作者：Buchanan, James, 1804-1870
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Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Developmen试读：
PREFATORY NOTE.
The contents of this volume originally constituted about one half of a work, entitled "Faith in God and Modern Atheism compared, in their Essential Nature, Theoretic Grounds, and Practical Influence." Simultaneously with the first issue of that work in Scotland, the five principal chapters in this volume were published separately, accompanied with the announcement that each was complete in itself. The hint thus given by the author, has been acted upon by the present publishers. On examining the whole work, it was found to be divided into four Sections. Of these, the third was devoted exclusively to "Modern Atheism." It embraced the five chapters already alluded to, together with a general introduction and four shorter chapters. It appeared, in fact, to be a complete treatise by itself; and it is now presented to the American public in the conviction that such a work is peculiarly demanded by the present state of religious opinion in this country.
The author is one of the most distinguished divines of the Free Church of Scotland. In 1845, he was appointed Professor of Apologetic Theology in the New College, Edinburgh; and, on the death of Dr. Chalmers, in 1847, he was translated to the Chair of Systematic Theology thus made vacant. In the former position, it became his duty to prepare a complete course of Lectures on Natural Religion. His work on "Faith in God," &c., contains, in an altered form, adapted to general readers, the substance of those Lectures.
Respecting this work, the British press generally has spoken in the highest terms. The distinguished geologist, Hugh Miller, says, in the Edinburgh Witness: "It is one of, at once, the most readable and solid which we have ever perused;" and the News of the Churches, the organ of the Free Church, describes it as "a work of which nothing less can be said than that, both in spirit and substance, style and argument, it fixes irreversibly the name of its author as a leading classic in the Christian literature of Britain." An American critic says: "His succinct analysis of the doctrines held by the various schools of modern atheism are admirable, and his criticisms on their doctrines original and profound; while his arguments in defence of the Christian faith against philosophical objectors are unsurpassed by those of any modern writer. Clear, vigorous, logical, learned, and strong as a Titan, he fairly vanquishes all antagonists by pure mental superiority; never understating their views or evading their arguments, but meeting them in all their force and crushing them." Another critic says: "It is a great argument for Theism and against Atheism, magnificent in its strength, order, and beauty.... The style is lucid, grave, harmonious, and every way commensurate with the dignity and importance of the subject.... The chapter on Pantheism is admirable. Regarding it as 'the most formidable rival of Christian Theism at the present day,' Dr. Buchanan seems to have specially addressed himself to the task of exposing and refuting this error. His statement of Spinoza's system is beautifully clear."
The reader will find that there is no exaggeration in these encomiums. Hugh Miller, always felicitous in his choice of words, has exactly described the two leading characteristics of "Modern Atheism," by the phrase "readable and solid." Every one who begins the book will find himself drawn strongly onward to the end; and no one can rise from its perusal without a conviction that it contains a weight of argument against all the forms of Atheism such as never before has been combined in one book.
Should the reception of this volume by the public furnish sufficient encouragement, it is the intention of the publishers to issue the remainder of the work ("Faith in God," &c.), in uniform style.
Boston, December, 1856.
INTRODUCTION.
