉和关系等,特别是政府管制对上市公司融资契约实施的重要意义得到了不完备法律理论和新比较经济学派的公共实施论的深入探讨。最后结合我国自20世纪70年代末以来的经济分权式改革和晋升激励所引发的地方政府之间的激烈竞争,分析了地方政府在上市公司融资契约中的重大作用。

第3~4章研究地方政府与IPO机会的获取。第3章以2006-2012年间的IPO申请为样本,研究产权性质与IPO机会的关系,发现产权性质对IPO机会没有显著影响。研究结果表明,伴随着转型进程的推进和国有企业改革攻坚战在21世纪初基本完成,中国资本市场在2006年出现转折性变化,进入了新的发展阶段,股权融资不再有产权性质歧视。第4章以我国2006-2012年民营企业的IPO申请为研究样本,同时考察企业拥有的企业层面政治关系和所在辖区层面政治关系,实证研究了政治关系是否有助于民营企业得到IPO机会。研究发现,政治关系对民营企业的IPO机会存在显著影响,拥有政治关系越多的民营企业越可能通过发审委IPO审核。研究结果表明,在中国这样的制度环境下,政治关系作为一种重要替代机制正在发挥作用。

第5~6章研究地方政府在辖内上市公司融资合约履行中出现问题时的履约行为及其经济后果。第5章通过分析证券发行管制下的地方政府“护租”行为,研究了地方政府参与辖内上市公司财务困境风险化解的机制:中央政府证券发行管制形成垄断租金,地方政府围绕证券发行机会的竞争使得垄断租金转化成为可占用性准租。为使辖内公司未来获得发行证券机会,避免租值转移,地方政府积极参与辖内上市公司财务困境风险化解。上述理论分析得到了经验证据的支持,以2005-2012年处于财务困境的上市公司为研究样本,发现辖内上市公司处于财务困境状况对该地区未来的公司证券发行申请通过发审委审核的比例存在显著影响,地方政府则会根据自身执行能力努力避免辖内上市公司处于财务困境。第5章的研究对于中国转型期证券行政监管阶段性有效,特别是地方政府积极参与辖内上市公司财务困境风险化解给出了机理性解释并提供了经验证据。第6章研究了薄弱法律环境下,基于政府管制权力外溢增强政府监管机构作为第三方的契约实施能力,从而调动地方政府积极化解上市公司违规风险的实施机制是否存在以及怎样存在。证券监管机构在地区间分配IPO资源时,可能会考虑各地所辖上市公司发生违规情况的频率和严重程度,地方政府出于自身理性,会做出履行与否以及履行多少的对策。研究发现,在法律实施机制下,投资者因公司发生违规的市场损失大,但通过诉讼可能得到的补偿也大,但是在管制实施机制下,投资者市场损失与诉讼收益都小,因为中小投资者能够观测到契约及其实施的影响因素,并事先将此信息反映在股票定价中,地方政府执行契约的程度越高,公司股价因为违规所受损失就越小,在管制实施机制下,地方政府主动积极救助,投资者损失以股价下跌较少的形式,得到一定程度的弥补。

第7章提出了优化我国上市公司融资履约机制的对策。第7章基于第3~6章的研究结论,分别从强化证券侵权案件立法和执法、完善证券发行监管、全面理解并发挥地方政府作用等角度提出了优化我国上市公司融资履约机制的对策。在强化证券侵权案件立法和执法方面,应该尽快出台内幕交易和操纵市场民事赔偿的司法解释,拓展前置程序、因果关系以及投资者损害的认定范围,理性认识集团诉讼在处理证券民事侵权纠纷上具有的优势,充分认识到和解是解决证券民事赔偿案件的重要途径,发挥地方政府在其中的重要作用。关于完善证券发行监管,股票发行注册制改革是资本市场牵一发而动全身的改革,需要有步骤地推进,但注册制不是简单的登记生效制,不是说股票发行不要审了,而是审核方式要改革,改革的方向是政府不断放权,加大市场的调节功能。未来证券监管机构的监管重心应进一步转向重视信息披露,弱化对地方政府的依赖,强化以保荐人为核心的中介机构的职责,并加大执法力度。对于由此带来的地方政府参与上市公司融资履约机制可能性与积极性的影响,需要在更高层次上破解,努力的方向是要改变地方官员晋升激励机制,引导地方政府积极推进改善辖区市场化进程,为辖内企业营造良好的公平竞争环境,以促使更为市场化的上市公司融资履约机制的形成。

