作者：周黎安
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转型中的地方政府：官员激励与治理(第二版)试读：
主编的话上世纪80年代，为了全面地、系统地反映当代经济学的全貌及其进程，总结与挖掘当代经济学已有的和潜在的成果，展示当代经济学新的发展方向，我们决定出版“当代经济学系列丛书”。“当代经济学系列丛书”是大型的、高层次的、综合性的经济学术理论丛书。它包括三个子系列：（1）当代经济学文库；（2）当代经济学译库；（3）当代经济学教学参考书系。本丛书在学科领域方面，不仅着眼于各传统经济学科的新成果，更注重经济学前沿学科、边缘学科和综合学科的新成就；在选题的采择上，广泛联系海内外学者，努力开掘学术功力深厚、思想新颖独到、作品水平拔尖的著作。“文库”力求达到中国经济学界当前的最高水平；“译库”翻译当代经济学的名人名著；“教学参考书系”主要出版国内外著名高等院校最新的经济学通用教材。
20多年过去了，本丛书先后出版了200多种著作，在很大程度上推动了中国经济学的现代化和国际标准化。这主要体现在两个方面：一是从研究范围、研究内容、研究方法、分析技术等方面完成了中国经济学从传统向现代的转轨；二是培养了整整一代青年经济学人，如今他们大都成长为中国第一线的经济学家，活跃在国内外的学术舞台上。
为了进一步推动中国经济学的发展，我们将继续引进翻译出版国际上经济学的最新研究成果，加强中国经济学家与世界各国经济学家之间的交流；同时，我们更鼓励中国经济学家创建自己的理论体系，在自主的理论框架内消化和吸收世界上最优秀的理论成果，并把它放到中国经济改革发展的实践中进行筛选和检验，进而寻找属于中国的又面向未来世界的经济制度和经济理论，使中国经济学真正立足于世界经济学之林。
我们渴望经济学家支持我们的追求；我们和经济学家一起瞻望中国经济学的未来。2014年1月1日献给我的父亲第 二 版 前 言
承蒙读者厚爱，书几年前即已售完。出版社希望将此书收录入“当代经济学系列丛书”，问我是否愿意趁机做些修订，我欣然允诺。然而，我很快发现时间远比想象的要少，修订工作时断时续，前后花费近三年才终于完成。
说起来是修订，其实是重写。除了原来的基本观点、分析架构大体不变之外，书的绝大多数章节都有较大幅度的修改和补充。自从2008年第一版问世以来，围绕着中国官员激励和政府治理这条主线我自己做了许多后续的研究，国内外学术界也涌现了一系列新的研究成果，在修订过程中我尽可能将最新的研究进展吸收进来。
就我自己而言，首先是沿着政治锦标赛的研究思路进行了一系列的拓展式研究，比如“层层加码”现象分析，地区间投资的空间效应，官员动态锦标赛，省交界地带的贫困问题，官员特征对地区投资、银行信贷的影响，政治商业周期、政治预算周期，“大跃进”时期与改革开放时期两个政治锦标赛的比较。在政治锦标赛的概念基础上我又进一步提出了“官场+市场”的分析视角，探讨了官场竞争与市场竞争之间的映射关系和互动模式。我认为，过去30年“官场+市场”的双层竞争模式驱动了中国经济的高速增长，塑造了中国独具特色的政经结构、市场经济和政商关系。基于这个视角，我区分了制度化的政企关系（比如地方政府与国有企业之间）与极具人格化的官商关系（如地方官员与民营企业家之间）的不同性质，以此为线索考察了过去30年从政企关系到官商关系的演变过程。我也把中国政府与市场的关系特征与东亚模式（如“日本股份公司”）、“发展型国家”等概念类型进行了对比，提出了“竞争性地方股份公司”的概括。
修订过程中改动最多的部分是行政发包制理论。在书的第一版提出这个概念的时候，我自信还是抓住了一些契合中国政府间关系的有趣而独特的现象，但是在分析层面上，不得不说它还是一个比较粗糙和模糊的知识想象。经过多年的反刍和推敲，特别是2012年以来我相继完成了几篇关于行政发包制的研究论文，行政发包制作为一种理想类型和分析理论终于有所突破和进步。从这个理论出发，我们可以更清晰地定义中国传统行政治理的特征，从而更准确地观察和识别过去20年来中国政府治理所经历的各项变革及其协同性、系统性和驱动力。我还尝试对条块关系和时下流行的项目制做了一些解析。不仅如此，行政发包制与政治锦标赛还更加有机地结合在一起，用于揭示中国国家治理能力的强项与弱项，地方政府内部的“帮助之手”与“掠夺之手”以及定义政府内部发包的组织边界。