A Treatise on the Being and Perfections of God, as the Creator and Governor of the world, can scarcely be adapted to the exigencies of modern society, unless it be framed with express reference to the existing forms of unbelief, and the prevailing tendencies both of philosophical thought and of popular opinion. It is quite possible, indeed, to construct a scheme of evidence on this subject out of the ample materials which the storehouse of nature affords, without entering into any discussion of the questions, whether Physical or Metaphysical, which have been raised respecting it. But this method, although it might be sufficient for many, perhaps for most, of our readers—for all, indeed, who come to the study of the subject with reflective but unsophisticated minds—could scarcely be expected to meet the case or to satisfy the wants of those who stand most in need of instruction; the men, and especially the young men, in all educated communities, who, imbued with the spirit of philosophical speculation, and instructed, more or less fully, in the principles of modern science, have been led, under the influence of certain celebrated names, to adopt opinions which prevent them from seriously considering any theological question, and to regard the whole subject of religion with indifference or contempt, as one that lies beyond the possible range of science,—the only legitimate domain of human thought. In such cases (and they are neither few nor unimportant), it may be useful and even necessary to neutralize those adverse presumptions or "prejudicate opinions," which prevent them from considering the evidence to which Theism appeals, and to review the various theories from which they spring, so as to show that they afford no valid reason for discarding the subject, and no ground for alleging that it is not fit to go to proof. It is true that we must ultimately rely, for the establishment of our main positions, on that body of natural and historical evidence, which depends little, if at all, on any of the Theories of Philosophical Speculation, or even on any of the discoveries of Physical Science; but it is equally true that the evidence, however conclusive in itself, cannot be expected to produce conviction unless it be candidly examined and weighed; and if there be anything in the existing state of public opinion which leads men to regard the whole subject with indifference or suspicion, to conceive of it as a problem insoluble by the human faculties, and to treat Theology as a fond fancy or a waking dream, it were surely well to examine the grounds of such opinions, to expose their fallacy so as to counteract their influence, and to refute those theories which prevent men from judging of the evidence as they would on any other topic of Inductive Inquiry. In adopting this course, we are only following the footsteps of the profound author of the "Analogy," who finding it, he knew not how, "to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry," set himself, in the first instance, to prove "that it is not, however, so clear a case that there is nothing in it;"—this preliminary proof being designed to neutralize objections, and to disburden the subject of all adverse presumptions, so as to be judged on its own proper and independent merits. We are imitating, too, the example of another sagacious writer on a kindred theme, who thought that "Apologists had paid too little attention to the prejudices of their opponents, and had been too confident of accomplishing their object at once, by an overpowering statement of the direct evidence, forgetting that the influence of prejudice renders the human mind very nearly inaccessible to both evidence and argument."[1]
If this method was ever necessary or expedient, it is peculiarly so in the present age. Opinions are afloat in society, and are even avowed by men of high philosophical repute, which formally exclude Theology from the domain of human thought, and represent it as utterly inaccessible to the human faculties. They amount to a denial, not merely of its truth, but of its very possibility. They place it among the dreams of the past—with the fables of the Genii, or the follies of Alchemy, or the phantoms of Astrology. They intimate, in no ambiguous terms, not only that Catholicism is effete, and Christianity itself dead or dying, but that Theology of every kind, even the simplest and purest form of Theism, must speedily vanish from the earth. Admitting that the religious element was necessarily developed in the infancy of the species, and that its influence was alike inevitable and salutary during the world's minority, when it was placed provisionally "under tutors and governors," they proclaim that mankind have outgrown the vestments which suited them in earlier times, and that now they must "put away childish things." That such sentiments have been publicly avowed, that they have been proclaimed as the scientific results of speculative thought, and that they have been widely circulated in the vehicles both of philosophic discussion and of popular literature, will be proved by evidence, equally sad and conclusive, in the succeeding chapters; in the meantime we refer to them merely for the purpose of showing that, in so far as their influence prevails, they must necessarily tend, unless they be counteracted by some effective antidote, to generate such a prejudice against the whole scheme of Theology, whether Natural or Revealed, as may be expected, especially in the case of young, inexperienced, and ardent minds, to prevent them from entertaining the subject at all, or examining, with serious and candid interest, any kind or amount of evidence that might be adduced in regard to it. For this reason, we propose to review the various Theories or Systems which may be said to embody and exhibit these prevailing tendencies, to meet our opponents on their own chosen ground, and to subject their favorite speculations to a rigorous and sifting scrutiny; and this, not for the purpose of proving our fundamental position, for that must rest on its proper and independent evidence, but simply with the view of neutralizing the adverse presumptions which prevent many from considering its claims, and proving that it is a subject that demands and deserves their serious and sustained attention.