作为一个新兴转型市场,我国资本市场经过20多年的发展,取得了一定的成就,对我国地方政府与上市公司融资履约机制的研究,对于我国资本市场今后的发展具有重要启发意义,对于其他新兴转型经济体也具有重要借鉴价值。

关键词:证券监管 地方政府 上市公司 融资履约机制

Abstract

Since the 1990s,China’s capital market has developed rapidly,while showing a distinctive feature of emerging and transition,among which local governments exerted unique influence on contract implementation issues of listed companies’financing.This research attempts to explore this mechanism and its different sides,mainly using transaction cost analysis based on performance capabilities in the sense of new comparative economics.

The success of China’s economic transformation is largely attributed to China’s decentralization reform in the economic field.In the process of decentralization reform,local governments canhave a significant impact on many decisions.Therefore,in the analysis of China’s listed companies’financing contract implementation issues,we need to take local governments into consideration.China’s decentralization in economic and the special political promotion constitute a powerful incentive of economic development for local governments,causing a fierce competition between regions.Facing with high-intensity incentives,local governments have a different impact on the perpetrators of the listed companies’financing contract such as local courts and regulatory agencies,thus forming a listed companies’financing performance mechanisms,in which local government is deeply involved.On the one hand,because of the competition between regions,local governments have a strong incentive to intervene cases which involve local companies,coupled with the dependence of district courts on local governments about personnel and finance,as well as China’s economic and civil cases generally use the“defendant on plaintiffs”principle,make this motivation become a reality,weakening implementation capacity of the courts as a third party.On the other hand,the competition between regions also lead to competition for resources between the regions including the capital market resources,China’s securities regulatory agencies flexibly use its capital market resources distribution rights-their right to regulate the issuance of securities fully mobilized the enthusiasm of the local government to participate in the governance oflisted companies in theirjurisdiction,thereby enhancing their ability to implement.

This subject follow the process to put forward problems,analyze problems and solve the problem.First,we conducted a literature analysis about the question of the protection of investors by financing and the important function of local government.Then we used theoretical analysis and empirical method respectively to test the influence of local governments on the enterprises’IPO opportunityand we used empirical method to analyze the logic and consequences of local governments’behavior to implement contract of listed companies’financing in their jurisdiction(be in financial trouble and violations).With the consequence of theoretical analysis and empirical research,finding the confine of a listed companies’financing performance mechanisms over depend administrative regulation and the government,we put forward suggestions respectively from strengthen court enforcement andimprove the regulation of securities issuance to fully understandthe role oflocalgovernment to optimize the performance mechanism oflisted companies’financing in our country.

The specific contents of this research are as following:

Chapter 1 is an introduction.It mainly explains the origin of this study,the questions,the research contents and possible theoretical contribution of the study.

In chapter 2 we conducted a literature analysis about the important role of local government on the financing contract.Firstly,we point out the significance of corporate governance issues caused by corporate finance and legal protection of investors on financing contract implementation.Then we presented literatures about the economic consequences,the country differences and the reasons of legal protection of investors respectively,as well as literatures about the great importance of government control on the implementation of financing contract to provide a basis for future research.Existed researches suggest that legal protection of investors have very huge economic consequences.These studies focused on differences in national legal sources,so they concluded that common law countries give investors greater protection than civil law countries.However,the law is constantly changing,sources of law generally do not change,so existed researches have many limitations on how to strengthen the legal protection of investors.The reform of investorlegal protection requires major reform in the legal system,it is rather difficult.Maybe its more sensible to explore functional convergence,namely to take some other alternative functional way,such as equity concentration,improving accounting standards,industry selfregulation,the establishment of special courts,the implementation of foreign supervisors,reputation and relationships and so on.In particular,the importance of government regulation on listed companies financing contract implementation get deeply discussedin the aspect ofincomplete legal theory andthe public implementation ofnew comparative economics.Finally,we analyzed the major role oflocal governments in listed companies financing contract combined with economic decentralization reforms since the late 1970s and intense competition among local governments causedby political promotion incentives.

