陆权论：汉英对照(经典文库)(txt+pdf+epub+mobi电子书下载)

作者：哈尔福德·约翰·麦金德

出版社：台海出版社

格式: AZW3, DOCX, EPUB, MOBI, PDF, TXT

陆权论：汉英对照(经典文库)试读：

This book, whatever its value, is the outcome of more than the merely feverous thought of War time; the ideas upon which it is based were published in outline a good dozen years ago. In 1904, in a paper on "The Geographical Pivot of History," read before the Royal Geographical Society, I sketched the World-Island and the Heartland; and in 1905 I wrote in the National Review on the subject of "Man-power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength," an article which I believe first gave vogue to the term Man-power. In that term is implicit not only the idea of fighting strength but also that of productivity, rather than wealth, as the focus of economic reasoning. If I now venture to write on these themes at somewhat greater length, it is because I feel that the War has established, and not shaken, my former points of view.H. J. M,1st February, 1919.I PERSPECTIVE

Our memories are still full of the vivid detail of an all-absorbing warfare; there is, as it were, a screen between us and the things which happened earlier even in our own lives. But the time has at last come to take larger views, and we must begin to think of our long War as of a single great event, a cataract in the stream of history. The last four years have been momentous, because they have been the outcome of one century and the prelude to another. Tension between the nations had slowly accumulated, and, in the language of diplomacy, there has now been a d é tente. The temptation of the moment is to believe that unceasing peace will ensue merely because tired men are determined that there shall be no more war. But international tension will accumulate again, though slowly at first; there was a generation of peace after Waterloo. Who among the diplomats round the Congress table at Vienna in 1814 foresaw that Prussia would become a menace to the world? Is it possible for us so to grade the stream bed of future history as that there shall be no more cataracts? That, and no smaller, is the task before us if we would have posterity think less meanly of our wisdom than we think of that of the diplomats of Vienna.

The great wars of history — we have had a world-war about every hundred years for the last four centimes — are the outcome, direct or indirect, of the unequal growth of nations, and that unequal growth is not wholly due to the greater genius and energy of some nations as Compared with others; in large measure it is the result of the uneven distribution of fertility and strategical opportunity upon the face of our globe. In other words, there is in nature no such thing as equality of opportunity for the nations. Unless I wholly misread the facts of geography, I would go further, and say that the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways, is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the end of a single World Empire. If we are to realize our ideal of a League of Nations which shall prevent war in the future, we must recognize these geographical realities and take steps to counter their influence. Last century, under the spell of the Darwinian theory, men came to think that those forms of organization should survive which adapted themselves best to their natural environment. Today we realize, as we emerge from our fiery trial, that human victory consists in our rising superior to such mere fatalism.

Civilization is based on the organization of society so that we may render service to one another, and the higher the civilization the more minute tends to be the division of labor and the more complex the organization. A great and advanced society has, in consequence, a powerful momentum; without destroying the society itself you cannot suddenly check or divert its course. Thus it happens that years beforehand detached observers are able to predict a coming clash of societies which are following convergent paths in their development. The historian commonly prefaces his narrative of war with an account of the blindness of men who refused to see the writing on the wall, but the fact is, that, like every other going concern, a national society can be shaped to a desired career while it is young, but when it is old its character is fixed and it is incapable of any great change in its mode of existence. Today all the nations of the world are about to start afresh; is it within the reach of human forethought so to set their courses as that, notwithstanding geographical temptation, they shall not clash in the days of our grandchildren?

In our anxiety to repudiate the ideas historically associated with the Balance of Power, is there not perhaps some danger that we should allow merely juridical conceptions to rule our thoughts in regard to the League of Nations? It is our ideal that justice should be done between nations, whether they be great or small, precisely as it is our ideal that there should be justice between men, whatever the difference of their positions in society. To maintain justice as between individual men the power of the State is invoked, and we now recognize, after the failure of international law to avert the Great War, that there must be some power or, as the lawyers say, some sanction for the maintenance of justice as between nation and nation. But the power which is necessary for the rule of law among citizens passes easily into tyranny. Can we establish such a world power as shall suffice to keep the law between great and small States, and yet shall not grow into a world tyranny? There are two roads to such a tyranny, the one the conquest of all other nations by one nation, the other the perversion of the very international power itself which may be set up to coerce the lawless nation. In our great replanning of human society we must recognize that the skill and opportunity of the robber are prior facts to the Law of Robbery. In other words, we must envisage our vast problem as business men dealing with realities of growth and opportunity, and not merely as lawyers defining rights and remedies.