Taking a comprehensive view of European Science and Literature during the last half century, we may discern the great currents, or chief tendencies, of speculative thought, in so far as it bears on the evidences and doctrines of Religion, in several distinct but closely related systems of opinion, which, whether considered severally or collectively, must exert, in proportion to their prevalence, a powerful influence on the side of Atheism. These systems may be divided generally into two great classes, according as they relate to the substance or to the evidence of Theism, to the truths which it involves, or the proofs to which it appeals. The interval between the first and second French Revolutions may be regarded as the season during which the theories to which we refer were progressively developed, and ultimately consolidated in their existing forms. The germ of each of them may have existed before, and traces of them may be detected in the literature of the ancient world, and even in the writings of mediæval times; nay, it might not be too much to affirm that in the systems of Oriental Superstition, and in the Schools of Grecian Skepticism, several of them were more fully taught in early times than they have yet been in Modern Europe, and that the recent attempts to reconstruct and reproduce them in a shape adapted to the present stage of civilization, have been poor and meagre in comparison with those more ancient efforts of unenlightened reason. What modern system of Skepticism can rival that of Sextus Empiricus? What code of Pantheism, French or German, can be said to equal the mystic dreams of the Vedanta School? What godless theory of Natural Law can compete with the Epicurean philosophy, as illustrated in the poetry of Lucretius? The errors of these ancient systems have been revived even amidst the light of the nineteenth century, and prevail to an extent that may seem to justify the apprehension, frequently expressed on the Continent of late years, of the restoration of a sort of Semi-Paganism in Modern Europe; and it is still necessary, therefore, for the defence of a pure Theism, to reëxamine those ancient forms of error which have reäppeared on the scene after it might have been supposed that they had vanished for ever. For the very tenacity with which they cleave to the human mind, and their perpetual recurrence at intervals along the whole course of the world's history, show that there must be something in the wants, or at least in the weaknesses of our nature, which induces men to tolerate and even to embrace them. But the chief danger, as we conceive, lies in those new, or at least newly organized, theories that have only recently received their full development in the Inductive and Scientific pursuits which constitute the peculiar glory of modern times; and which, commencing with the era of Bacon and Descartes, and gradually matured by Newton, Leibnitz, and their successors, have at length issued in the construction of a solid fabric of Science. To Theism there is no danger in Science, in so far as it is true, for all truth is self-consistent and harmonious; but there may be much danger in the use that is made of it, or in the spirit in which it is applied. In the hands of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, the doctrine of Natural Laws was treated as an ally, not as an antagonist, to Theology; in the hands of Comte it becomes a plea for Atheism; and even in the hands of Combe an argument against a special Providence and the efficacy of prayer. Here the danger is the greater just by reason of the acknowledged truth and practical value of the Inductive Philosophy; for its certainty is so well ascertained, and its manifold uses so generally appreciated, that if it shall come to be regarded as incompatible with the recognition of God and Religion, Society will soon find itself on the verge of universal Atheism. And this is the fearful issue to which the more recent schools of speculation are manifestly tending. The first French Revolution was brought about by the labors of men who fought against Christianity, at least ostensibly, under the banner of Deism or Natural Religion; the second Revolution was consummated under the auspices, not of a Deistic, but of an Atheistic philosophy. The school of Voltaire and Rousseau has given place to the school of Comte and Leroux. The difference between the two indicates a rapid and alarming advance. It may not be apparent at first sight, or on a superficial survey; but it will become evident to any one who compares the two French Encyclopædias, which may be regarded as the exponents of the reigning philosophy of the two great revolutionary eras. The first, the Encyclopedie of D'Alembert, Voltaire, and Diderot, sought to malign and extirpate Christianity, while it did frequent homage to Natural Theology; the second, the "Nouvelle Encyclopedie" of Pierre Leroux and his coadjutors, proclaims the deification of Humanity, and the dethronement of God!FOOTNOTES:
[1] Bishop Butler, "Analogy," Preface, p. II.
Dr. Inglis, "Vindication of the Christian Faith," p. VI.
CHAPTER I.
GENERAL VIEW OF ATHEISM.
Before entering on a detailed discussion of the theories to which it appeals, it may be useful to offer some general reflections on Atheism itself, its generic nature and specific varieties, its causes and springs, whether permanent or occasional, and its moral and social influence, as illustrated alike by individual experience and by public history.
By Atheism we mean any system of opinion which leads men either to doubt or to deny the Existence, Providence, and Government of a living, personal, and holy God, as the Creator and Lord of the world. In its practical aspect, it is that state of mind which leads them to forget, disown, or disobey Him.