Chapters 3 and 4 we studied the influence of local governments on the enterprises’IPO opportunity.In chapter 3 we tookIPO application during 2006 to 2012 as a sample to study the relationship between the nature ofproperties andIPO opportunities.We found that the nature of properties have no significant effect on IPO opportunities.The results showed that,because of the promotion of the transition process and the campaign of state-owned enterprise’reform has completed at the beginning of this century,China’s capital market has changed a lot in 2006 andhas entered a new stage ofdevelopment,in which equity financing is no longer discriminatedby the nature ofproperties.In the 4th chapter,we took the IPO application of private enterprises in 2006 to 2012 as a research sample,and observed the political relations both in corporate level and region level to research empirically whether political relations can help private enterprises get more IPO opportunities.The results showed that under the institutional environment in China,political relations as an alternative mechanism is playing an important role.

In chapters 5 to 6 we used empirical method to analyze the logic and consequences of local governments’behavior to implement contract of listed companies’financing in their jurisdiction.

In chapter 5,through analysis of local government“protection rent”under securities issued regulation,we studied the local government participate in risk resolving of listed companies’financial distress:monopoly rents is generated by the control of securities offerings by the central government,the competition of getting chance to publish securities among local governments transforms monopoly rents into appropriable quasi rent.In order to obtaining a chance of securities offering in future,avoiding the transferring of rents,the local government positively participate in dissolving financial risk of the companies which are in their jurisdiction.Theories analyzed above are supportedby empirical evidences.Take the listed companies which were in financial risk during 2005 to 2012 as our sample,studies have found that the situation of the financial distress of companies in jurisdiction has a significant influence on the proportion of the pass of applying for future securities offering,which is examined by the issuance examination committee.The local government will try their best to reduce financial distress of the listed companies in their jurisdiction according to their own executive ability.Research in this chapter is stage effective to administrative supervision of securities offerings in the transition period of China.Especially,a mechanical explanation and experience evidence is given to interpret the dissolving of financial problem of listed companies in their jurisdiction,which is positively participated in for the local governments.

The 6th chapter examines whether it exists a kind of mechanism and how does it exist under the weaklegal environment based on that the government regulation power spillover could strengthen the capacity of regulatory agencies to implement contract as a third party,and mobilize local government to solve violation risks of listed companies.The securities’regulatory agencies may take violation frequency and severity of listed companies in the jurisdiction into consideration when distributing IPO resources,so the local government will decide whether to implement or how much to implement for their own rationality.The study found that in the law enforcement mechanism,the company violation occurs may lead to a large market losses to investors,but the compensation investors may get by litigation is also large.However,under the control implementation mechanism,market losses and litigation earnings to investors are both small,because small and medium investors can observe contracts and the influence factors of them,and the information is reflected in stock price in advance.The higher the degree of local governments to perform the contract,the smaller loss of the companies’shares due to irregularities,because under the control implementation mechanism local governments assist the companies actively so the investors can get a degree of offset in the form of shares price fall less.

Chapter 7 provides suggestions for the optimization of the performance oflisted companies’financing mechanism.Based on the research conclusion of The 3th chapter to the 6th chapter,we put forward suggestions respectively from strengthen court enforcement and improve the regulation of securities issuance to fully understand the role of local government to optimize the performance mechanism of listed companies’financing in our country.In strengthening court enforcement on security tort,we should issue insider trading and market manipulation of civil compensation injudicialinterpretation as soon as possible,expanding the prepositional procedure,causal relationship and accredited investors damage.Rationally know the advantages of group litigation in the treatment of securities civil disputes.Pay more attention to settlement is an important approach tosolve the securities civil compensation cases,and play the important role of local government.On improving securities issue supervision,registration system rather than examination system is a good way.But because the stockissuing registration reform is a systemic reform of the whole capital market,it needs to be promoted gradually.Registration system is not a simple registration effective system.Its not to say that share issuance does not need to be examined anymore,its the way to examine needs to be reformed.The direction of the reform is that the governments delegate powers to the market,enlarging the adjustment function of the market.Securities regulation agencies should attach more attention to information disclosure in the future,weaken dependence on local government,strengthen responsibility of agencies where sponsors as the core,and intensify law enforcement.For the impact on the possibility and positivity of the local government taking participation in implement contracts of the listed companies’financing,it needs to be broke at a higher level.One direction is to change the local officials’promotion incentive mechanism,guiding local governments to actively promote improving marketization process in its jurisdiction,creating a fairly competitive environment,thus promote the formation of a more market-oriented implementation mechanism of listed companies’financing.