My endeavor, in the following pages, will be to measure the relative significance of the great features of our globe as tested by the events of history, including the history of the last four years, and then to consider how we may best adjust our ideals of freedom to these lasting realities of our Earthly Home. But first we must recognize certain tendencies of human nature as exhibited in all forms of political organization.II SOCIAL MOMENTUM"To him that hath shall be given"

In the year 1789 the lucid French People, in its brain-town of Paris, saw visions, generous visions — Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. But presently French Idealism lost its hold on Reality, and drifted into the grip of Fate, in the person of Napoleon. With his military efficiency Napoleon restored order, but in doing so organized a French Power the very law of whose being was a denial of Liberty. The story of the great French Revolution and Empire has influenced all subsequent political thought; it has seemed a tragedy in the old Greek sense of a disaster predestined in the very character of Revolutionary Idealism.

When, therefore, in 1848, the peoples of Europe were again in a vision-seeing mood, their idealism was of a more complex nature. The principle of Nationality was added to that of Liberty, in the hope that liberty might be secured against the overreaching organizer by the independent spirit of nations. Unfortunately, in that year of revolutions, the good ship Idealism again dragged her anchor, and by and by was swept away by Fate, in the person of Bismarck. With his Prussian efficiency Bismarck perverted the new ideal of German Nationality, just as Napoleon had perverted the simpler French ideals of Liberty and Equality. The tragedy of National Idealism, which we have just seen consummated, was not, however, predestined in the disorder of Liberty, but in the materialism, commonly known as Kultur, of the organizer. The French tragedy was the simple tragedy of the breakdown of Idealism; but the German tragedy has, in truth, been the tragedy of the substituted Realism.

In 1917 the Democratic Nations of the whole Earth thought they had seen a great harbor light when the Russian Czardom fell and the American Republic came into the War. For the time being, at any rate, the Russian Revolution has gone the common revolutionary way, but we still put our hope in Universal Democracy. To the eighteenth-century ideal of Liberty, and the nineteenth- century ideal of Nationality, we have added our twentieth-century ideal of the League of Nations. If a third tragedy were to ensue, it would be on a vast scale for democratic ideals are today the working creed of the greater part of humanity. The Germans, with their Real-Politik, their politics of reality — something other than merely practical politics — regard that disaster as being sooner or later inevitable. The War Lord and the Prussian military caste may have been fighting for the mere maintenance of their power, but large and intelligent sections of German society have acted under the persuasion of a political philosophy which was none the less sincerely held because we believed it to be wrong. In this War German anticipations have proved wrong in many regards, but that has been because we have made them so by a few wise principles of government, and by strenuous effort, notwithstanding our mistakes in policy. Our hardest test has yet to come. What degree of International Reconstruction is necessary if the world is long to remain a safe place for democracies? And in regard to the internal structure of those democracies, what conditions must be satisfied if we are to succeed in harnessing to the heavy plow of Social Reconstruction the ideals which have inspired heroism in this War? There can be no more momentous questions. Shall we succeed in soberly marrying our new Idealism to Reality?