关于中国官员激励与政府治理的特征和机制，学术界并不缺乏观察和相关研究，缺乏的是一种相对简洁、统一的理论，以便组织、梳理各式各样的观察现象并揭示其背后的相关性和一致性。这些年来，我一直在追寻这样的理论，本书就是对这个探索历程的忠实记录，希望可以为学术界起到抛砖引玉的作用。
感谢格致出版社的钱敏编辑，她的耐心细致和专业精神令人印象深刻。我的相关研究得到了国家自然科学基金面上项目的资助（项目批准号70973004），本书的修订也得到了我的学生吴敏、曹光宇的热情协助，一并致谢。
最后还是要感谢我的家人。本书从最初问世到修订见证了女儿文文的成长，也夺去了许多应该陪伴她的时光，对于后者我深感愧疚。我这些年专注于研究与工作，如果没有妻子和女儿的理解和支持是难以想象的，在此特别感谢她们。周黎安北京大学光华管理学院2016年11月5日前 言
回顾中国过去的30年，中国经济的迅速崛起几乎超出了所有人的预期。对于一个30年前还是商品高度匮乏、人民生活水平低下、国民经济到了崩溃边缘的人口大国，30年后国内生产总值（GDP）已经名列世界第四，平均年增长率接近10％，而这一切又发生在一个发展中的社会主义国家。这个事实首先令西方学者和观察家感到困惑。西方人的这种困惑在20世纪70年代曾经出现过，那一次是日本经济的崛起。西方人短时间内无法接受一个非西方国家能够在经济上与西方世界最发达的国家平起平坐，之后经过相当一段时间才终于在心理上接纳了这位东亚的新成员。这一次中国之崛起在思想和价值方面所带来的冲击波，我相信，远比日本崛起来得大，因为中国不仅是一个非西方国家，而且还是一个在政治和经济体制上与西方国家有着重大区别的国家。
平心而论，中国经济的奇迹对于中国人来说同样难以置信。如果说西方人的困惑在于他们不了解中国，而中国人的困惑则在于我们太了解中国。我们太熟悉中国政治和经济体制当中的各种弊端，我们太熟悉中国技术的落后，我们太熟悉中国人均资源的匮乏。打一个夸张一点的比喻，中国经济就如同一辆在高速公路上飞速奔跑的旧车，西方人作为局外人不理解为什么这么旧的车还能够一路高速行驶，认为里面一定有神秘装置；而坐在车内的中国人，发现满车的装置简陋不堪，心里也禁不住老犯嘀咕：这么旧的车为什么还能够一路狂奔？
这种普遍的困惑说明，关于大国崛起的起因，关于经济增长的条件和机制，关于中国经济的奇迹，我们知道的还是太少。我们需要重新审视中国的过去，重新认识和估价中国经济、政治和其他制度所包含的独特因素，正是这些因素使得中国经济在相对短暂的时期内迅速起飞。
本书就是理解中国行政体制中所包含的独特因素的一种尝试，它记录了我个人关于中国地方官员的激励与政府治理问题的一些观察和思考。我试图把中国经济的高速增长及其长期积累的各种问题与中国地方官员的激励和政府治理的独特制度联系起来。在整本书里，我想强调的是，中国当今地方官员的激励和治理模式的一些重要特征一直蕴涵在两千多年以来中国传统的官僚体制之中。无论是毛泽东还是邓小平，他们的施政理念都是最大限度地激活和发展这些特征，以推动中国的经济发展，然而结局却大不相同。近年来中国所发生的一系列变化又使得中国地方政府治理模式面临前所未有的挑战，并且正在经历着艰难而重要的转型。我们需要在一个系统的理论框架下去理解中国政府治理的过去和正在发生的变化。在中国改革开放30年之际，国内许多学者都在对中国这30年所走过的历程进行反思和总结。本书就算是我个人的一个反思和总结吧。
我在读博士期间开始对中国地方官员的激励和行为感兴趣。回国以后便有心写一本关于地方官员的书。这些年来，平时不仅跟踪和研读相关文献，每日浏览新闻和闲书时也格外关注与地方政府有关的内容。本书一部分内容来自过去的积累和近年来发表的一些相关的学术论文，但更多的内容是最近一年来的研究成果。
说起来只是一本小书问世，在整理自己所欠付的学术“债务”时发现，需要鸣谢的师长友人可以拉出一个长长的名单。虽然无法一一列举，但首先需要特别感谢的是我在斯坦福大学的导师青木昌彦教授。青木教授不仅在博士论文写作期间给予我无数细心的指点、评论和建议，毕业以后也一直鼓励我继续从事地方官员激励的研究，每次见面都会问及研究进展，并提出富有建设性的意见和建议。我从另外两位导师B.Douglas Bernheim和Antonio Rangel身上受益同样巨大，他们严谨、犀利和深邃的思想给我留下深刻印象。在斯坦福大学经济系求学期间有幸得到钱颖一教授耳提面命的教诲，亲眼目睹和见证了他的诸多经典论文的生产过程。我对中国地方官员问题的浓厚兴趣在很大程度上就来自于他的开创性工作和平时无数次的讨论和交流。钱老师对我的学术影响之深在本书可以得到很好的印证。