We are met, however, at the outset, by a previous question, Whether Atheism be a real or even a possible thing? a question which was wont to be discussed by divines under the head, an dentur Athei?[2] and which has recently been revived by the strong protestations of some philosophic writers, who deny not only the existence, but the very possibility of Atheism. On this point the policy which infidels have pursued has been widely different at different times. On some occasions, they have sought to exaggerate the number of Atheists, claiming as their own adherents or allies a large majority of the intellectual classes, as well as whole tribes or nations of barbarians, in order to impress the public mind with the conviction that belief in God is neither natural nor universal; at other times, they have sought to allay the prejudice which avowed Atheism seldom fails to awaken, by disclaiming much that had been imputed to them, by professing a sort of mystic reverence for the Spirit of Nature, and by denying that their speculations involve a disbelief in God. In following these opposite courses at different times, they have been actuated by a politic regard to the exigencies of their wretched cause, and have alternately adopted the one or the other, just as it might seem, in existing circumstances, to be more expedient either to brave or to conciliate public opinion. It is incumbent, therefore, on every enlightened advocate of Christian Theism to exercise a prudent discretion in the treatment of this topic, and to guard equally against the danger either of being led to exaggerate the extent, or of being blinded to the existence of the evil. Nor is it difficult to discover a safe middle path between the opposite extremes: it is only necessary to define, in the first instance, what we mean when we speak of Theism or Atheism respectively, and then to ascertain, in the second place, whether any, and what, parties have avowed principles which should fairly serve to connect them with the one system or with the other. A clear conception of the radical principle or essential nature of Atheism is indispensable; for without this, we shall be liable, on the one hand, to the risk of imputing Atheism to many who are not justly chargeable with it—a fault which should be most carefully avoided;[3] and equally liable, on the other hand, to the danger of overlooking the wide gulf which separates Religion from Irreligion, and Theism from Atheism. There is much room for the exercise both of Christian candor and of critical discrimination, in forming our estimate of the characters of men from the opinions which they hold, when these opinions relate not to the vital truths of religion, but to collateral topics, more or less directly connected with them. It is eminently necessary, in treating this subject, to discriminate aright between systems which are essentially and avowedly atheistic, and those particular opinions on cognate topics which have sometimes been applied in support of Atheism, but which may, nevertheless, be held by some salvâ fide, and without conscious, still less avowed, Infidelity. And hence Buddæus and other divines have carefully distinguished between the radical principles or grounds of Atheism, and those opinions which are often, but not invariably, associated with it.[4]
But it is equally or still more dangerous, on the other hand, to admit a mere nominal recognition of God as a sufficient disproof of Atheism, without inquiring what conception is entertained of His nature and perfections; whether He be conceived of as different from, or identical with, Nature; as a living, personal, and intelligent Being, distinct from the universe, or as the mere sum of existing things; as a free Creator and Moral Governor, or as a blind Destiny and inexorable Fate. These are vital questions, and they cannot be evaded without serious detriment to the cause of religion. A few examples will suffice to prove our assertion. M. Cousin contends that Atheism is impossible, and assigns no other reason for his conviction than this,—that the existence of God is necessarily implied in every affirmation, and may be logically deduced from the premises on which that affirmation depends.[5] His reasoning may possibly be quite conclusive in point of logic, in so far as it is an attempt to show that the existence of God ought to be deduced from the consciousness of thought; but it cannot be held conclusive as to the matter of fact, that there is no Atheism in the world, unless it can be further shown that all men know and acknowledge His existence as a truth involved in, and deducible from, their conscious experience. Yet he does not hesitate to affirm that "every thought implies a spontaneous faith in God;" nay, he advances further, and adds that even when the sage "denies the existence of God, still his words imply the idea of God, and that belief in God remains unconsciously at the bottom of his heart." Surely the denial or the doubt of God's existence amounts to Atheism, however inconsistent that Atheism may be with the natural laws of thought, or the legitimate exercise of speech.
Yet the bold paradox of Cousin was neither an original discovery
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