Idealists are the salt of the Earth; without them to move us, society would soon stagnate and civilization fade. Idealism has, however, been associated with two very different phases of temper. The older idealisms, such as Buddhism, Stoicism, and Mediaeval Christianity, were based on self-denial; the Franciscan Friars vowed themselves to Chastity, Poverty, and Service. But modern democratic idealism, the idealism of the American and French Revolutions, is based on self-realization. Its aim is that every human being shall live a full and self-respecting life. According to the preamble of the American Declaration of Independence, all men are created equal and endowed with the rights of liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

These two tendencies of idealism have corresponded historically with two developments of reality. In older times the power of nature over man was still great. Hard reality put limits to his ambitions. In other words, the world as a whole was poor, and resignation was the only general road to happiness. The few could, no doubt, obtain some scope in life, but only at the cost of the serfdom of the many. Even the so-called Democracy of Athens and the Platonic Utopia were based on domestic and industrial slavery. But the modern world is rich. In no small measure man now controls the forces of nature, and whole classes, formerly resigned to their fate, have become imbued with the idea that with a fairer division of wealth there should be a nearer approach to equality of opportunity.

This modern reality of human control over nature, apart from which democratic ideals would be futile, is not wholly due to the advance of scientific knowledge and invention. The greater control which man now wields is conditional, and not absolute like the control of nature over man by famine and pestilence. Human riches and comparative security are based today on the division and coordination of labor, and on the constant repair of the complicated plant which has replaced the simple tools of primitive society. In other words, the output of modern wealth is conditional on the maintenance of our social organization and capital. Society is a "going concern," and no small part of our well-being may be compared with the intangible "goodwill" of a business. The owner of a business depends on the habits of his customers no less than on the regular running of the machinery in his factory; both must be kept in repair, and when in repair they have the value of the "going concern"; but should the business stop, they have merely a break-up value — the machinery becomes so much scrap metal, and the goodwill is reduced to the book debts.

Society reposes on the fact that man is a creature of habit. By interlocking the various habits of many men, society obtains a structure which may be compared with that of a running machine. Mrs. Bouncer was able to form a simple society for the occupation of a room, because Box slept by night and Cox by day, but her society was dislocated when one of her lodgers took a holiday, and for the nonce changed his habit. Let any one try to realize what would happen to himself if all those on whom he depends — the postmen, railwaymen, butchers, bakers, printers, and very many others — were suddenly to vary their settled routines; he will then begin to appreciate in how great a degree the power of modern man over nature is due to the fact that society is a "going concern," or, in the language of the engineer, has momentum. Stop the running long enough to throw men's habits out of gear with one another, and society would quickly run down to the simple reality of control by nature. Vast numbers would die in consequence.

Productive power, in short, is a far more important element of reality in relation to modern civilization than is accumulated wealth. The total visible wealth of a civilized country, notwithstanding the antiquity of some of its treasures, is generally estimated as equal to the output of not more than seven or eight years. The significance of this statement does not lie in its precise accuracy, but in the rapid growth of its practical meaning for modern men, owing to their dependence on a machinery of production, mechanical and social, which in the past four or five generations has become increasingly delicate and complicated. For every advance in the application of science there has been a corresponding change in social organization. It was by no mere coincidence that Adam Smith was discussing the division of labor when James Watt was inventing the steam- engine. Nor, in our own time, is it by blind coincidence that beside the invention of the internal combustion engine — the key to the motor-car, submarine, and aeroplane — must be placed an unparalleled extension of the credit system. Lubrication of metal machinery depends on the habits of living men. The assumption of some scientific enthusiasts that the study of the humane arts has ceased to be important will not bear examination; the management of men, high and low, is more difficult and more important under the conditions of modern reality than it ever was.

We describe the managers of the social machine as Organizers, but under that general term are commonly included two distinct categories. In the first place, we have Administrators, who are not strictly organizers at all — begetters, that is to say, of new organs in an organism. It is the function of the administrator to keep the running social machine in repair and to see to its lubrication. When men die, or for reasons of ill-health or old age retire, it is his duty to fill the vacant places with men suitably trained beforehand. A foreman of works is essentially an administrator. A Judge administers the Law, except in so far as in fact, though not in theory, he may make it. In the work of the administrator, pure and simple, there is no idea of progress. Given a certain organization, efficiency is his ideal — perfect smoothness of working. His characteristic disease is called "Red Tape". A complicated society, well administered, tends in fact to a Chinese stagnation by the very strength of its momentum. The goodwill of a long- established and well-managed business may often be sold for a large sum in the market. Perhaps the most striking illustration of social momentum is to be seen in the immobility of markets themselves. Every seller wishes to go where buyers are in the habit of congregating in order that he may be sure of a purchaser for his wares. On the other hand, every buyer goes, if he can, to the place where sellers are wont to assemble in order that he may buy cheaply as the result of their competition. The authorities have often tried in vain to decentralize the markets of London.