我想借此机会感谢我的合作者李宏彬和陈烨，我们在一起合作完成的论文成为本书的一个重要基础。在本书完稿之前曾有机会向香港中文大学的车嘉华讨教，受益匪浅。实际上在过去十年间我们围绕着本书的主题就曾有过数次深入交流，令我收获很大。
本书关于“行政逐级发包制”和“政治锦标赛模式”的部分内容2007年8月至11月间分别在天则经济研究所、复旦大学社会主义市场经济研究中心、浙江大学民营经济研究中心宣讲过，对于张曙光教授、张军教授和史晋川教授的盛情邀请以及与会者许多富有启发性的评论和建议，在此一并致谢。
在过去六年的时间里，我所在的工作单位——北京大学光华管理学院提供了良好的学术环境和氛围，尤其是应用经济系的同事和学生给了我很多的支持和鼓励。如果没有这样一个可以安心做学问的环境和同事之间频繁的思想交流，很难想象我会有信心从事本书的研究。我想特别感谢张维迎、蔡洪滨、陈玉宇这些年来对我研究工作的鼎力支持、合作和鼓励。另外，我的一些学生为本书的研究和写作提供了各式各样的热情协助，从数据收集到材料的准备，特别值得提及的是陈永伟、杨殊威、陶靖和余婧文同学的辛勤投入。
我也要特别感谢上海世纪出版集团社长陈昕先生和复旦大学新政治经济学研究中心的史正富教授，他们联袂主编“中国改革30年研究丛书”，使我有机会参与这个意义非凡的课题研究项目。今年四月份在北京召开了丛书中期报告会，陈平、肖耿、陈昕、史正富等诸位教授、专家对本书的初稿提出了中肯和令人鼓舞的评论和建议。格致出版社的钱敏女士为本书做了出色的编辑工作，认真仔细地核对文献，校正文字，使本书避免了许多不该有的错误。
近三年来，我在地方官员的激励和行为方面的研究得到了国家自然科学基金面上项目的资助（项目批准号70573008），本书也是该项研究的一个阶段性成果，特此感谢。
最后应该感谢我的家庭。因为忙于写书和其他的教学研究工作，无暇照顾家庭，两年来妻子带着幼小的女儿文文一直远在哈尔滨，我岳父、岳母为照顾文文倾注了大量的心血，他们默默的牺牲和奉献令我感激不尽。我猜想，两岁的女儿最不能理解的也许就是爸爸总是出现一段时间就神秘地不见了，希望以后能够向她解释明白。周黎安2008年10月于北京大学ABSTRACT
Starting from a poor, planning, nearly bankrupt economy in the late 1970s, China has emerged as a world economic superpower over the past three decades. China's economic miracle has profoundly challenged the conventional wisdom that property rights protection, an independent legal system, and a democratic government with checks and balances are requisite to support long-term growth. By international standards, China has a low ranking in the supply of all these institutional fundamentals. However, the sustainability of China's high economic growth has been threatened by a host of attendant problems and challenges, including environmental pollution, alarming income inequality and regional disparity, under-funded social security, and bureaucratic corruption. This book analyzes the institutional sources of China's high and sustained economic growth, as well as its downsides, using a unified conceptual framework focused on the incentives of local officials and government governance.