As an emerging and transition market,China’s capital market has made some achievements after 20 years ofdevelopment,research on China’s local governments andlisted companies’financing compliance mechanism has an inspiring meaning for the development of China’s capital market,it also has an important reference value for other emerging economies in transition.

Key Words:Securities regulatory;Local government;Listed companies;Enforcement mechanism of financing contract第  1  章绪论1.1 研究背景

企业是一张契约之网(Jensen&Meckling,1976),但是,由于人的有限理性(bounded rationality)与机会主义(opportunism),契约存在其固有的缺陷(Williamson,1988)。由于人的有限理性,缔约者要想签订一个包括对付未来随机事件的完全契约条款是不可能的,由于机会主义的存在,仅仅依赖缔约者的承诺是天真的,现实中的人时时刻刻都可能会损人利己。对于企业契约的这个局限性,企业理论的产权学派强调应该赋予企业家剩余控制权,特别是非人力资本的剩余控制权,以鼓励人们对资产进行投资的积极性,即剩余控制权是与专用性资产的投资密切相关的。企业理论的新产权派强调,企业所有权结构优化的评价标准是能否促进合约的参与者进行事先的专用性投资(Grossman&Hart,1986)。然而,现代企业的所有权配置制度也有其自身的缺陷,Shleifer&Vishny(1997)指出,对于大多数国家的公司而言,基本的代理问题不是Berle&Means(1932)式的股东与管理者之间的冲突,而是大股东与中小投资者之间的利益冲突。对上市公司而言,正是由于控股股东和公司内部人拥有企业的剩余控制权,出于自身利益的考虑,他们往往有进行违规活动的动机,从而可能侵害中小投资者的利益。由于现代企业契约和产权制度的不完善,以公司内部人为代表的利益团体的机会主义倾向才有得以施展的空间。

上市公司的外部投资者把资金投入后,由于所有权和经营权的分离以及信息不对称,随之而来的是代理问题,那么,如何促使公司的内部人能够可信地向外部投资者支付回报,从而使外部融资实现呢?上市公司的融资契约可以看做上市公司和外部投资者之间的一个动态[1]博弈,动态博弈的关键是可信性,即上市公司的融资契约是否真正能够得到实施的问题。可以一简例考察如下:假设甲公司有一投资额为500万元的项目,预期项目成功后能够产生50万元的净收益,但公司的投入资金只有400万元,而投资者乙正好有100万元资金可以投资。假设甲希望乙能将100万元资金投给自己用于项目投资,并许诺乙在项目成功后给予回报10万元,那么乙是否会向甲投资呢?乙最[2]关心的是甲公司的许诺是否可信,以及若甲不履行给予回报的诺言他是否能够采取行动保护自己的利益。对于此博弈的结果可区分以下两种情形进行考察:情形1是没有强制实施契约的机制。此情形下的博弈有两个阶段,第二阶段甲的理性选择是项目成功后不给乙回报,乙知道投资给甲将得不到回报,故第一阶段乙不会投资给甲。显然,作为理性决策者,乙将选择不投资,这是此博弈的均衡。博弈双方获得的支付是(0,0),对社会而言,资源没有获得有效配置。情形2是有强制实施契约的机制。与第一种情形不同的是,此情形下若第二阶段甲选择项目成功后不给乙回报的话,进入博弈的第三阶段,作为理性决策者,此时乙将选择采取行动使契约得到强制实施,博弈双方[3]获得的支付是(38,9);甲会预期到这一点,在第二阶段会选择回报,此时博弈双方获得的支付是(40,10);乙知道若他第一阶段选择投资甲会获得回报,这种情况下的状况好于他在第一阶段选择不投资的状况。因此,此博弈的均衡是乙在第一阶段选择投资,甲在第二阶段选择给予乙回报,博弈双方获得的支付是(40,10),这个结[4]果对社会而言,资源获得了有效配置。从上述上市公司融资契约的博弈分析可以看出,适当的强制实施契约的机制对上市公司融资契约的达成与履行,从而对资源有效配置是至关重要的。它是解决融资博弈可信性问题的关键之所在,融资契约事后的执行情况将影响到事前是否能够达成。如果没有某种适当的强制实施契约的机制,上市公司控制者将不可能有激励去执行契约;相反,他们会通过各种违规方式来侵害外部投资者的利益。在重复博弈过程中,外部投资者无疑会失去对证券市场和上市公司的信心,从而影响到证券市场的正常运转乃至国民经济的发展。