In order to appreciate the other type of organizer, the Creator of social mechanism, let us again consider for a moment the common course of Revolutions. A Voltaire criticises the running concern known as French Government; a Rousseau paints the ideal of a happier society; the authors of the great Encyclop é die prove that the material bases for such a society exist. Presently the new ideas take possession of some well-meaning enthusiasts — inexperienced, however, in the difficult art of changing the habits of average mankind. They seize an opportunity for altering the structure of French society. Incidentally, but unfortunately, they slow down its running. Stoppage of work, actual breakage of the implements of production and government, removal of practiced administrators, and substitution of misfitting amateurs combine to reduce the rate of production of the necessaries of life, with the result that prices rise, and confidence and credit fall. The Revolutionary leaders are, no doubt, willing enough to be poor for a time in order to realize their ideals, but the hungry millions rise up around them. To gain time the millions are led to suspect that the shortage is due to some interference of the deposed powers, and the Terror inevitably follows. At last men become fatalists, and, abandoning ideals, seek some organizer who shall restore efficiency. The necessity is reinforced by the fact that foreign enemies are invading the national territory, and that less production and relaxed discipline have reduced the defensive power of the State. But the organizer needed for the task of reconstruction is no mere administrator; he must be able to design and make, and not merely to repair and lubricate social machinery. So Carnot, who "organizes victory", and Napoleon with his Code Civil, win eternal fame by creative effort.

The possibility of organization in the constructive sense depends on discipline. Running society is constituted by the myriad interlocking of the different habits of many men; if the running social structure is to be altered, even in some relatively small respect, a great number of men and women must simultaneously change various of their habits in complementary ways. It was impossible to introduce Daylight Saving except by an edict of Government, for any partial adherence to the change of hour would have thrown society into confusion. The achievement of Daylight Saving was, therefore, dependent on social discipline, which is thus seen to consist not in the habits of men but in the power of simultaneous and correlated change of those habits. In an ordered State the sense of discipline becomes innate, and the police are but rarely called upon to enforce it. In other words, social discipline, or the alteration of habit at will or command, itself becomes a habit. Military discipline, in so far as it consists of single acts at the word of command, is of a simpler order, but the professional soldier knows well the difference between habitual discipline and even the most intelligent fighting by quick-trained men.

In times of disorder the interlocking of productive habits breaks down step by step, and society as a whole becomes progressively poor, though robbers of one kind or another may for a while enrich themselves. Even more serious, however, is the failure of the habit of discipline, for that implies the loss of the power of recuperation. Consider to what a pass Russia was brought by a year of cumulative revolutions; her condition was like that terrible state of paralysis when the mind still sees and directs, but the nerves fail to elicit any response from the muscles. A nation does not die when so smitten, but the whole mechanism of its society must be reconstituted, and that quickly, if the men and women who survive its impoverishment are not to forget the habits and lose the aptitudes on which their civilization depends. History shows no remedy but force upon which to found a fresh nucleus of discipline in such circumstances; but the organizer who rests upon force tends inevitably to treat the recovery of mere efficiency as his end. Idealism does not flourish under his rule. It was because history speaks plainly in this regard, that so many of the idealists of the last two generations have been internationalist; the military recovery of discipline is commonly achieved either by conquest from another national base or incidentally to a successful national resistance to foreign invasion.

The great organizer is the great realist. Not that he lacks imagination — very far from that; but his imagination turns to "ways and means", and not to elusive ends. His is the mind of Martha and not of Mary. If he be a Captain of Industry the counters of his thought are labor and capital; if he be a General of Armies they are units and

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