As an introduction to the entire book, Chapter 1 links the puzzle of China's growth miracle with the critical and positive role played by China's local governments. It elaborates on the special status of local governments in the Chinese political system and their unique contributions to China's economic reforms and development. In line with the literature's clarion call for“getting incentives right”in addition to“getting prices right”, Chapter 1 highlights the importance of“getting government incentives right”in understanding China's miraculous catch-up over the past three decades.
Our analysis of Chinese local governments is based upon two important theoretical concepts. One is administrative subcontracting, which will be addressed in Chapter 2, and the other is political tournament, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 2 demonstrates the value and significance of administrative subcontracting in characterizing China's intergovernmental relations and their evolution from ancient times. Instead of adopting a Weberian bureaucracy, Chinese intergovernmental relations have long followed a top-down subcontracting practice: the central government subcontracts virtually all administrative functions and public services to the intermediate subordinate government, and the latter further subcontracts all of these functions and services down to the next level of government, all the way down to the bottom-level local governments, such as counties or townships. By so doing, the central government specializes in major decision-making and monitoring and saves itself from routine micromanagement, and the middle-level local governments are mainly monitors of the lower-level governments. The lowest-level governments(counties and townships) are responsible for providing all essential public goods, no matter whether they are national or local in nature. In stark contrast with Weberian bureaucracy, administrative subcontracting features the de facto power of subcontractors(i.e. lower-level governments), fiscal or budget subcontracting with significant self-finance, and outcome-oriented evaluations. Chapter 2 examines in detail how the practices of“sequential administrative subcontracting”and“territory management”were established and developed in ancient times and later evolved in the era of the People's Republic of China, ranging from the planned economy regime to the post-reform regime. Some fundamental shifts in the traditional system occurred until the late 1990s in order to correct serious problems created by administrative subcontracting. We also discuss some determinants of the scope and extent of administrative subcontracting, highlighting the important role of monitoring costs, fiscal constraints, and governance risks. Finally we strive to establish administrative subcontracting as an ideal type differentiated from administrative decentralization, M-form organization, and government outsourcing.
Chapter 3 provides a historical overview of the successive waves of decentralization since 1958 and in particular the devolution of central authority since the beginning of economic reforms. This chapter seeks to describe and analyze the evolution of sequential administrative subcontracting and territorial management over the history of the People's Republic of China. Even during the planned economy regime, China maintained a much more decentralized economy than the Soviet model. Moreover, local governments played very important roles in economic planning and materials distribution, thanks to conscious and persistent efforts by Mao Zedong to weaken the control of the central ministries and empower local leaders. Since the advent of economic reforms in the late 1970s, China's decentralization has gone much further but featured a gradualist approach that started with freeing coastal areas from central control. Chapter 3 explores in detail the reasons why both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping favored regional decentralization even though their economic regimes were so different, and why these reforms fared so differently in terms of their economic performances. It also elaborates on some recent developments in central-local relations and their implications, such as the vertical centralization of banking, taxation, and customs at the central level and of product quality regulation, land management, and other issues at the provincial level.