因此,上市公司融资契约实际上是一种包括各相关主体在内的契约行为。契约的实施包括自我实施(self-enforcing)和第三方实施。所谓自我实施契约,是指契约当事人依靠日常习惯、合作诚意和信誉来执行契约,包括第一方实施和第二方实施。第一方实施的力量来自每一个参与契约的个体自身,比如道德、图腾禁忌等,第二方实施的力量来自参与契约的各个主体之间的互相作用,比如互利原则、组织内部强迫力等。在契约自我实施的过程中,声誉具有重要作用,因为签约双方不仅要考虑当前,还要考虑未来;不仅要考虑缔约方的利益,还要考虑未来可能对自己产生影响的交易对手的态度。在一个重复的博弈中,一个人的行动是可以影响他人的未来选择的,别人可以从他的行动中判断他履约的能力,了解他的信誉情况,并由此决定与他的合作关系。同样,一个企业履约的情况会被它的交易对手时时观察,当知道它的不履约行为时,实际或潜在交易对手就远离这个企业了。[5]我国证券市场目前还未建立起激励上市公司注重信誉的机制(黄学敏,2006),因此,我们专注于研究我国上市公司融资契约的第三方[6]实施。第三方实施是指由合约之外的其他主体对合约方施加压力以促使合约的履行。上市公司融资契约作为一种典型的非人际交易,往往需要依赖第三方强制实施,作为第三方实施者的往往是法院或者证券监管机构。那么,在上市公司融资契约的实施中,多大程度的政府干预或者说什么样的制度选择才是合适的?以施莱弗(Shleifer)为[7]代表的新比较经济学派对此进行了研究。

新比较经济学派认为,好的经济制度必须根据本国情况因时因地而变,有效地保护产权,使人们能够从投资中获益、订立合同和解决[8]纠纷。现实经济生活中既存在私人侵占的无序(disorder),也发[9]生着政府侵占的专制(dictatorship),私人侵占与政府侵占是一种替代关系,制度可能性边界(institutional possibility frontier,IPF)(见图1-1)被用来表示这种替代关系(Djankov,Glaeser,La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes&Shleifer,2003)。图1-1 制度可能性资料来源:转引自Djankov,Glaeser,La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes&Shleifer(2003)。

制度的功能就是控制无序和专制这两方面的成本,制度的选择需要在无序与专制之间进行权衡。权衡的社会控制策略主要有:私人秩序(private orderings)或市场竞争秩序(market discipline)、独立执法(independentjudges)或私人诉讼(private litigation)、监管型国[10]家 (regulatory state)或通过监管的公共实施(public enforcement through regulation)、国家垄断经济(socialism)或国家所有制(state ownership)。这四个类别的划分提供了一个基准,有助于探讨政府在经济生活中所应扮演的角色,在同一市场中,市场竞争秩序、私人诉讼和政府管制可以并存。显然,一个拥有更大权力来控制经济的政府必然会产生较强的专制。从私人秩序,到独立执法,到监管,到国家垄断经济,政府的干预程度逐渐上升,相应地,无序的社会成本逐渐减少,而专制的社会成本逐渐增加。