Chapter 4 focuses on the evolution of central-local fiscal sharing since 1949 and its underlying logic. In contrast to the common perception, China's central-local fiscal relations in the pre-reform period displayed a significant degree of fiscal decentralization and subcontracting. Fiscal subcontracting refers to a fiscal sharing relation whereby a higher-level government certifies and fixes the expenditure obligations of lower-level governments, and if these lower-level governments can generate more revenues than the certified budgetary expenditures, then they can keep the remainder or a large proportion of it. The popularity of fiscal subcontracting between governments at different levels in a centralized planning regime can be understood by the necessity to support top-down administrative subcontracting arrangements, and to incentivize local governments to generate revenue and minimize expenditures. The fiscal contracting reforms started in the early 1980s represented an important extension of previous fiscal subcontracting relations in the planning regime. Under the new fiscal contracting system, local governments essentially became residual claimants of locally-generated revenues, and they gained increased autonomy over budgetary expenditures. While tax-sharing reforms initiated in 1994 substantially increased the center's fiscal authority, China's intergovernmental fiscal relations still maintained some basic features of traditional fiscal sharing, especially at subnational levels. Chapter 4 also discusses the role of extra-budgetary funds in China's local public finance as well as the current situation of intergovernmental fiscal relations at subnational levels.
Chapter 5 outlines an important governance mechanism deeply rooted in China's traditional political system—“political tournaments”, that is, competition among same-ranked local leaders in different regions for promotion to a position of higher rank. China's miraculous economic take-off occurred when promotion tournaments shifted their focus from political loyalty-based competition during the Mao era to economic-performance-based competition during the Deng era. Chapter 5 lists several preconditions which make China particularly suitable for applying growth performance-based promotion tournaments as an incentive scheme, such as: the centralized personnel control system, the lock-in effect in local officials careers, the M-form organization of the economy, and the multiple layers of territorial administration. It discusses the transition in political tournaments from the Mao regime to the Deng regime in detail. The performance-based promotion tournaments provide a vital ingredient for China's growth miracle. We also discuss the limitations of political tournaments as an incentive system when promotion becomes very difficult for most bureaucrats, especially at the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy. The last section explores the implications of a tale of dual markets created by performance-based tournaments, namely the interaction and bundling between political markets for local leaders and commercial markets for firms. Given promotion tournaments, market competition among firms located in various jurisdictions affects the economic performance of local leaders, while political competition among local leaders affects their efforts to support local firms in their jurisdictions to win in market competition.
Chapters 6—8 extend the analysis of the“dual markets model”proposed in Chapter 5 to reveal the political economy logic of China's economic growth model. Chapter 6 looks at the interaction between politics and markets, Chinese style. We document the interesting phenomenon of“top-down acceleration of growth targets”appearing in China's five-year plans at both central and local levels over the past three decades. We then link this phenomenon to the simultaneous promotion tournaments at different hierarchical levels. Chapter 6 also analyzes several other interesting issues. First, it examines the incentives of local leaders in a dynamic tournament setting, where an interim ranking of GDP growth across rival regions affects the incentive of local leaders to promote the current year's GDP growth. Second, we present evidence on the presence of a political business cycle in China and find statistically significant correlations between local leaders' age and investment growth, and between local Party congresses and resource misallocation in manufacturing. Finally, we find that city leaders' age significantly affects bank lending growth and performance; the peak of this effect appears between the ages of 54 and 55 when city leaders are close to the termination of their authority.
Chapter 7 analyzes the impact of local officials' promotion incentives on interregional competition and cooperation. There is a great deal of evidence pointing to the prolonged presence of local protectionism, duplicative investments in infrastructure and key manufacturing industries, and excessive competition in attracting FDI and many other areas. The mainstream interpretation of these phenomena in interregional interactions emphasizes the fiscal incentives of local governments to protect or expand local tax bases. However, this explanation fails to capture the essence of these phenomena: why are local leaders unable to sit down and reach an agreement to gain more from trade and cooperation? The failure of political cooperation among local leaders can be better understood by their promotion incentives: there is little benefit from cooperation but much to potentially gain through competition in a zero-sum promotion game. Moreover, the tremendous difficulty of compensating losers in the political arena makes ex ante cooperative agreement virtually impossible. Chapter 7 applies this perspective to explain why so much poverty and cross-border pollution occur among the border regions in China. The massive poverty in the border regions is not a geographical phenomenon, but a result of coordination failure among local leaders in the border regions. Local leaders who are in competition for promotion fear that if their part of the border region is developed, then there will be positive spillovers to the neighboring regions whose leaders are their political rivals. This analysis provides a political economy interpretation of China's widening regional disparity over the past several decades.