图1-1描述了一个社会或社会某个部门的IPF,横轴表示由于专制带来的社会损失,纵轴表示由于无序带来的社会损失,无序和专制的[11]成本用同样的单位来衡量,并对此进行权衡。IPF凸向原点,其位[12]置取决于文明资本(civic capital),具体形状则是由专制在减少无序方面的边际效力决定的。如果专制在减少无序方面的边际效力较高,更多地通过政府控制社会无序会产生较少的社会损失,这种情况下IPF的形状会更陡;在那些市场约束更有效、参与者之间的资源分配更平等的部门,加强政府专制并不会减少太多的社会无序,这些部门IPF的形状会更平坦。就短期而言,文明资本是一种约束而不是一种选择,IPF的位置是固定的。IPF反映了社会的制度可能性:随者政府干预的逐渐增加,有多大程度的无序可以被减少。

图1-1中向下倾斜的45°线显示了一定程度的无序和专制下的总社会成本(total loss minimisation,TLM),它与IPF的切点就是一个社会或社会中某部门的有效率制度选择。当IPF的形状更平坦时,符合效率的选择点要求更少的政府干预;反之,当IPF的形状更陡时,在有效选择点上允许存在更大程度的政府干预。

对于证券市场而言,上述可能的对经济生活的社会控制措施都是不完美的,而最优的制度设计需要在这些不完美的方案之间做出选择,Shleifer(2005)从市场秩序、独立执法/通过法院的私人诉讼、管制(公共实施)、国家垄断经济的成本权衡中说明了公共实施的比较优势。La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes&Shleifer(简称LLS)(2006)研究发现,在纯粹的管制和私人诉讼之间有一个中间策略,即基于公共规则的私人诉讼,可能成为证券市场一个有效的制度选择,即政府可以强制规定发行人必须披露的具体内容,但是需要对披露结果不满意的投资者自己进行诉讼,这样做的理由在于,在执行某些特定的条款而不是宽泛的合同原则时,采用诉讼的形式可能较好。

新比较经济学派的研究为我们提供了有益的研究基础,但是他们的研究对象并没有包括像中国这样的新兴转型经济体,这为我们提供了进一步研究的机会。[1] 动态博弈的一个中心问题是可信性问题。所谓可信性,是指动态博弈中先行为的博弈方是否该相信后行为的博弈方会采取对自己有利或不利的行为。后行为方将来会采取对先行为方有利的行为相当于一种“许诺”,而将来会采取对先行为方不利的行为相当于一种“威胁”。参见谢识予:《经济博弈论(第二版)》,126页,上海,复旦大学出版社,2002。[2] 这里的一个隐含假设是,项目的价值是真实的,这在成熟市场经济中是靠充分信息披露实现的。在我国这样的新兴转型经济中,由于存在比较严重的信息不对称问题,是靠政府信用担保的。[3] 支付是(38,9)而不是(40,10),表示在甲不给予回报的情况下,乙由于采取行动行使权利会发生成本,而甲因为乙采取行动也将受到惩罚。[4] 虽然此结果对这个公司融资博弈是最优的,但由于社会需要建立某种适当的外部投资者保护机制以使契约得到实施而付出一些成本,因此对社会而言,只能得到一种次优结果。[5] 这个过程称为契约履约的可观察性或可证实性。参见[美]科斯、哈特、斯蒂格利茨等:《契约经济学》,译者前言,18页,北京,经济科学出版社,1999。[6] 自我实施多发生于排外的小型社会或具有稳定的重复交易之中;在专业化分工增进社会福利的非人际交换世界中,普遍依赖第三方实施(巴泽尔,1998,2001)。凡是具有惩罚能力或施加成本的能力,都具有实施强制性(巴泽尔,1998)。实施执行者通过与被执行者保持长期关系或者造成损害来强加成本,它或者体现为通过正式规则直接施加惩罚,或者通过非正式规则间接进行威慑。[7] 新比较经济学研究不同市场经济的比较,旧比较经济学比较计划经济和市场经济的差异。

试读结束[说明:试读内容隐藏了图片]

下载完整电子书

若在网站上没有找合适的书籍,可联系网站客服获取,各类电子版图书资料皆有。

客服微信:xzh432

登入/注册
卧槽~你还有脸回来
没有账号? 忘记密码?