Chapter 8 examines the evolution of the local government-business relationship over time. It first describes the evolving nature of the relationship between local governments and state-owned enterprises(SOEs), explaining how the subcontracting relationship between local governments and SOEs affected the path and outcomes of SOE reforms. Then it turns to explore the role of local governments in the rise and fall of township and village enterprises(TVEs). The positive role of township and village leaders in the rise of TVEs offers a canonical example of how local governments can be a helping hand to the local economy under certain conditions. As most SOEs and TVEs were privatized, the local government-business relationship entered into a new era where local governments foster strategic coalitions with private firms and joint-ventures, and local leaders and businesspeople shake hands and gain from trade to improve economic performance and profits, ultimately enhancing local leaders' chances of winning in growth-based promotion tournaments.
Chapter 9 synthesizes the theoretical constructs developed in previous chapters, administrative subcontracting and political tournaments, into a unified theoretical framework. These two institutional arrangements are complementary and mutually supporting, creating de facto regional decentralization in a system of central control, strong fiscal incentives, and career concerns for local officials. This analytical framework is used to explain the centralization-decentralization paradox in China's central-local relations. The success of China's economic reforms and development derives from the construction of a new Chinese style of local government governance, which is rooted in traditional political institutions dating back to ancient times. Top Chinese leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, geared Chinese reforms towards activating and enabling the traditional elements of China's government governance. Since the late 1970s, state authority has devolved gradually into the hands of local governments. A system of“fiscal-sharing contracts”between the central and provincial governments were implemented and continuously revised over time. The criterion for official promotion has shifted from political loyalty during the Mao regime to local economic growth since the Deng regime. As a result, Chinese local leaders have to compete for improved economic performance in order to get a better chance of promotion than their political rivals. All of these reforms empowered local officials with authority, discretion, and fiscal resources, motivating them to seek all possible ways to boost local economies in order to secure promotion. However, current government governance has its own weakness and is responsible for local governments' soft budget constraint, bureaucratic corruption, and localism in legal enforcement. The last section of this chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of China's state capacity from the perspective of the complementarity between administrative subcontracting and promotion tournaments.
The book's final chapter discusses the ongoing governance transition of China's local governments. China's time-honored government governance structure is facing serious challenges and undergoing profound changes. For instance, the territorially-based administrative subcontracting system gave local governments too much authority to protect their own interests at the expense of national interests and has led to regional segmentation of national public goods provision, such as local market protectionism and localization of social security, law enforcement, and other public services suitable for central provision. Growth-based promotion tournaments have caused distorted incentives for local officials to damage natural environments and under-supply public services that are in high demand. China's traditional government governance is seriously constrained by the costs of collecting information about local officials' behavior, since a politically centralized regime only allows for vertical, hierarchical monitoring and disables the monitoring of local governments by citizens, independent media, and checks and balances from the legislature and judicial systems. China is now moving towards the rule of law, increasing the voices of public media, people's congresses and political consultative conferences in local governments, and experiments in elections and political campaigns within the Chinese Communist Party. As the information constraint facing the central government is relaxed, we observe an interesting shift in China's government governance from traditional administrative subcontracting, which stresses de facto decentralization and market-oriented incentives, towards Weberian bureaucracy, which emphasizes accountability, procedural justice, rule of law, and centralization of authority and budgetary control. This movement is in stark contrast with the“New Public Management”movement, which calls for a shift from Weberian bureaucracy to the market-incentive-based contracting system. How China's new governance will balance the trade-off between accountability and local officials' incentives remains to be seen.
The appendix provides theoretical background for the economic analysis in the book. It briefly reviews the economic theories of incentives, organizations and governance, and their applications in government organizations. It also introduces and discusses the theories of decentralization, fiscal federalism and political tournaments. These theoretical constructs both inspire and enable our analysis in this book.
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